>>15358 >I don't think it's worthwhile trying to find terminology that won't give certain people the wrong idea. Verdun was an offensive, that doesn't mean it restored maneuver warfare to WWI. I think it's just not the same. The whole line is on a constant offensive, the offensive actions aren't really indicative of any grander undertaking than that. >I think that at a certain point the Ukrainians will be so thinned out that even if they don't collapse or concede, the only thing continuing to fight the war as a war of attrition will only serve to waste Russian money and humor the Ukrainians delusions. One could argue that this has been the case for a while now. >I think that eventually Ukraine will reach a point where they simply cannot contain a Russian breakthrough, and then Russia will be able to launch a decisive offensive which ends the war. Ukraine seems willing to fight to something close to the last man, so waiting for them to collapse on their own is pointless. The question instead is at what point will Ukrainian units be adequately depleted. I think that point may already have been reached, and that if it has, then Russia is probably already carefully staging their forces for the decisive blow. If it hasn't, then Russia will simply continue to attrit Ukrainian materiel and manpower until it is time to do so. I don't think this will happen for two reasons. One is the way technology shaped this war, i.e. small unit actions becoming a necessity means that Russians won't commit large formations even when Ukraine is close to breaking, and two, because Ukraine's supply and intel will never run out. It will be necessary to either make them concede, or kill enough of them to cause a collapse. >At this point Russia probably has the manpower to keep the whole front line going while also conducting a large attack. Even a breakthrough of relatively limited depth that cuts off a section of the front could have a massive impact on the war. If it went fast enough it could allow them to outflank neighboring units and wrap up the line like in ancient warfare Ukraine is fuckhuge. Even if they commited every reserve to a banzai and took the whole of Harkov from the Northern flank for example, it still wouldn't guarantee a victory, with the cost in casualties being prohibitive. >Ukraine did it at Kursk. I'm not saying that Russia doesn't have more to worry about due to American satellite coverage, but they could do it. It'd take a long time to prepare and get everything staged, but Russia is clearly very patient. I could see them pulling their best equipment off the front one piece at a time over the course of months and hiding it away in camouflaged positions in order to assemble a strike package. The Kursk debacle was more due to Russian mistakes than Ukrainian capability. And as you point out, Ukraine has American and other intel working for it. >They're obviously going to do that. A longer front line favors Russia. It does, but Russia is juggling priorities here. Economics, human resources, public opinion, stocks of equipment, etc.

>>15360 >the good stuff that's left Most of the "good stuff" at this point is new production. > after hot dog man's thunder run I imagine that more of it than ever is being kept close to Moscow I don't think that's likely. The wild ride was a one off, because the only military force operating in Russia right now that doesn't answer to the Russian state is the North Koreans, and they aren't going to try to storm Moscow outside of Norktard's fantasies. >I was expecting that a lot of the good stuff would have been thrown at the Kursk incursion It seems like Russia didn't consider Kursk to be a major threat. They just treated it like another place to grind down Ukrainian manpower. >I've seen recent videos of both sturmladas (with that term used loosely) and some pretty gruesome concertina wire shenanigans. No need to get so butthut over a bit of flippancy. Your whole post was indistinguishable from NAFO shit. You weren't being realistic but flippant, you were being retarded. >>15361 >I think it's just not the same. The whole line is on a constant offensive During WW1 both sides were trying constant offensives. An offensive during a positional war of attrition entails a major logistical investment and force commitment to enable a period of abnormally high operational intensity. During WW1 the places where the front moved the least were frequently the places with the most intense fighting. I think that Russia would have been wise to husband its resources over the winter and through the spring in order to have more available for a large summer offensive. >One could argue that this has been the case for a while now. I suspect it may be, but it's impossible to tell from the outside. It might be impossible to tell from the inside too. Actually identifying where that point is and when it's been reached will be a very hard task for the Russian general staff, and being wrong about it could lead to a disastrous failed offensive. It's better to err on the side of caution, plus once you do assess that it's now time to smash the Ukrainians you have you assemble your package and carefully plan out how you're going to do it. >I don't think this will happen for two reasons. But you said that it might already be the case that continuing to wage a war of attrition against the Ukrainians is pointless. If a war of maneuver is impossible then what alternative do you suggest? Ukraine has proven to be unwilling to negotiate, so Russia will need to defeat them militarily. >One is the way technology shaped this war, i.e. small unit actions becoming a necessity means that Russians won't commit large formations even when Ukraine is close to breaking In the current positional fighting large force concentrations aren't practical, but that's largely due to the insane concentration of force along the front line. Both sides fire assets are all in range of the front line, so the space between being seen and being killed is very small. Given the limited number of places a person can hide in the tiny amount of space that is actually being fought over, larger forces can't really accomplish much more than smaller ones. Most of Ukraine's forces are concentrated within a few dozen kilometers of the front line though, so in the event of a breakthrough the search area goes from a few tree lines and villages to hundreds or even thousands of square kilometers, and the time it takes for Ukraine to put fires onto the targets it locates will be much longer. So a breakthrough in force with a large mechanized unit could avoid the bulk of Ukraine's forces, which are mostly mobiks sitting in trenches, and instead would just have to deal with the relatively small mechanized reserves that Ukraine has left. Doing so would be extremely difficult, since it'd require punching through every line of Ukraine's defenses before they can rush their mobile reserves to the fray to stabilize the front (or muscle through those too), but I think at this point many of Ukraine's positions are so lightly manned that there is probably some place on the front where that could be done. >two, because Ukraine's supply and intel will never run out. Ukraine's supplies of a lot of things have run out or nearly so. They aren't going to run out of everything completely, but they are very low on tanks, IFVs, artillery, and AA. Moreover even the stuff that they do still get supplied to them has to be transported to the front, which is why a breakthrough could work. Once a breakthrough is made the Russians could cut off highways and supply routes along huge sections of the front lines. As for intel, the intel they get from NATO is a powerful tool, but has serious limitations. Satellites aren't overhead at all times, and when the satellite looks at a place they still have to have analysts actually find stuff with them. In the event of a fast moving breakthrough the western intel would mostly be able to tell the Ukrainians where the Russians were a few hours ago. Still useful, but not nearly as much. >Ukraine is fuckhuge yes, that's why I think a breakthrough and subsequent maneuvers could be possible. Ukraine is fuckhueg but almost all of the defenses are concentrated along the front, so if Russia punches through some and reaches past the defenses, they could go hog wild with near impunity. >Even if they commited every reserve to a banzai If they conduct an offensive to breach Ukrainian lines quickly to make a breakthrough that doesn't mean they'd have to attack recklessly. There is no reason to assume a larger commitment of forces means those forces will suddenly become retarded and throw themselves at Ukrainian positions with no regard for their own safety. In fact it would probably result in proportionally less losses, since those forces would still be fighting the same Ukrainian positions, just with more help. >and took the whole of Harkov from the Northern flank for example I don't think an offensive would be aimed at something like Kharkov. During the positional fighting it's fine to just try and pursue territorial objectives, but the goal of a maneuver offensive would be to destroy the fighting power of the Ukrainian military. I think the best way to do this would be to cut their supply routes to the front. As I've pointed out before, even if they don't actually cut off that much of the front, if they make a section of the front collapse entirely instead of falling back to another defensive line, then Ukraine's whole defense is basically done for. At that point the sections next to that part will either collapse too or be outflanked, and so on down the line, while the mobile reserves would be busy trying to re open the supply lines. As more of the front collapses more Russian units would be freed up to launch more offensives or help finish off pockets of resistance. >The Kursk debacle was more due to Russian mistakes than Ukrainian capability. True, but I think that what the Russians did by mistake the Ukrainians are doing by necessity. They simply don't have the forces to man the whole front line very thoroughly, and unlike Russia it's not just a few places where their line is weak. >as you point out, Ukraine has American and other intel working for it. Yes, but that's not omniscient. If Russia is staging for a major offensive, they could do a lot to hide it. Russia is very patient and has a lot of very clever intel people, and it's not like the US can hide its satellites. A piece of equipment here and there being pulled off a train or truck while the spy satellites aren't overhead wouldn't be that hard to pull off, and over the course of months could allow them to squirrel away a substantial strike package. The soldiers involved don't need to know until shortly beforehand. >It does, but Russia is juggling priorities here. True, but they can stretch their front line thinner than they are. If they were to stretch to the point that Russian and Ukrainian troops were at equal density across the whole front line, then they'd have a lot of men left over. I'm not saying they should or will go to that extreme, and it's not quite as huge a difference as that would imply since unlike Ukraine, Russia actually rotates their troops, but they could still stretch the front line a lot without problems. >vid 1 Is that a Ukrainian drone attack in Russia? I only ask because I would think that Ukrainian men wouldn't just be hanging out in the street for fear of being bussified. >vid 3 what on earth is going on there? >vid 4 what's that IFV? With all the cages and shit I can't tell. Props to whoever made it for using Rammstein instead of fucking phonk.

>>15362 >But you said that it might already be the case that continuing to wage a war of attrition against the Ukrainians is pointless. If a war of maneuver is impossible then what alternative do you suggest? Ukraine has proven to be unwilling to negotiate, so Russia will need to defeat them militarily. I meant pointless from the Ukrainian side. From the Russian side, it is the only way to play. The alternative is as I said; keep killing them until there are none left. Sooner or later even the most retarded hohol will realize that the real enemy is the one sending him to the meatgrinder. >I think at this point many of Ukraine's positions are so lightly manned that there is probably some place on the front where that could be done. It's not a bug, it's a feature. The reason positions on both sides are so lightly manned is the ISR force multiplier combined with the necessity to stay hidden. A bigger unit leaves a much bigger footprint and 3 dudes in a treeline can buffer an attack for long enough to bring artillery and drone support to repel an enemy. The truth of the matter is, this is defense in depth and the guys on the forward position are the most expendable. They are meant to be a speedbump for the enemy while you concentrate fire on him. Now if you can imagine this mechanized force you describe having to stop at every such speedbump and losing say 10% of vehicles to each, then it will become combat ineffective pretty fast. And no, there is no way to bypass these speedbumps. >Ukraine's supplies of a lot of things have run out or nearly so. Even at a third of the shell production, that is still a lot of shells to send towards the Russians. >As for intel, the intel they get from NATO is a powerful tool, but has serious limitations. Satellites aren't overhead at all times, and when the satellite looks at a place they still have to have analysts actually find stuff with them. In the event of a fast moving breakthrough the western intel would mostly be able to tell the Ukrainians where the Russians were a few hours ago. Still useful, but not nearly as much. I think you underestimate how many resources US intelligence brings to bear. They are probably radar-mapping the area 24/7. >Ukraine is fuckhueg but almost all of the defenses are concentrated along the front It's not as simple as bypassing the Maginot. Ukraine still should have an overall manpower advantage over Russia in theatre, so they can dedicate a lot to the defense and containment of any push. >There is no reason to assume a larger commitment of forces means those forces will suddenly become retarded and throw themselves at Ukrainian positions with no regard for their own safety. Has nothing to do with regard to safety, if you gather the numbers for the type of thing you're suggesting, it's tens of thousands of troops with accompanying logistics, they will get noticed. They will get ATACM'd in the assembly area, their depots and logistics will get struck repeatedly, their assault will be anticipated and met with drone swarms and mined fields. Kind of like what happened with the Ukrainian dream offensive in 23. A traffic jam of burnt up armor. >True, but I think that what the Russians did by mistake the Ukrainians are doing by necessity. They simply don't have the forces to man the whole front line very thoroughly I really don't know where you got the idea Ukraine has holes in the frontline due to lack of personnel. Sure, there can be issues with units on the front due to attrition, and people need to be press-ganged into service because it's a death sentence, but they are still fielding a huge force. >A piece of equipment here and there being pulled off a train or truck while the spy satellites aren't overhead wouldn't be that hard to pull off, and over the course of months could allow them to squirrel away a substantial strike package. A layered intel gathering operation would still probably pick up on it. The soldiers involved don't need to know until shortly beforehand. Sounds like a recipe for disaster. >True, but they can stretch their front line thinner than they are. If they were to stretch to the point that Russian and Ukrainian troops were at equal density across the whole front line, then they'd have a lot of men left over. I'm not saying they should or will go to that extreme, and it's not quite as huge a difference as that would imply since unlike Ukraine, Russia actually rotates their troops, but they could still stretch the front line a lot without problems. Ukraine does rotate troops, what they don't do is demobilize them. Trust me, if troops didn't get rotation, they'd quit pretty fast. And again, Ukraine still probably holds the numerical advantage. > I only ask because I would think that Ukrainian men wouldn't just be hanging out in the street for fear of being bussified Nah, it's a Geran strike in Ukraine >what on earth is going on there? Need for Speed.

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>what's that IFV? With all the cages and shit I can't tell. Props to whoever made it for using Rammstein instead of fucking phonk. It kind of looks like an MT-LB from the shape of the hatches, but it looks off in my eyes, maybe because of the camera lens and angle.

>>15360 >concertina wire shenanigans Damn that concertina wire, always ruining the best laid plans!

>>15366 >I meant pointless from the Ukrainian side. Well that goes without saying. Ukraine really doesn't gain anything from this war at all aside from keeping the current regime in power. It's not like they'll manage to hold onto the ground Russia wants, much less regain their pre-2014 borders. >Sooner or later even the most retarded hohol will realize that the real enemy is the one sending him to the meatgrinder. I think they'll just be dead. If they were going to wise up they would have done so a long time ago. >It's not a bug, it's a feature. I have seen multiple pro-Ukrainian sources say that units are operating at 40% manpower or less, and I first heard that figure back in late 2024. I think that Ukraine would definitely man many of their positions more heavily if they could. >Now if you can imagine this mechanized force you describe having to stop at every such speedbump and losing say 10% of vehicles to each, then it will become combat ineffective pretty fast. But I do not imagine it proceeding like that. I imagine that the initial breakthrough would follow similar tactics to the current assaults, but would involve even more fire support and a much larger allocation of artillery and air support to enable them to proceed much faster. The larger numbers of Russian troops involved would not be committed all at once, but instead would be following behind to conduct assaults on subsequent Ukrainian positions immediately after the previous one falls. I don't think the mechanized force would be the same force conducting the breakthrough, they'd be separate and kept in reserve waiting for a breakthrough to exploit. The breakthrough would be conducted with mostly the same light infantry tactics they've been using, but they'd sustain the pressure at a much higher level and provide a lot more support. >Even at a third of the shell production, that is still a lot of shells to send towards the Russians. While my knowledge on the topic is spotty, I did see figures indicating Ukraine only has a few hundred howitzers left, so I think their major bottleneck would be tubes rather than shells right now. Russia can't completely disarm Ukraine, but there are a lot of areas where the west couldn't provide them with enough stuff even if they wanted to. Ukraine has already used up a huge chunk of NATO's stockpiles of Patriot missiles, and they aren't being produced fast enough to keep up with demand. They also probably won't get many more MBTs or planes. Another thing to keep in mind is that if Ukraine is getting a third of the shells Russia is, that increases the relative impact of Russian strikes on Ukrainian logistics. >I think you underestimate how many resources US intelligence brings to bear. I'm probably not. >They are probably radar-mapping the area 24/7. There are lots of things the Russians could do to about that even if they were, which I doubt. Russia has substantial EW capabilities including multiple platforms which are tailored to jam specific AEW&C radars. >It's not as simple as bypassing the Maginot. No, but it's also not as difficult as going through the Maginot line would have been. It might or might not be harder than punching through a WW1 trench line. I suspect it's probably easier, due to the difficulties that actually exploiting a breakthrough in the lines with WW1 technology would have involved, you would have needed a much larger and more sustained breakthrough back then for it to make a difference. >Ukraine still should have an overall manpower advantage over Russia in theatre Do they? I genuinely thought they were at a disadvantage right now in terms of total manpower. Maybe the figures I was saw were including Russian forces outside of the theater or were using a broader definition of what counted as being in the theater. >if you gather the numbers for the type of thing you're suggesting, it's tens of thousands of troops with accompanying logistics, they will get noticed. I envision things being more dispersed than you do. Any large gatherings would be done well inside of Russia, and the actual movements to the front would be done in thousands of small groups over the course of weeks where they would move into small concealed positions and entrenchments. It'd be a major undertaking, but one that is very similar to what they are already doing, just at a much larger scale. They'd be noticed, but Ukraine would not have much reason to believe a mechanized breakthrough was incoming, and even if they did, they wouldn't have much they could do about it. At worst if Ukraine rushes everything they can to reinforce that section of the front then they can just call things off and count the fact that other sectors would suddenly make a ton of progress as a win. >They will get ATACM'd in the assembly area, their depots and logistics will get struck repeatedly, That's why I was suggesting that they would pre position hidden caches of equipment and supplies near the front. It wouldn't be enough to sustain the whole operation, but it'd go a long way towards keeping the tempo up. >their assault will be anticipated and met with drone swarms and mined fields. The drones mostly have something like a 10km range, and the minefields don't extend much past the front line. It'd be infantry tactics like we've been seeing that would clear the way, the mechanized force would be there to exploit the breakthrough, not create it. Once the path is cleared of Ukrainian forces, the mechanized exploitation force would need to clear paths through the minefields and get through before the Ukrainians can respond. >I really don't know where you got the idea Ukraine has holes in the frontline due to lack of personnel. I don't think there are holes. I think that there are places where the speed bumps are a lot thinner on the ground than they should be, and the forces that are there to respond to those speed bumps being turned into potholes are much weaker than they would need to be in order to contain a major Russian attempt to make a breakthrough. >A layered intel gathering operation would still probably pick up on it. Russian intelligence is pretty famous for their deception operations. I don't think it'd be hard to convince HUMINT that it's just corruption or something and to create a convincing cover story. Or they could just move stuff around so much that things get lost in the noise. There are lots of options here. It doesn't really matter if western intelligence knows something is up, just that they don't know what is up. >Sounds like a recipe for disaster. The officers would need to know what's going on, but the troops already are doing the same stuff they'd be doing. The mobile element that actually exploits the breakthrough might need a week or two of notice so they can get briefed on everything, but they aren't going to be at risk of being taken POW until it's already too late for the Ukrainians, so as long as they keep them from telling anyone or posting about it on the internet, it should be fine. >Ukraine does rotate troops, what they don't do is demobilize them. Just today WillyOAM was talking about a post by a Ukrainian officer where he complained that his men sit in dugouts for months with no human contact at all getting food and water by drone. Some units might have the luxury of rotating, but not all of them. >Trust me, if troops didn't get rotation, they'd quit pretty fast. From what I've gathered Ukraine does have a pretty major desertion problem. >again, Ukraine still probably holds the numerical advantage. We really should dig into this. I'll try to take some time to tomorrow and see if I can find some credible estimates. >it's a Geran strike in Ukraine I figured. I think I read somewhere that there are Gerans with thermobaric warheads being made, do you have any clips of those? >It kind of looks like an MT-LB from the shape of the hatches I think you're right. I was thrown by the shape of the cage over the top which made me think it had a turret, which was reinforced by the dude laying on the front firing at the drone which I thought was coming from said turret.

>>1473 unemployed? looking for excitement?

>>15372 >Well that goes without saying. Ukraine really doesn't gain anything from this war at all aside from keeping the current regime in power. It's not like they'll manage to hold onto the ground Russia wants, much less regain their pre-2014 borders. Their strategic plan is to exhaust Russia, or make it too costly to continue. It is a logical plan and it might work. Killing the populace is just an added benefit

>>15402 >Their strategic plan is to exhaust Russia I think that's just "cope". They switched to saying that after the failure of the 2023 counteroffensive and the Kursk offensive(s). In reality it seems like they recognized that their only realistic hope was to break the stalemate and defeat the Russians with some bold maneuver which would destroy the Russian army in the field. Once it became clear that was impossible, they started to double down on their propaganda claims about casualty figures and claim they were inexplicably winning the war off attrition in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. >It is a logical plan and it might work. Lol no. You'd have to be fucking retarded to actually believe that. >Killing the populace is just an added benefit Killing the populace of Ukraine doesn't really benefit anyone, in spite of what conspiracists claim about Zelensky trying to use this as some mechanism to exterminate the white race or whatever they go on about.

>>15403 It is perfectly logical to use your vast resources to absorb the enemy hits and try to make it too expensive for them to continue. And if Ukraine's "partners" weren't a bunch of hypocritical scum, it might have a lot more effect. I wasn't saying it's an anti-white conspiracy. The people dying now are Russian speakers, so from Ukraine's point of view, it's killing off unwanted trash anyway. It literally costs them nothing to shovel more ethnic Russians into the meat grinder.

>>15409 >It is perfectly logical to use your vast resources to absorb the enemy hits and try to make it too expensive for them to continue. If Ukraine had vast resources, your post would make sense. Russia doesn't seem to be using their vast resources to absorb hits and make it too expensive for the Ukrainians to continue, instead they seem to be using them to kill Ukrainians. > if Ukraine's "partners" weren't a bunch of hypocritical scum, it might have a lot more effect. If Ukraine's "partners" weren't a bunch of hypocritical scum, they wouldn't be supporting them in the first place, so be careful what you wish for. A lot of them have already given them pretty much everything they can give, and the ones that haven't aren't going to because Ukraine still wouldn't win. >I wasn't saying it's an anti-white conspiracy. Given the degree to which you seem to be totally detached from reality, it's not clear what flavor of schizophrenic nonsense you believe. >The people dying now are Russian speakers No duh, it's a war between two Russian speaking countries. >so from Ukraine's point of view, it's killing off unwanted trash anyway. It literally costs them nothing to shovel more ethnic Russians into the meat grinder. Is this some schizo shit about Zelensky being an Israeli agent or something?

>>15410 Ukraine is a huge country nigger, it has vast resources. One of those resources are people they can shovel into the meat grinder. And they're backed by the pre-eminent military alliance on the planet. The ruling clique has proven they hate Russians, so why would they care if Russians die in their defense?

>>15413 >>15413 >Ukraine is a huge country nigger, it has vast resources. Ukraine is a large country going up against one of the world's top 3 military powers. You could describe it as having "vast resources" if it were fighting a small country, but Russia isn't a small country, it's not even a large or even huge country, it's a fuckhueg country. >One of those resources are people they can shovel into the meat grinder. Not really, even with conscription and press ganging people off the street they haven't even been able to recruit half of what Russia has through just volunteers. Ukraine's population is much smaller than Russia's, but more importantly they lack the effective state capacity to actually leverage their population even with conscription. >they're backed by the pre-eminent military alliance on the planet. Which mostly ran out of stuff to give them within the first year of the war. NATO is high tech, but lacks the production capacity to actually sustain Ukraine's war of attrition. >The ruling clique has proven they hate Russians, so why would they care if Russians die in their defense? I don't think the rulers of most countries care about their soldiers. They do tend to care about winning though, and Ukraine is not in a position to sacrifice their soldiers in a way that secures victory. So your prior point about Ukraine making it too costly for Russia to continue is stupid, since they can't fucking do that. Expendable manpower is a resource, and even from the perspective of Ukraine's command, they are wasting it.

>>15414 Except Russia isn't in total war mode and is not utilizing all the resources it could, as opposed to Ukraine that is basically fighting to the death. And for most of the conflict it had superiority in numbers, so I don't know what you're on about.

>>15416 >Except Russia isn't in total war mode and is not utilizing all the resources it coul How is that an "except"? Russia is massively out producing the collective west and they aren't even in total war mode, meanwhile Ukraine is trying to fight to the last Ukrainian and they can barely mobilize half of what Russia is getting as volunteers. Russia's resources are definitely vast, while Ukraine's aren't. >for most of the conflict it had superiority in numbers, Well they don't right now.

>>15417 >How is that an "except"? It means Russia is still doing a balancing act between keeping its economy in good shape and trying to win a war against the West. Just because they're outproducing the enemy, doesn't mean it's enough. If Ukraine really does shovel every last Ukrainian into the meat grinder, they might last long enough for Russia to start running out of volunteers. Because this can still go on for several years. >>15417 >Well they don't right now. And you know this how?

>>15414 >Ukraine is a large country going up against one of the world's top 3 military powers. At this point, I would say that including Russia in that club is tenuous. Ignoring nukes, of course. >Which mostly ran out of stuff to give them within the first year of the war. NATO is high tech, but lacks the production capacity to actually sustain Ukraine's war of attrition. NATO also isn't even nominally on a wartime footing and the Russian MIC is dogshit. Their production of airframes has tanked since the fall of the USSR, their armored vehicle production relies on raiding boneyards and their domestic electronics are atrocious - and all of this is with something like 35% of their budget currently going to their military, catastrophic levels of inflation, their currency in the shitter and as much leverage as the government can bring to bear to keep things wheezing along. >I don't think the rulers of most countries care about their soldiers. They do tend to care about winning though, and Ukraine is not in a position to sacrifice their soldiers in a way that secures victory. All victories come at a cost of men and materiel - the bang you get for your buck is what matters. >So your prior point about Ukraine making it too costly for Russia to continue is stupid, since they can't fucking do that. Expendable manpower is a resource, and even from the perspective of Ukraine's command, they are wasting it. It's not about cost, it's about exchange. How many Ukrainian lives was it worth to destroy 40% of Russia's strategic bombers? How many Russian lives is it worth to move the trenches another hundred yards to the west?

>>15418 >>15419 Jesus fucking Christ you're retarded.

>>15421 t. vatnigger

>>15427 You are not better

>>15432 Sometime it's better to just let them get the last word in. He did the equivalent of trying to win an argument by shitting his pants.

>>15433 I mean in my language there is proverb that "the smarter one retreats" and It makes sense

>>15372 >There are lots of things the Russians could do to about that even if they were, which I doubt. Russia has substantial EW capabilities including multiple platforms which are tailored to jam specific AEW&C radars. What I meant with that was satellite radar mapping of the ground. Though I can't say to what extent jamming works and the capabilities of the satellites, as I'm a layman on the subject. >Do they? I genuinely thought they were at a disadvantage right now in terms of total manpower. Maybe the figures I was saw were including Russian forces outside of the theater or were using a broader definition of what counted as being in the theater. Honestly, we don't know. Ukraine is definitely keeping up the "recruitment" efforts at a steady pace and shuffling rear echelon troops into the trench, so I doubt they're critically low on numbers. >Just today WillyOAM was talking about a post by a Ukrainian officer where he complained that his men sit in dugouts for months with no human contact at all getting food and water by drone. Some units might have the luxury of rotating, but not all of them. What that could mean is simply once they get engaged, there's no way out. Once a sector gets attention, there'll be drones hitting any logistics and reinforcements coming in and disrupt casevac, while arty and planes erradicate the frontline. >I figured. I think I read somewhere that there are Gerans with thermobaric warheads being made, do you have any clips of those? Haven't really seen any claim of a vid being specifically a certain warhead. And it's hard to judge by the videos.

>>15435 >What I meant with that was satellite radar mapping of the ground. there are going to be serious limitations involved in a satellite based approach. It's also still possible to interfere with it with electronic warfare. >Honestly, we don't know. What I've been seeing indicates that Russia may have less men allocated to the front at any given time, but overall they have about 5x to 7x as many total soldiers. They rotate them more and keep a much larger reserve. >Ukraine is definitely keeping up the "recruitment" efforts at a steady pace and shuffling rear echelon troops into the trench, so I doubt they're critically low on numbers. We'll see, although I get the impression that their recruitment is extremely low, with even the press gangs being unable to kidnap enough people to make up for their losses. I think that most surviving Ukrainian men are extremely unwilling to fight, and the recruitment process is so corrupt that it's trivial to avoid being sent to fight unless you're flat broke. >What that could mean is simply once they get engaged, there's no way out. Once a sector gets attention, there'll be drones hitting any logistics and reinforcements coming in and disrupt casevac, while arty and planes erradicate the frontline. I think you're right, although I've read in multiple places that Ukraine doesn't provide their troops with leave and doesn't rotate their troops adequately. They probably do pull troops out of the trenches for a bit and reshuffle them, but I don't think they rotate them to the rear very often. >Haven't really seen any claim of a vid being specifically a certain warhead. And it's hard to judge by the videos. makes sense, I suspect that thermobaric Gerans won't be used much until they increase production to the point that they are using them on front line positions, but it's not like it'd be easy to tell. The buzzing noise they make really is intimidating.

>>15436 >What I've been seeing indicates that Russia may have less men allocated to the front at any given time, but overall they have about 5x to 7x as many total soldiers. They rotate them more and keep a much larger reserve. The estimates of Ukrainian numbers are still close to a million and remember, small unit action. When an advance is made, it wasn't a platoon wiped out, it was just a fire team or two holding a treeline or a squad in a village. All perfectly manageable losses. As I mentioned before, Russian estimates on enemy KIA was less than half a million in two years, which probably means even fewer. >it's trivial to avoid being sent to fight unless you're flat broke Well, lucky for them Okraina is a poor shithole. >The buzzing noise they make really is intimidating. I fucking love the sounds of war. I'm not weird, you're weird!

>>15439 >The estimates of Ukrainian numbers are still close to a million and remember, small unit action. When an advance is made, it wasn't a platoon wiped out, it was just a fire team or two holding a treeline or a squad in a village. All perfectly manageable losses. As I mentioned before, Russian estimates on enemy KIA was less than half a million in two years, which probably means even fewer. I think that Ukrainian manpower shortages are more problematic than you're making it sound, but I also think that my earlier estimation that their manpower levels are critical was an over correction. >Well, lucky for them Okraina is a poor shithole. I don't think it's luck, I think it's a poor shithole for the same reason they're having these problems to begin with. >I fucking love the sounds of war same >I'm not weird, you're weird! Why can't I find the other weirdos? I just want to find other people who love war and weapons and don't give a fuck about morality. /k/ used to be the place to find them.

>>15442 Conversely I think they are not as problematic and won't be for a while still. The front-line speed bumps don't need to be fit or motivated, they just need to be there with enforcers behind them (Azov, Sich, Tornado, etc.) And more valuable resources like drones and artillery supporting their defense. >I don't think it's luck, I think it's a poor shithole for the same reason they're having these problems to begin with. Yes, of course, I was joking. If Okraina had open borders, most of the men and populace in general would be long gone by now. The sooner it is dismantled, the sooner the populace will be better off.

>>15444 >Conversely I think they are not as problematic and won't be for a while still. I guess we'll find out which of us is right eventually. Whatever is going on in Pokrovsk might sure is interesting.

>>15450 *Whatever is going on in Pokrovsk might be interesting.

>>15451 I read someplace the brigade holding the Southern reaches said they ran out of men. Grain of salt and all that, but it would explain why the Russian sabotage groups were able to just walk into the city.

>>15452 IIRC what they said was they ran out of infantry. The specificity of that is somehow more concerning to me. Like "we ran out of men" could be hyperbole. "We ran out of infantry" is the sort of thing you say at the end of a wargame red dragon match where you were fighting against a couple Very Hard AIs in a no time limit Total Destruction match. If you've never tried doing that I'd suggest trying it, it can be surprisingly fun if you have a few hours to sink into it.

>>15458 The AI was pretty dumb, it would just attempt to rush you through the fastest route. My go-to tactic was round the clock blind bombing sorties on the positions just forward of my blocking force of infantry, whilst gathering more and more units to have local fire superiority and then just let them exhaust themselves on my defensive line before slowly pushing forward. Hot damn, almost exactly what the Russians are doing now. Maybe you were on to something before when you compared it to real life.

>>15464 Yeah, the AI is really dumb, but when you're fighting 10 AIs that are set to the highest difficulty, it doesn't really matter since they are pushing everywhere. At the end of a match like that you eventually reach the point where the tide of incoming enemies dries up and you can launch a counter attack to mop up the rest of the map. I think Russia reached the point where fresh Ukrainian troops coming into the fray dried up a while ago, and I've been waiting for them to launch the mop up offensive. I think that it might have just kicked off over the last few days. We'll see.

>>15466 There won't be any mop-up offensives. Just steady pushing where able. Until one day the line collapses and the "able" will be everywhere. And the piggers didn't disappoint, they are still refusing peace overtures.

>>15472 >There won't be any mop-up offensives. Just steady pushing where able. Until one day the line collapses and the "able" will be everywhere. I'm starting to agree with your assessment on that. I think there might be some mop up though, because when the Ukrainian lines collapse I think there might be attempts to regroup in urban centers for a last stand. >counterstrike video I am going to imagine that Geran strike was ordered by someone on the other team.

>>15475 Of course, there will be many tactical-level mop up operations because of various reasons. On a strategic level they're doing what works and again I'll commend them for being realists about the situation. Defied expectations really.