Plato sort of disregards the classical forms of state for a moment (monarchy, oligarchy, democracy) to restate Theocracy – seems to conclude that an appeal to the maintenance of these forms is an appeal to 'might is right' and not virtue. There I think I disagree with Plato and agree with Hobbes, whose sentiments in Leviathan say that the fundamental law of nature once Commonwealth is instituted is to keep and maintain whatsoever form that State be as fundamental to their peace and security. Then I'd have to even echo Aristotle, who says that the forms of government have their own virtues, despite disagreeing with his opinion that political & economical differ – so it isn't just might is right but the maintenance of the virtue of their respective forms as fundamental, I think monarchy certainly has virtues to consider with its formal qualities and it isn't just a question of might is right when I talk about keeping the form of government as a fundamental law. I've mentioned before, that where Aristotle talks about a pre-eminent ruler in Politics, there's a precedent to that in Plato's Laws as well (& I think elsewhere): >There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows: –Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint even oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and united. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind. But if either a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires–wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an individual,–then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this tale of mine. … Besides Aristotle's description of a pre-eminent king who must be a god among men (& likewise Plato) – whom both sort of deny it, albeit leaving some ambiguity enough with this bar set so high for other philosophers and monarchs to try and make firm that standard. –Where they will say that a monarch is a distribution of higher mind and to the state a mastermind. This is the sentiment Gaius Caligula echoes, >As a shepherd has a higher nature than his flock does, so also the shepherds of men, i.e. their rulers, have a higher nature than do the peoples under them. Which I'm under the impression Gaius Caligula is referencing. … With conservatives, I'd agree that some laws are fundamental – Bodin likewise agrees that while there is a sovereign power above human laws (& a capacity of sovereign power to change laws) – this is notwithstanding the fundamental laws, the laws of God and Nature – and Hobbes likewise writes down a list of his own laws of nature (in a more modern tradition and what he considers the fundamental laws of sovereignty) – the fundamental laws of sovereignty and the succession law is upheld, but not every ordinance and policy of states is fundamental. … I think conservatives favor custom and a more conventional understanding of law – not even because they are against the rule of men and appeal to the rule of law as the rule of God – but because in legislation, again, they're married to Aristotle's opinion in Politics, that a composite brain has a better capacity to govern than the rule of a wise man… so they favor rule by custom and precedents as conventionally understood between numerous heads and assemblies, by numerous courts, so that the laws are their convention like with Aristotle's appeal to a partnership of clans rather than unitary thinking. Some conservatives will pretend that these laws fall from heaven and no men are instituting them – but when some commentators say that there are no legislators or law-makers, just the discovery of laws – there is still the question of who institutes those laws upon divination and discovery, and who has the authority, and that is the divination and discovery of sovereignty… so sometimes this is just useless semantics about whether someone is 'instituting' or 'discovering' laws. I'd just echo K. James VI & I, who says, >Not that I deny the old definition of a King, and of a law: which makes the King to be a speaking law, and the Law a dumb king. And people will hate me for expressing that, maybe Plato would also, but I have to agree with King James VI & I's sentiments there (yes, I don't deny Bracton would say that the law makes a king (that is, the law fundamental, so the king should uphold the law – but certainly there's the case to be made that considering the fundamentals of sovereignty, that the king is a speaking law, and the ship of state and policy are under the king – which Bodin would agree, that when he says that the king is absolute, he doesn't mean the fundamental laws, law of God or nature, but for policy, and that Plato in maintaining this must mean for the magistrate). If anyone reading this thread or my audience would question that, I'd also think it's worth repeating that Plato in Republic also speaks along these lines (if not a fault of the translation). >But, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world is so incredulous. >Yes, one is enough. >The ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing, and the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them? >Certainly. … Now Plato brings up a decent point that there's no measure without measure, how should a ruler do that without the laws, but like King James VI & I says the rulers themselves are a speaking law and some distribution of mind – I don't think a ruler should keep a policy the same – especially if it is not fundamental – for instance, Hobbes talks about not dieting the Commonwealth (which conservatives who talk about this neverchanging policy want to maintain at times): >In the Distribution of land, the Commonwealth itself, may be conceived to have a portion, and possess, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to sustain the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Public Land, or of any certain Revenue for the Commonwealth, is in vain; and tends to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of mere Nature, and War, as soon as ever the Sovereign Power falls into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of money, or too hazardous in engaging the public stock, into a long, or costly war. Commonwealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Public Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, diverse Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and diverse services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Public, but in his Natural capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those public Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Commonwealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appears by the late Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vain, to assign a portion to the Commonwealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative. … What Hobbes means here is that it is insufficient to set apart some crown lands and permanently rely upon them: at times, new taxes are to be levied because sometimes the what is sufficient to maintain the public in the past is not what it is sufficient in the future, and regardless the whole commonwealth should carry the burden (since the strength of the entire commonwealth is there) and not a some royal estates for the king's natural person. So it isn't best to diet (like a food diet) when in some circumstances it will need more strength, but conservatives thinking in light of the rule of law want to also keep that stagnant at all times. –I could never see myself agreeing with that mentality, –I think even in light of succession law, that the sovereign still nevertheless has the capacity of pick his heir if he really thinks that his heir is incompetent (in the maxim, that the father of a family has power of life and death over his children and can make and unmake his sons), if the succession calls for it (which some monarchists will disagree with me about). Archibald Kennedy >There is, in every Family, a Sort of Government without any fixed Rules; and indeed it is impossible, even in a little Family, to form Rules for every Circumstance; and therefore it is better conceived than expressed; but perfectly understood by every Individual belonging to the Family. The Study of the Father or Master, is for the Good of the Whole; all Appeals are to him; he has a Power, from the Reason and Nature of Things, to check the Insolent, or Indolent, and to encourage the Industrious: In short, the whole Affairs of the Family are immediately under the Care or Direction of the Father or Master; and this is a natural Prerogative, known and acknowledged by every Man living, who has ever had a Family, or been any Ways concerned in a Family, in all Ages and in all Places. His Majesty, as he is our political Father, his political Prerogative, from the like Circumstances and Reasons, is equally necessary. And this political Authority has been allowed the supreme Director, in all States, in all Ages, and in all Places; and without it, there would be a Failure of Justice. This sentiment here to absolute monarchists – this is the natural law, that Kennedy says is a natural prerogative – albeit flexible for circumstances that come to chance, this is what is seen as fundamental and consistent with sovereignty, that while there are fundamental laws, there is also flexibility when it is needed and that it is impossible form rules for every circumstance (*without needing to later redress things that happen by accident).

Bertrand de Jouvenel, who is a critic of modern states and absolutism, notes while there are some things are appropriated from Plato (like the idea of a unitary / corporatist polity), there are corollaries we'd rather forget as well: De Jouvenel: >The idea was won all hearts by reason of the twofold movement which it brings to light, though, to be sure, the two paths join in the end. Hegel turned it to good account: recalling that Plato in his Republic had rigorously stressed the importance of the citizens remaining undifferentiated and had seen in that the essential condition of social unity, Hegel asserted that the characteristic of the modern state was, contrarywise, to allow a process of differentiation, by which an ever growing diversity could be ranged within an ever richer unity. >But there would be grave dangers in so avowedly normative an approach as this. It would in the first place build an ivory tower which was so remote from reality that advice issuing from it would be unable to influence the citizens of the real world: so it was with Plato's Republic, which was built on just these foundations. Worse still, the attraction exercised by pretty pictures of this kind lures men into importing them into reality and leads them on to tyrannical actions to achieve their ideals: there is a tyranny in the womb of every Utopia. >So we joined with the ruling preoccupation of Plato and Rousseau: moral harmony within the the City. And with that we come up against the corollaries so displeasing to their modern admirers that they generally contrive to forget them. These corollaries, which are four in number, all stem from a single principle: so great a blessing is moral harmony that whatever tends to weaken it must be dangerous and bad. >The first corollary is smallness: the City must not become too large, for otherwise, when the number of citizens is too great for intimacy between them to be possible, the harmony will be less intense. This first corollary I've considered when 8chan.moe was filled with 4chan refugees and had too many people in one board, but eh – the absolutists discarded this idea and said that a Commonwealth could be whatever size, not so limited to 5040 as an ideal city… I don't have the exact quotes where that is discarded, but I'll try to find it later. This is an issue right libertarians will call out for sure, because cities are extremely populous and have way more than 5040, but they appeal to smaller communities nonetheless. >The next is homogeneity: the introduction as citizens into the City of foreign elements (metics), whose upbringing has given them a different outlook from that of the original inhabitants, would spell disaster to that psychological harmony of the whole. >The same anxiety is the reason for the third corollary: it is dangerous to allow the entry into the city of beliefs and customs from the outside, for these create a motley variety of reactions and practices. These corollaries I'm okay with remembering, but other people would rather forget (*cough, cough* like people around /leftypol/ and other circles). >The fourth corollary is that of immutability, and condemns as a source of disc0rd the spirit of innovation in all its forms, as introducing disharmonies. This I have a love-hate relationship with: again, I'd ideally keep the fundamental laws, but then again not every law is fundamental and circumstances call for innovations at times. I can see why that conservative sentiment would appeal to others, like De Jouvenel, and he'd chide us for not wanting to remember this corollary, but it really is stupidly stagnant and too static, so I have to disagree with the traditionalists on that front. >So dangerous indeed is the logic immanent in this system of thought that the dream-state which Plato conceived in his reaction against Athens, condemner of Socrates, could have endured the presence of Socrates even less than Athens could! At Athens the condemnation of Socrates might not have happened; in the Platonic republic it was bound to occur. >(Footnotes): For a denunciation of the oppressive character of the institutions conceived by Plato, see my Power, Book III, ch. VII. Almost simultaneously there appeared in London a work of vast erudition and great intellectual vigour by Professor Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. The ideas developed in the present chapter often join hands with those of Professor Popper's fine book. I think for myself I'd rather forget parts of corollary #1 and some of the pretenses with #4 that is like an intestinal blockage. I am ngl I have a love-hate relationship with these antique teachings and see the usefulness of modern practices that aren't entirely in line with them.

These quotes from King James VI & I, Archibald Kennedy, Gaius Caligula, and Jean Bodin – they reflect the attitude of Plato's Statesmen, which is a bit more lenient to the expertise of a ruler than Plato's Laws. It gives a bit of leeway for the art and expertise of a ruler (albeit it generally sides with the rule of law over an expert, Plato's Statesmen does concede that the rule of an expert, when it truly happens, is very desirable)… but it is ambivalent and sets the state for criteria that absolute monarchists would hate being refurbished in Aristotle's work (who carries where Plato left off in doubting the rule of a wise man even further with democratic input). But quotes like King James VI & I >Not that I deny the old definition of a King, and of a law: which makes the King to be a speaking law, and the Law a dumb king. Is followed by in Plato's Statemen: >But the law is always striving to make one;—like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one. Which is probably the only instance of a Greekoid (and particularly Plato) re-considering it. James VI & I must have been keen on this work, because in his Counter-blast to Tobacco, James VI & I describes himself as a royal physician for the body-politic in a way not too unlike the description there. The aim here I gesture is what the traditionalists generally stress more (where I just stress the virtues of monarchy) is the virtue of aristocracy and good government itself, the true science and art to govern – whether by rule of a skilled pilot or imitation of that skillful pilot in policy/law. The absolutist tendency is to straightly uphold the distinction of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy plain and simply in conjunction with sovereignty. … There are three things I suppose I could for sure count on in making a foil between Plato and Aristotle to bolster Monarchy (on Plato's part): 1. On account of Aristotle putting monarchy with the unity of a household, saying too much unity is bad for the political state – on the other, Plato's affirmation of it. 2. Plato affirms the rule of a wise man while Aristotle has his food argument. 3. Plato believes a household / state have the same science, Aristotle does not (& Aristotle thinks monarchy is proper to household, freemen / equals to state). … That is about it. I'd like to think of other obstacles for bolstering Monarchy from antiquity: - Where is State Corporatism / Unitary Politics aligned with Monarchy? (It really shouldn't need explanation, but that I haven't found in antiquity but in absolutist writers). - Anything to juxtapose to Aristotle's heroic kings? (I think this is a big deal on account of hereditary monarchy, how to show that monarchy started out from the unity of a monarch rather than a partnership of clans electing him… on a baseline level, I think Bodin's insistence on Lordly Monarchy being the origin of states and other monarchies is show monarchies weren't instituted by a partnership of clans – the partnership of clans, food argument (so the importance of election to choose the best king), political/economical are different all might converge behind the heroic kings for Bodin and that's why he insists on the first king ruling by force, so there could be unity at the origin of states so the unity of a monarch is justified in summoning the estates… rule by force in Bodin's view is justified to consolidate order in the very beginning (like a prelude to Hobbes) where people at their natural liberty lack any firmer order / unity and the inadequacy of this friendship of hosts to do it). … I don't think there is anything in classical tradition like this view of Bodin's where force is justified in the beginning to consolidate unity and contrive the beginning of policy… I'd guess that is innovation on his part (that Hobbes would follow through with fear being a unifying force & the distinction of sovereignty by institution / sovereignty by acquisition in light of Lordly Monarchy)… I don't think traditionalists or other monarchist peers would be satisfied with this like I am, they want more precedent for this idea in political science (I guess Bodin's citation of numerous antique historians and the Bible might do it, but the idea of Lordly Monarchy being justified might be an innovation). Bodin testifies, >And that more is, the rule that wills that the law of arms should take no place where there be superiours to do justice… that where there is no superiour to command, their force is reputed just. The problem with the first kin … I personally have seen the appeal for something like fear to be a unifying force and bring an arbiter into the picture… anything that calls for an arbiter over a partnership of hosts is of interest, but that is also an innovation to be considered with sovereignty. (That won't appeal to other monarchists, esp. if it isn't backed up with the precedent / some antique names). … This is what I have been contemplating in a scheme to justify monarchy and form a counter-narrative to the other meta-narrative in the monarchist community against monarchical absolutism… Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut lineage in political thought from antiquity to modernity for it – it is a cobbled mess to build a meta narrative that way… I sympathize with Hobbes' sentiments on the unreliability of the classical tradition for this agenda – maybe a few appeals would work, but the other half needs innovation, that is my opinion.

Plato Republic Book 5: >This, then, Glaucon, is the manner of the community of wives and children among the guardians. That it is consistent with the rest of our polity and by far the best way is the next point that we must get confirmed by the argument. Is not that so?” “It is, indeed,” he said. “Is not the logical first step towards such an agreement to ask ourselves what we could name as the greatest good for the constitution of a state and the proper aim of a lawgiver in his legislation, and what would be the greatest evil, and then to consider whether the proposals we have just set forth fit into the footprints of the good and do not suit those of the evil?” “By all means,” he said. >“Do we know of any greater evil for a state than the thing that divides it and makes it many instead of one, or a greater good than that which binds it together and makes it one?” >“We do not.” >“Is not, then, the community of pleasure and pain the tie that binds, when, so far as may be, all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths?” >“But the individualization of these feelings is a dissolvent, when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings to the city and its inhabitants?” “Of course.” “And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ and similarly with regard to the word ‘alien’? >“Precisely so.” >“That city, then, is best ordered in which the greatest number use the expression ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ of the same things in the same way.” Plato State Corporatism / Unitary Policy: State like an individual man (from Republic). >And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. >For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for ‘integration’ >with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that suffers, and that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger. And for any other member of the man the same statement holds, alike for a part that labors in pain or is eased by pleasure.” >“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.” >That is the kind of a state, [462e] then, I presume, that, when anyone of the citizens suffers aught of good or evil, will be most likely to speak of the part that suffers as its own and will share the pleasure or the pain as a whole.” “Inevitably,” he said, “if it is well governed.” >But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.” … >Then will not law-suits and accusations against one another vanish, one may say, from among them, because they have nothing in private possession but their bodies, but all else in common. >So that we can count on their being free from the dissensions that arise among men from the possession of property, children, and kin.

Plato Laws: >For there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose… The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.'. Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost —whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second. … >Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of the land. >Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the Gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead. >Of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no children of their own. >How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws. … >Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:—Good friends, honour order and equality, and above all the number 5040. >Secondly, respect the original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and is given to him by God

While MLP's song Our Town shows a bleak picture from Plato's Community of Pleasures & Pains, MLP Equestria Girls Cafeteria song (I think) shows a better depiction seen in Plato's Statesmen of a royal weaver (Twilight Sparkle is that royal weaver here). Plato Statesmen: >The whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by common sentiments and honours and reputation, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State. >This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and enfolding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.

There are similar themes in Hobbes' political works & Plato I direct my attention to. … To list: #1. In the preface to Hobbes' Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes talks about navigating between Authority and Liberty. Hobbes writes, >For in a way beset with those that contend on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much Authority, ’tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. Now Plato touches on this theme in his work Laws, contrasting Athenian Liberty and Persian Despotism. >With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other. A theme like this also appears in Hobbes work De Cive on the cover: Imperium and Liberty.

#2: 2. Unitary / State Corporatism: All men as one man. >The error concerning mixed government [constitutionalism] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men. And also from Hobbes: >And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it,) is "One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence.” Now compare with Plato Republic: >And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. & >“The same,” he said, “and, to return to your question, the best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism.” & >But we further agreed that this unity is the greatest blessing for a state, and we compared a well governed state to the human body in its relation to the pleasure and pain of its parts.” & >That the other citizens too must be sent to the task for which their natures were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity. & Plato Laws: >That all men are, so far as possible, unanimous in the praise and blame they bestow, rejoicing and grieving at the same things, and that they honor with all their heart those laws which render the State as unified as possible

#3 Hobbes stresses the Sovereignty as the Soul of Commonwealth and a consisting with the generation of a people. Thomas Hobbes >For the Sovereign, is the public Soul, giving Life and Motion to the Commonwealth [State]. >[The Sovereign] relation to the City is not that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man has a will, that is, can either will, or nill. Just as unity comes first, sovereignty is the soul and unity of a people, breathes life into them. … Which is what Plato maintains in Laws – the priority of the soul – and Sovereignty is understood to be the soul of commonwealth.

#4 Political & Economical no different. I believe this is also maintained. … <Hobbes / That a Family is a little City >"Propriety receiv'd its beginning, What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vain, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sons of a Family have propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things." Thomas Hobbes >And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same has not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth [state] or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union & >A great Family if it be not part of some Commonwealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Sovereignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Sovereign. & >And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families <Plato / There won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household & the bulk of a small city >Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him. Aristotle writes in Politics, >Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and a master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. Aristotle: >For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same Aristotle: >The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head: >whereas constitutional rule is a government of freemen and equals.

#5: In Hobbes Leviathan, there is a Sword and Crosier in one body, and the sovereign is also a pastor. King James VI & I: >As your office is likewise mixed, betwixt the Ecclesiastical and Civil estate: for a King is not mere laicus, as both the Papists and Anabaptists would have him, to the which error also the Puritans incline over far. In Plato's Laws, religious and civil offices are aligned for cultivate civic virtue. In Plato Statesmen: >…In Egypt, the King himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistrates, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by him who has been chosen by lot to be the King Archon.

#6: Jean Bodin testifies Plato having a composition of a Tyrannical & Popular estate (which he later goes on to deny any mixed constitutionalism whatsoever and say it was purely popular). >Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonwealth, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannical and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, having established a Commonwealth not only Popular, but altogether also Popularly governed; … Looking at Leviathan, it's exactly that: Hobbes isn't a mixed constitutionalist, but Leviathan is a composition of Monarchy and the People: >The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are citizens, that is to say, Subjects… >And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seem a Paradox) the King is the People.

#7: Beginning with the constitution of individuals and some families at odds – & later deference to an arbiter to hash out their differences and establish peace. <Hobbes: The Sixteenth, Of Submission To Arbitrement; [OR, the NECESSITY of an arbitrary power] >And because, though men be never so willing to observe these Laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former whereof, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; therefore unless the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, "That they that are at controversy, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator." … This is a theme in Hobbes, and in Plato there is also a turn of deference of some Arbiter because of conflicting laws / customs of private families: these are in conflict, Plato establishes, but the unity of some Arbiter(s) takes what laws the private families have and decides which are best to keep from the families altogether… Which aligns with the absolutist agenda for deference to some arbiter to bring unity… in Hobbes case it is by virtue of fear (and I believe compulsion, but also a bit of persuasion through education), but for the Classics it is generally love of justice and laws and virtue… and persuasion over compulsion (which I can imagine with some very powerful music or eloquence to bring people together?) … Anyways, what I would point to is in Plato's Laws: Plato Laws >Athenian: And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well. –This right here is really the basis of what Hobbes gets at with a war of all against all – but more importantly, at this point, there is a failure to have a concord of hosts / partnership of clans, it is futile… every man will have the extent of his laws and boundaries in another man's boundaries, interceding and conflicting…. there must be deference to an Arbiter. >Athenian: The next step will be that these persons who have met together, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to choose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live. … IN the same way, King James VI & I talks about this process above and being an arbiter: King James VI & I >This I must say for Scotland, and I may truly vaunt it; Here I sit and govern it with my Pen, I write and it is done, and by a Clerk of the Councell I govern Scotland now. >Of this I can best resolve you: for I am the eldest Parliament man in Scotland, and have sit in more Parliaments than any of my Predecessors. I can assure you, that the form of Parliament there, is nothing inclined to popularity. >About a twenty days or such a time before the Parliament, Proclamation is made throughout the Kingdom, to deliver in to the King's Clerk of Register (whom you here call the Master of the Rolles) all Bills to be exhibited that Session before a certain day. Then they are brought unto the King, and perused and considered by him, and only such as I allow of are put into the Chancellor's hands to be propounded to the Parliament, and none others: And if any man in Parliament speak of any other matter then is in this form first allowed by me, The Chancellor tells him there is no such Bill allowed by the King. >Besides, when they have passed them for laws, they are presented unto me, and I with my Scepter put into my hand by the Chancellor, must say, I ratify and approve all things done in this present Parliament. And if there be any thing that I dislike, they raze it out before. If this may be called a negative voice, then I have one I am sure in that Parliament.

#8: Persuasion. While fear and compulsion are predominate factors for Hobbes, he did take note of persuasion too. People are entitled to their private conscience and opinion even, but publicly show obedience and worship and conformity. Plato advocates persuasion numerous times over compulsion: like a freeman's doctor or a slave's doctor (the freeman's doctor persuades his patient before acting, but a slave's doctor just does it anyways). And recommended a preamble for the laws (persuading people). Hobbes: Public instruction >I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Sovereignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Sovereign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himself in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

#9: Community of pleasures and pains through a Cult of Personality. If there is one innovation here every monarchist should consider, it is the advent of the Cult of Personality, or work of One Person on the multitude. Plato Republic >And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ Plato Republic - Community of Pleasures & Pains >And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow? >No doubt. >Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is disorganized This is a controversial point, but Hobbes first talks about appetites (pleasures) and aversions (pains) of the private persons, then consolidates all the persons into One Personhood. <Thomas Hobbes The Generation Of A Common-wealth >The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: & >This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, “I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner.” & >This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. …

This (in)famous picture of ᴉuᴉlossnW with a plurality of Si, si, si, si, si, si behind his personage represents this unity of the representer and a cult of personality Imagine every Si behind ᴉuᴉlossnW as "Mine" and "Thine" like Plato says – it seems like the condition is met where all citizens utter in a unanimous voice "mine" and "thine" – without abolishing private property, but I'll talk about that soon. … Consider the Community of Pleasures and Pains, this is cultivated in Hobbes' Leviathan and private appetites and private aversions are not allowed to override the Leviathan: >But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. … Now, considering private property: Hobbes allows the distribution of private property, but it is limited by the popular consent, the distribution from the Sovereign is also in accord with unanimous "mine" and "thine" in a way. <Hobbes: Propriety Of A Subject Excludes Not The Dominion Of The Sovereign, But Only Of Another Subject >From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consists in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Sovereign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Sovereign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he represents,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. So particular subjects are limited in their estate, all property is limited by an absolute power – as well as subordinate corporations – by a sovereign, who has in his cult of personality "thine" and "mine" of every subject in a plurality of voices brought unto one voice. ... Those are similarities I've taken note of (despite their differences in philosophy).

Robert Filmer: >Also before him [Aristotle] the Divine Plato concludes a Commonweal to be nothing else but a large Family. & >This it seems he learnt of his master Plato, who in his third book of Laws affirms, that the true and first reason of authority is that the father and mother, and simply those that begat and ingender, do command and rule over all their children.

Max Stirner in the Ego and its Own -- an anarchist work -- talks about this. >"But only look at that Sultan who cares so lovingly for 'his people'. Is he not pure unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself for his people? Oh, yes, for 'his people' . Just try it; show yourself not as his, but as your own; for breaking away from his egoism you will take a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on nothing but himself; he is to himself all in all, he is to himself the only one, and tolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of 'his people'."

Plato in Laws (Book 2) talks about educating a populace with holidays and seasonal festivities: By continually shaping a people with these seasonal festivities year round, over and over, they'll have the habit and loyalty divested. ... I agree that a regime not only aims to take the education of the youth in whatever institution of schooling / education, but also makes holidays with festivities, songs, clothing, nice sweets -- to associate all those happy memories with the regime itself. This will keep the loyalty and mood of the public in a trance with the regime. ... Today there are "secular holidays" or public holidays like in North Korea Day of the Sun or Day of the Shining Star -- In the US, the 4th of July (and more contemporary, Pride Month) and other numerous examples. This is pretty critical in educating a populace: to have a cult of personalty, to have control of public education, to form holidays and seasonal festivities. ... Plato notes to take advantage of the pleasures and pains people feel at a young age: bring those happy sensations in line with the regime. & have a cult of personality that makes the identity of people in league with the festivities they celebrate and the clothes they wear, popular customs that will distinguish a people from the rest, so they feel independent and more attached to these customs because they'll be trademarks to their identity... Plato links this cycle of holidays / festivities to the stability of States, by inducing habits by a long trial of festivities and celebrations, people will be less inclined to abandon that State. ... A good example is Christianity today: Christmas wins the hearts of youth early on, gives them gifts and candy, builds happy memories with their parents, and keeps Christianity alive even if people say that Christmas being heavily commercialized has subverted the themes and teachings of Christianity, I'd say to the contrary it is probably helping keep Christianity strong and relevant, even mostly secular people love Christmas. ... Seasonal change and natural imagery is also important to take into consideration and the mood people, what they see.

Max Stirner: >But only look at that Sultan who cares so lovingly for 'his people'. Is he not pure unselfishness itself, and does he not hourly sacrifice himself for his people? Oh, yes, for 'his people' . Just try it; show yourself not as his, but as your own; for breaking away from his egoism you will take a trip to jail. The Sultan has set his cause on nothing but himself; he is to himself all in all, he is to himself the only one, and tolerates nobody who would dare not to be one of 'his people'.

Another item Hobbes has from Plato's Laws: Plato: >That the man who receives the portion should still regard it as common property of the whole State Which Hobbes does. The Sovereign / "The People" by a community of pleasures & pains as a whole says "Thine" & "Mine" in a way Hobbes writes, >Propriety of a subject excludes not the dominion of the Sovereign, but only of another subject.

I'd rather have a naked king than the mere clothes of a king. You can toss all that window dressing away and keep the bare minimum: the crown, the regalia, the ceremonies, -- toss that all of this into the trash -- I'll take a naked king over this. A father remains a father no matter what clothes he wears or even if he was naked. I'm not into monarchy because I like ceremonies, traditions, the fancy clothes, customs -- these items are lifeless without someone.

Hobbes' Leviathan might be the very foundation for modern states -- it might not be an idea of statehood built on the Summum bonum or highest good, but arguably I'll point this out just to show the importance of understanding this difference. Hobbes Leviathan promotes a kind of State Corporatism (State as one individual) like Plato advocates. Hobbes also, on the cover of De Cive, contrasts Imperium and Libertas -- like Plato does between Persian Despotism and Athenian Liberty. Plato Republic: >And the city whose state is most like that of an individual man. >The best governed state most nearly resembles such an organism. Check. Hobbes makes the State like that of an individual man. Plato Republic: >so the entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a unity. That is also confirmed in Hobbes' Leviathan: for Hobbes his State is more than just a partnership of clans bonded by a common idea, like Orthodoxy is. In Hobbes words: >This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a real Unity of them all, in one and the same Person And >The error concerning mixed government has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the union of many men. Now consider also: Plato Laws: >That the man who receives the portion should still regard it as common property of the whole State Which is also found in Hobbes Leviathan: >Propriety of a subject excludes not the dominion of the Sovereign, but only of another subject. Or What about this community of pleasures and pains that Plato writes about in Republic? Where everyone feels mine and thine together. Plato Republic: >And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains–where all the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow? >And the chief cause of this is when the citizens do not utter in unison such words as ‘mine’ and ‘not mine,’ Hobbes Leviathan reduces all wills, that is, all mines and thines, unto one will in unison: >that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: The measure of the State for Hobbes in a way is Plato's community of pleasures and pains. >But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. So while it is true that De Jouvenel for instance is complaining about Modernity and Liberalism, De Jouvenel is also complaining about the true lineage of Plato's ideas in modernity in a way: that modernity is more centralized is in a way a fulfillment of Plato's ideas of more corporatist and unitary government.

Monarchies will make a comeback sooner or later. Yet monarchists shouldn't count on the Bourbons, Orléanists, or Bonapartists. The Law monarchists should oblige is the Law of Nature: Empires rise and fall, & generally old dynasties don't come back after being deposed 100+ years. I'd say 70 years maximum. The current state of monarchist legitimatism does more harm than good: 1st, monarchists are too easy to depose a ruler to begin with on any pretense of tyranny; 2nd, while Restorationism is feasible within 1 or 2 generations, 100+ years Restoration of an old dynasty is hoping for a miracle and does more harm than good, because it becomes a Scorched Earth policy against potential new monarchies that might develop, likely by Caesarism (which monarchists despise, but really that is how it usually happens). Sadly, the overwhelming majority of monarchists are stupidly legitimatist. I wish monarchists were as stupidly loyal when the dynasties in question were alive (& not stupidly loyal when they are finally dead), but monarchists are the opposite and are easy-going about overthrowing a monarchy in question when it is alive but stupidly loyal upon overthrow and successful usurpation – an effort to take it back and trying to restore a regime is considerable within 70 years, but 100+ years it is a lost cause. … If monarchists were smart, they'd be endorsing Caesarism and trying to slip Christian crowns over Christian-affirming, rightwing would-be Caesars or just push for hereditary dictatorship or go back to thinking how monarchies sprout up naturally (as if there were no dynasties to begin with).

I deem Windsorism & Habsburgism to be cringe malefactors for Online Monarchists in terms of suffocating us with their style of royalism and overall being the contemporary face of monarchy. People complain about Absolutism being the face of monarchy, but it is not & I wish it was.

>"A State may be strong when it serves a greater destiny when it feels itself to be the instrument of a great destiny for a people. Otherwise, the State is tyrannical." >“Spain cannot be defined by having its own language, or by being a race, or by being a set of traditions, on the contrary, Spain is defined by an imperial vocation to unite languages, unite races, unite peoples and unite customs in a world destiny; Spain is much more than a race and much more than a language, because it is something that is expressed in this way, from which I become more and more sure that this is the unity of destiny throughout the world." >“All humans are brothers, white and black, all because many centuries ago, in another distant land, one martyr shed his blood and sacrificed himself so that this blood would establish love and brotherhood among people on Earth.” — José Antonio Primo de Riverа This is a great Catholic sentiment, but I wouldn't deem it as very Fascist. >"That is a grave problem, since the transcendent conception that rules over the Catholic Church contradicts the immanentist character of the political conception of Fascism." - Giovanni Gentile Fascism is totalitarian, statist & nationalistic, because of its immanentism; it values life in the here and now & Fascism values the State/Nation/Race & Language (these aren't mere pawns in the game of the High Church & Fascism isn't apathetic to the political like Spiritual Sword > Political or Church sword > political sword). I feel this way strongly because Hitler blames the Habsburgs not caring about race/nationalism and saying the Habsburgs put Religion in service of Politics; but what is responsible for every grievance of Hitler towards Habsburgs is what José Antonio Primo de Riverа is saying.

My response to Hitler is the Habsburgs were apathetic towards Germanization/German race, because they were fixated on another blood relationship to such a greater extent: Christ's blood & the Catholic Church. People love the Habsburgs because they are the Catholicism™ the dynasty. I think Hitler's assessment for his contempt of the Habsburgs is fundamentally wrong. What is responsible for Hitler's dislike of the Habsburgs isn't a lack of nationalism or that they put Religion in service of Politics, but the other way around: Habsburgs put Politics in service of High Church/Religion (to its own detriment). I think maybe Hitler understood this, and that is why out of all the Habsburgs he likes HRE Joseph II. This hits me close also as a hereditary monarchist (who values dynastic patriotism)… Because contrary to Hitler, I don't believe dynastic patriotism is at fault for his grievances towards the Habsburgs… They hate monarchies either for being too Liberal or too High Church I talked about Windsorism & Habsburgism: I feel these two dynasties adequately sum up why people hate Monarchy either for being too Liberal (Windsorism) or too High Church (Habsburgism). It doesn't have to be that way.

DPRK is an example of how dynastic patriotism works with nationalist sentiment (contrary to Hitler). I always point this out to White Nationalists who love North Korea, but hold strongly to Hitler's maxims against dynastic patriotism: because North Korea seems like the exception to their rule (that hereditary leadership is fundamentally at odds with a people). The reason why European dynastic patriotism doesn't cultivate nationalist sympathies is the neglect of their own dynastic patriotism for the Church's dynastic patriotism. Many Christian royalists and White nationalists are blind to this notion: primarily due to the reason they restrict this view to High Churchism and neglect in Politics, in a way High Churchism has blinded royalists to the idea of the monarchy before being being their familial abode and White nationalists in reaction to them and in harmony with High Church royalists juxtapose the dynasty to nationalist aims because of it… Western Europeans aren't used to thinking in these terms, albeit it is very manifest spiritually, but politically all the hallmarks of mixed constitutionalism and apathy towards kings are there in spite of High Church sentimentality. –This is what I'm responding to. … The Nation can be a Family with the King as their Father. There can be such as thing as King and Kin (King and Country). Monarchy can embody the corporatist ideal of a nation unified under One Person, so the people can have an identity emanating from their King as a family.

Dynastic patriotism for European monarchies coming to fruition has lineage. You simply take Christ's blood and let the King be like a Christ unto his Nation: That is, to make the Nation a family under their King. We just need to stress the importance of Politics where it is due. … When I say a King to be a Christ to his Nation: I don't mean it should be a blood relationship for everyone, but the opposite. Christ's blood is a blood relationship everyone drinks around the globe. Christ is an extension of what a King does for his Nation to all humanity.

The reason why various churches portray Christ as different races is because that is what a King is for his Nation, their archtype and cult of personality at their core of their identity: Where there is no Christianity, a King or Emperor would have fulfilled this role naturally. As Christian Monarchy is concerned, K.James I had it right in stressing the Kingdom as a family under their King (which is lacking in Windsorism/Habsburgism). Albeit too much High Church to the detriment of your own core identity and that relationship: like I see with Habsburgism and to a latter extent the partisanship of many Catholic Jacobites in sacrificing this in turmoil with Low Church Protestants as I explain here: >>7990 Who both are very adamant about Christ is King, but by the radiance of that statement very blind to the King before their eyes and they family they could be with that King in their Kingdom.

North Korea. Ancestor worship & blood relationship between the Leader & his people: White nationalists don't understand this in Monarchy, because many nationalists are blind to what dynastic patriotism is because they restrict this view to the Church & not Politics. It is a mixture of Catholicism and Aristotle's mixed constitutionalism that has made Europeans so inept at nationalism and East Asians as better nationalists. That is a controversial opinion of mine: East Asians do nationalism better than Westerners. Their nations are what White Nationalists really want: big national blocs, monoliths of their ethnicity. This is the case because they have always been big families truly united around their imperial dynasties and kings: whereas political pluralism in Aristotle's mixed constitutionalism has denied this and Catholicism has only made this idea a spiritual reality but not politically manifest amongst the people themselves. … GK Chesterton is vindicated in his writing that European peoples have always been a motley patchwork of peoples because of their attachment to mixed constitutionalism and the primary of High Church. <The Judaism of Hitler >Hitlerism is almost entirely of Jewish origin. >But what i frankly and flatly deny, in history as a whole, is that any Nordic Men ever brought anything in the way of an idea into the world. The Germans came in due course to describe their piracy as imperialism; but they borrowed the idea of imperialism from the Romans. They produced a sort of Prussianism that was praised or blamed as militarism; but they borrowed the idea of militarism from the French. The German Emperors modelled themselves on the Greek Emperors and the Roman Emperors. The greatest of the Prussians did not even conceal his contempt for Prussia. He refused to talk anything but French, or to exchange ideas with anybody except somebody of the type of Voltaire. Then came the liberal ideas of the French Revolution, and the whole movement of German unity was originally a liberal movement on the lines of the French Revolution. Then came the more modern and much more mortally dangerous idea of Race; which the Germans borrowed from a French man named Gobineau. And on top of that idea of Race, came the grand, imperial and insane idea of a Chosen Race, of a sacred seed that is, as the Kaiser said, the salt of the earth; of a people that is God's favourite and guided by him, in a sense in which he does not guide other and lesser peoples. And if anybody asks where anybody got that idea, there is only one possible or conceivable answer. He got it from the Jews. >But among the thousand and one ways in which Semitism affected Germanism is in this mystical idea, which came through Protestantism. Here the Nordic Men, who are never thinkers, were entirely at the mercy of the Jews, who are always thinkers. When the Reformation had rent away the more Nordic sort of German from the old idea of human fellowship in a Faith open to all, they obviously needed some other idea that would at least look equally large and towering and transcendental. They began to get it through the passionate devotion of historical Protestants to the Old Testament. That, of course, is where the joke comes in; that the Protestants now wish to select for destruction what nobody else except the Protestants had ever wanted to had ever wanted to select and set apart for idolatry. But that is a later stage of the story. By concentrating on the ancient story of the Covenant with Israel, and losing the counter-weight of the idea of the universal Church of Christendom, they grew more and more into the mood of seeing their religion as a mystical religion of Race. >But it is true that it all began with the power of the Jews: which has now ended with the persecution of the Jews. People like the Hitlerites never had any ideas of their own; they got this idea indirectly through the Protestants, that is primarily through the Prussians; but they got it originally from the Jews. In the Jews it has even a certain tragic grandeur; as men separated and sealed and waiting for a unique destiny. But until we have utterly destroyed it among Christians, we shall never restore Christendom.