>>11093 >Are there even any conflicts on the horizon in macaco lands? No, everything always ends in samba and feijoada, practically all South American presidents are aligned with the São Paulo Forum, a communist event where they organize and discuss policies for the whole of Latin America, a great little club for communist dictators. The chance of any conflict in these parts is nil.

>>11093 >Are there even any conflicts on the horizon in macaco lands? Regular violence (50 thousand homicides per year) could already be considered a civil war, with cartels as insurgent groups. But nothing that looks like a regular war or insurgency is in the horizon. Maybe FARC or another insurgent group in the Amazon might dare to make another cross-border raid. For the past few decades, the nightmare scenario in the Brazilian military establishment is a First World country or coalition (e.g. France) invading a resource-rich area in the Amazon on behalf of "the environment" or "oppressed Amerindians". But this won't happen under the current leftist government. >How does jungle warfare even look like? In counterinsurgency: meticulously collect information with undercover agents, then behave like an insurgency, dispatching small, stealthy teams of special forces to decapitate the insurgent leadership and hunt down the remaining insurgents (the Araguaia model). In an invasion by a superior conventional military: apply the Vietnamese model (insurgency until the enemy loses the will to occupy your territory) In a conventional war with a peer adversary: Brazilian doctrine holds that this should be solved with a quick offensive, but that sounds unlikely, even if a lot of helicopters were used. In this theatre, civilian transport is mostly through rivers, roads are scarce and muddy. Hence the Navy should have some gunboats, but small transport aircraft will offer faster logistics from urban hubs to forward bases. Then use helicopters from those bases to the frontline. Maneuver forces will have to be light infantry, partly drawn from the local population or at least with local guides. Just as other terrains dominated by light infantry, forces will disperse into smaller groups and fight by infiltration. For a lengthy exposition, you could read this article by a Brazilian colonel, with American commentary at the end: https://web.archive.org/web/20170202122248/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/amazon/amazon.htm >How is the military tackling the cartels ? Outside of border security, tackling the cartels is constitutionally a police, not military attribution, unless civilian authorities call in the Armed Forces in exceptional circumstances. But exceptional circumstances happen all the time, so you get >>11035. Garrisoning troops in the favelas was mostly a thing of the past decade, though. So nowadays the military isn't doing much. >What do you think would be the best way to remove cartels out of these southern shitholes? The Bukele model is highly successful, but El Salvador is tiny and even a strong dictatorship would find it difficult to scale that model to a continent-sized country. In any case, cartel removal would require a serious and creative counterinsurgency. It's not a generic "war on drugs" but a war between the state and insurgent groups defying its sovereignty (this is also a strong case for using the military, as the defense of national sovereignty is one of its normal constitutional attributions). Consider geography, for instance. The classical Rio favelas are defined by their density and inaccessibility to motorized transport - an impenetrable human hive. Maybe some highways should be blasted into them to give the state easy access. This will remove a lot of houses, but new settlements can be built elsewhere, or on unused land and buildings in the city center. Furthermore, the classical favela is built on a steep slope with access to a wooded mountaintop, offering escape routes for the insurgents whenever the state invades the area. Maybe there should be permanent military/police garrisons atop the largest massifs. None of this is happening, cartels administer favelas right beside upper-class neighborhoods, where the state is supposed to be at its strongest. If they've never been dealt with it's because they're part of the system and serve some purpose for the ruling classing. A better scenario under the current system is São Paulo, which has lower crime rates and is generally far better run than Rio. Apparently the dominant cartel has a deal with the government and enforces a reduced level of violence.

The Ministry of Defense's operational requirements for a medium range/altitude AA system, published in 2020, are in this pdf. They want launchers and missiles that can simultaneously engage with at least 16 targets at a maximum altitude of at least 15 km and a maximum horizontal range of at least 40 kilometers. Item 1.1, however, specifies that it must be adaptable to a maximum range of 80 kilometers with no modifications outside of replacing/adapting the launcher and missiles (so the radar and other systems must be flexible). Airlift capability for KC-390 and C-130 transports is a must. The Navy wants sealift capabilities for the marines. Back in 2014 MBDA partnered with Avibras to offer a CAMM-launching ASTROS. Its maximum range would be above 25 kilometers, so it wouldn't fit the 2020 requirements. But 40 km is still a modest distance. The USAF would have an easier time flattening Brazil than it had in Iraq.

There are seemingly no ATGMs in operation. Several sources mention the Milan and Eryx were used in the past but have been discontinued, and it is exceedingly difficult to find information on them. Ten Spike LR2 launchers were purchased in 2021, but they haven't even arrived. An indigenous ATGM, the MSS, is tested every once in a while, but don't get your hopes up, this program is ongoing since 1986. I conclude the top brass is simply oblivious to this decades-old technology and information on their success in any war in recent years doesn't filter up to the High Command, which would much rather keep buying outdated MBTs and other flashy items just to keep up their hollow prestige. What's worrisome is that few seem to worry at all about ATGMs, which would provide some cost-effective deterrence for a poor military without threatening neighboring countries.

>>11098 weapons without a huge industrial overhead cost like man-portable systems are less desirable because they are harder to control and can threaten more complex weapons systems like the MBTs you mentioned. Tools useful for guerilla warfare are also useful for civil insurgency.

>>11099 (you don't sage just because you disagree) So the top brass will never buy ATGMs because it thinks cartels will get them? If that were the case, the Air Force would've never allowed the Armed Forces to buy MANPADS.

>>11100 (saging so as not to keep a thread at the top with incessant shitflinging between two streloks.) The Air Force is confident in their ability to circumvent portable anti-air weapons with planes that are invisible to radar. Why do you think that there is no interest in portable anti-air lasers? If you think about it there's nothing better for taking down distant, fast moving targets than a weapon with a velocity matching the speed of light in the same medium. It's not that we don't have the technology, it's that it's asinine to invent a counter to your own weapons systems.

>>11101 >(saging so as not to keep a thread at the top with incessant shitflinging between two streloks.) If you mean the ones in past months, ignore them. Content (researching shithole country armed forces and reading the official sources critically) should be bumped. >The Air Force is confident in their ability to circumvent portable anti-air weapons with planes that are invisible to radar. But this is a shithole country we're talking about. The Brazilian Air Force isn't confident on anything, the best it has is the Gripen. Yet back in the 90s, when it didn't even have those, it consented to the Army's purchase of Iglas, and even got some of them for its base security teams. The Navy bought MANPADS for its marines, too. Nobody vetoed them on the basis that Rio cartels would be shooting down Air Force jets. And no jets have been shot down. Likewise, fears of cartels or other Brazilian insurgents getting ATGMs wouldn't be brought up. That's why I attribute the current situation to the High Command's vanity and technological conservatism. From a Third World perspective, weapons might even be produced locally, but they won't be bleeding-edge technologies. Only actual military powers can push industrial boundaries. What a sensible Third World, low-budget military should do is select among existing technologies those with the greatest cost-effectiveness for destroying an invader's expensive hardware. A poor investment for a high-tech military might be the best for a shithole country. Hence, jungle infantry brigades would ideally have large stocks of MANPADs, as a hypothetical invader would rely a lot on helicopters. A resource-rich, "pacifist" Third World military's rational purpose is to maximize the cost of a high-tech invasion.

So is Argentina gonna have a civil war because of the boomers?

Venezuela is saber-rattling over the Esequibo, the western half/two-thirds of Guyana it has always claimed. It's sparsely populated and has oil offshore. This motivates speculation on a Malvinas-style irredentist war. Guyana's irrelevant armed forces might tempt Maduro with an easy victory, but it would be a stupid move. There aren't even roads over the border, western Guyana is covered in undeveloped jungle. If you request an overland travel route from Georgetown to Venezuela, Google Maps will instruct you to head south into Brazil and then back north in the Boa Vista-Georgetown road. Maybe Venezuela can win if it tries hard enough with aerial and amphibious assaults and light infantry trekking through the jungle. But the United States would almost certainly intervene. Focused as it may be on Israel and Ukraine, there's no way they'd allow a landgrab war in their backyard. If Venezuela had to rely on aerial and naval supply routes to the occupied territory, those would be easily cut off by an USN carrier in the Caribbean. The alternative scenario would be Lula allowing Venezuela to move and supply its invasion force through Brazilian territory. The ruling party in Brazilia has always been friendly to Bolivarianism. However, this would anger the military and invite American retaliation. If American carriers pass by our waters, or American missiles hit Venezuelan supply lines in Brazil, there might be an impeachment or even coup d'état in Brasília. For those in power, nothing good can come out of this. Lula should be wise enough to avoid this path. >>11103 If they didn't have it back when coups and terrorism happened every other day, they won't have it now.

>>11104 If I was a chicom who is ready to invade Taiwan once the US too distracted with other conflicts, then I would definitely try to fan the flames over there. I don't expect that to happen anytime soon, but maybe it's a good idea to keep a tab on such potential conflicts and see if there is a pattern.

>>11104 Retard here, why would USA bother intervening? To make sure Russia and China don't intervene themselves?

>>11106 South America has always traditionally been the U.S.'s playground so they simply don't tolerate anyone else meddling in their sphere of influence. It's a split between defence concerns, glow nigger revenue raising and political prestige that means the US will probably, so long as they are able, keep South America exclusively under their control.

>>11104 Didnt USA make a deal with Venezuela to buy their oil in large quantities? If so messing with vuvuzela would cause a lot of economical fuckery.

>>11108 Yeah over the last two years of skimmed article headers it seems the US has started opening up to Venezuelan oil.

Under present circumstances, any outcome to this conflict would be negative for Brazil. If Venezuela annexes the Esequibo, our northernmost state (Roraima) would lose a weak neighbor and find itself surrounded on three sides by an unstable and potentially dangerous neighbor. Venezuela might give us the Pirara, a formerly disputed border zone lost to British Guyana, but it's not worth the price. If the Venezuelan invasion is annihilated by the United States, a permanent American military presence would be established in the region. And in either case, Brazil loses credibility as a regional power and guardian of stability. Under Bolsonaro's government, there'd already be a major military buildup in the border and explicit statements in support of Guyana's territorial integrity. Rumors of such a buildup already exist, but there's zero evidence for anything other than routine exercises by the small Roraima garrison, and every reason to believe the government is telling the military to stay put. The ruling leftist coalition wants a weak, humiliated military. Lula is pragmatic enough to give the generals concessions but he won't let them have the spotlight. Maduro's timing is no surprise. I still don't believe he'll invade. He just wants a cheap popularity boost to distract his populace from their economic woes. If he's too loud, an American carrier will show up in the area to dissuade an actual war. But imagine what the Argentine general staff was thinking back in 1982. "We have the most modern military in the continent, whereas the United Kingdom gave away its entire empire for free, it's a decaying power, gradually losing its ability to project power, and even if they can do it, their population won't have the stomach to fight a far off colonial war". And as it turned out, a decaying First World power could still beat a relatively modern Third World expedition. History might repeat itself. >>11106 For the same reason Russia intervened in the 2020 Azeri invasion of Artsakh. Latin America is the oldest part of the American empire and it'd lose credibility as a hegemon if it allowed this war with no consequences. And there's another reason: https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/locations/guyana >ExxonMobil is firmly established in Guyana, operating an office in Georgetown, with numerous ongoing exploration and development operations offshore. ExxonMobil Guyana is the first and largest oil producer in Guyana, and is the operator of the Stabroek, Canje and Kaieteur Blocks offshore. Over 25 significant discoveries have been made since May 2015, with production beginning in December 2019 from the Liza Phase 1 development.

The only viable transport in undeveloped parts of the Amazon (broadly speaking, as the Guyanas aren't even part of the Amazon basin) is by river. There's apparently one viable invasion route for Venezuela through the Cuyuni river. That's better than relying on the sea, but would still be vulnerable to American retaliation. On closer inspection: https://www.britannica.com/place/Cuyuni-River >Although the river is approximately 350 mi (560 km) long, rapids impede navigation. Its economic significance is less as a transportation artery than as a source of alluvial gold and diamonds.

>>11108 >>11109 Not many choices when you've drained the strategic reserves selling it to China to keep prices down. Saudis don't really give a shit either since Venezuelan oil means they don't have to drill more and expose their own socialist welfare state.

>>11110 >ExxonMobil If there is one American oil company that seems to always pop up whenever shits a-brewin' it seems to be these chucklefucks. I swear they must be a direct arm of the US government at this point.

>>11111 Maybe they can revive bicycle battalions? You could carry a stinger or a kornet on the back of a bike. Or is South American jungle different than Malaysian jungle?

>>11114 Did the Japanese ride their bicycles through intact jungle? Wikipedia claims they rode "usually along plantation roads, native paths and over improvised bridge". All of those only exist around settlements. Bicycle infantry might move through trails in the jungle, but even trails only exist where people live. Can't use them in empty jungle. Might as well consider Guyana an island. Lula's statements on this topic are weak-worded and refrain from explicitly stating Venezuela shouldn't invade, but he has said he's against a war, has sent one of his advisors to Caracas to inform them of his stance and keeps contact with the Guyanese president. The Brazilian Ministry of Defense has been clearer, and said the Venezuelan military won't be allowed to move through Brazilian territory to attack Guyana. However, Brazil cannot physically prevent the Venezuelan army from occupying northern Roraima. A single infantry battalion, a field artillery group and a mechanized cavalry squadron (i.e. company) are all the Brazilian Army has in the state. As of the 29th of November, this squadron is now, on paper, a regiment (i.e. battalion). 20 Iveco LMVs will be transferred from southern Brazil over the course of this month. Too little and too late, it's not like this regiment assembled at the last minute could stop Venezuelan T 72s. In fact, not even Leopard 1s could do much, and would take a monumental logistical effort to deploy them on the northern border. On paper it should be possible to quickly airlift a couple battalions of light infantry to the north, but it remains to be seen if they have a serious state of readiness and the Air Force has readily available cargo capacity. No ATGMs to fight off the T 72s, either. Poor roads will be a bigger obstacle than the Brazilian Army.

>>11115 >Japanese riding through the jungle The more apt comparison would be that shitshow of what the shitshow of the Burma road portion right before the Burma-China border. I don't know if that Venezula is able to pony up ~200k labor to build a proper road.

>>11116 Maybe force a load of jungle aboriginals to build it?

>>11117 Even if they build a road in their territory, there's nothing on the other side. They'd have to open a road and occupy new territory at the same time, and their advance would be as fast as their workers can clear the path. American retaliation might arrive long before Venezuelans reach their objectives.

>>11118 But can the US justify murdering all those aboriginals as they bomb the Venezuelan rd?

>>11115 I'd imagine getting caught with your pants down and then proceeding to not defend your own territory would be viewed very poorly by the general populace and Brazilian military regardless of preparedness or capability.

>>11120 Generals and the Ministry of Defense have spent the past decades on pompous talk of "strategic rapid action forces", a "readiness system", the Amazon as the #1 priority of national defense and so on. But now, when there's a real chance of external aggression, the northern border is basically defenseless. The top brass deserve to be humiliated. Roraima's population doesn't deserve Venezuelan occupation, though. They didn't even vote for Lula.

>>11121 To be honest defending the border itself in military context is retarded since it does not give you time to react to the incoming attack.

https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-12-06/venezuela-guyana-dispute-maduro-mobilizes-the-army-and-announces-annexation-of-essequibo.html Shit is on lads !

So how does the French Foreign Legion play into this? Don't they run sting operations on gold smugglers in Guyana? >>11121 >They didn't even vote for Lula. Welp, that alone ensures their fate of being occupied territory.

There is no money.

>>11125 There are a lot of whites in argentina, eh?

>>11127 My lol is veery beeg.

>>11127 Thank you very much anonymous I fucking love me some reddit screenshots Can you post more so that we may enjoy them?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hd3HrbjaVMk HistoryLegends dropped a new video about the Favela Wars.