>>15082
Goddammit after I went on and on about not taking the bait, here I am coming back and gobbling down that yummy yummy bait.
>they launch jdamski's at maximum ranges from a long way inside russia that are just about able to hit forward and rearward positions on the frontline.
That means they have air supremacy over their own territory and the front line, and air superiority deep enough into Ukraine's territory to prevent Ukraine from conducting their own CAS.
>i do think that's different from actual heavily utilized air superiority.
That doesn't match the definition of air superiority used by the USAF, or of any other military I know of. One of the many indications of a complete lack of understanding of the topic is simply not knowing basic terminology, like the difference between air superiority and air supremacy. Another indication of poor understanding is treating air superiority and air supremacy as real things which exist, rather than abstractions designed to communicate complex states of affairs that are typically highly localized in both time and space.
>during operation desert storm, the US faced a much denser and arguably more intergrated air defense system than russia did in ukraine
That is untrue in every way that matters. While the popular accounts of the war claim that the Iraqi air defense network was formidable, in reality it was quite frankly totally inadequate, with no strategic SAMs at all, and the French made KARI system which you describe as being "more integrated" was only capable of tracking about 40 threats simultaneously, and didn't integrate any of their AAA at all. Here is an interesting article about Iraq's air defenses:
https://balloonstodrones.com/2022/10/19/looking-back-at-iraqi-air-defences-during-operation-desert-storm/
This stands in contrast to how Ukraine has had large quantities of strategic SAMs since the very start of the war, and they have received constant supplies of new systems. Additionally their air defense network is highly integrated. While it's difficult to know the exact capabilities of Ukraine's IADS at this point, due to wartime secrecy and the unknown ways in which various systems have been integrated, it's likely to be a major point of focus for western assistance since it is easily put under the umbrella of intel sharing and advising rather than direct military aid.
>please go ahead and tell me how turning off your targeting and acquisition equipment because dozens of SEAD aircraft are flying sortees over your head daily, is going to magically shoot down said aircraft and stop them from carrying out their missions.
Modern IADS like those operated by Ukraine and Russia are actually capable of acquiring targets using targeting data from long ranged early warning radars, and can launch based upon that data and only activate their targeting radars for the last few seconds before the missile hits. I say modern, but really even the Krug was capable of that. If you can't suppress the long ranged early warning radars, then you can't really do much to suppress a modern IADS. More importantly, shooting down planes is not necessary for air defenses to achieve the goal of hampering enemy air operations, in fact shooting down planes implies they
haven't accomplished that goal very well, since the attacker should be able to pick and choose where to employ their planes, and if they think there is a high chance of being shot down, they are simply not going to send their planes and pilots into that situation.
>sure, you can absolutely do SOME damage by occasionally setting up and trying to shoot down some aircraft
Modern air defense systems stay in near constant motion, even systems like the S-300 can go from marching to combat positions in five minutes.
>russia, since the end of the beginning of the war, has absolutely refused to go anywhere near ukrainian AA coverage if at all possible
It speaks volumes that you have to use such a grammatically tortured sentence. At the start of the war Russia had suppressed nearly all of Ukraine's air defenses through a combination of cyber warfare, air power, missile strikes, and aggressive ground operations. To use a bit of jargon that I think has fallen out of favor at the Pentagon, they conducted J-SEAD operations across multiple domains.
>that's air superiority to you?
yes, it is. It's also air superiority according to the US military and NATO definition.
>yes, and?
Being ignorant of 50 years of development in air-defenses is like someone in 'Nam thinking that air power is inconsequential because their understanding of air power comes from the use of biplanes in WW1.
>i'm talking about a scenario where russia is flying over all of ukraine and hitting any transport they can
No, you were talking about supply lines being constantly disrupted and storage depots being hit constantly. Both those things are happening.
>you seemingly refuse to acknowledge that this is possible
It's probably possible for Russia to temporarily suppress all of Ukraine's air defenses and strike wherever the hell they want, but it'd be insanely costly and they can already hit anywhere in Ukraine by means other than air power, so doing so would be stupid of them. Saying that Russia's air force should prove they are competent by launching a wasteful campaign to suppress Ukrainian air defenses across the whole country is like a creationist asking for a crocoduck to prove that evolution is real. It's not only not proof, but it'd disprove the thing it's supposedly proof of.
>oh i know that, i've made numerous references to continuous aircraft coverage but you seemingly just ignore those
A common tactic in online debates is to make an offhand reference to something and acting dismissive of it so that when people later go "you fucking moron, you completely ignored the importance of X" the person who didn't want to actually engage with that can just go "nuh uh, I already covered X, so I already won that argument and now I'll move on and act like you're an idiot if you keep bringing it up".
>complex and extremely difficult is right, which is why countries with an afterthought airforce like russia and many others are not capable of this.
For any airforce there is a level of opposition a point where they simply cannot sustain a SEAD campaign indefinitely, and one where they can't suppress enemy air defenses it in the first place. Even the US is unlikely to be capable of sustaining an air campaign against Russia for long.
>if you're willing to give me that reading list, i'd appreciate it, there may be something of interest there for me.
I actually didn't get this far into the post when I first read it, since I didn't want to take the bait. It'll take some time to make a reading list, and I'll try to keep it to stuff on libgen or otherwise available online. You should start with Clausewitz's classic "On War", that one's on Gutenberg. Next read
Soviet Military Operational Art - In Pursuit of Deep Battle by David M. Glantz to get a general idea of Soviet doctrine and keep in mind that they have updated their doctrine much like we have. In terms of acquainting yourself with the specifics of anti-aircraft systems, I'd suggest
Defending Putin's Empire - Russia's Air Defense System by Mihajlo Mihajlovic. I've mentioned it before in this thread, it's the best and most recent book on Russian air defenses, and to be honest I'm not aware of many books that provide in depth information of the systems Ukraine uses that aren't Soviet in origin, although I've never really looked since a lot of them are either so new as to be unlikely to have good books written about them, or are things that Ukraine has in small numbers that aren't really going to make a huge difference to the overall situation (I should probably find a book to recommend with good information on the Patriot though). I'll need some time to find good sources on the other side of things, since even if I remembered the titles of all those books about air power I checked out from the library as a teenager, most of them were pretty out of date even then. There are tons of other things I think it'd be good to read, like manuals about how to plan operations, some more in depth histories of wars like Iraq and Yugoslavia, but I'm going to try to keep this short, I've had to pair it down a lot because even my reading list keeps pushing this post over the 12000 character limit.
>>15087
>i understand how complex and difficult these OPS are, and how they have to be performed intensively over weeks to months
It's easy to say you understand something, but much harder to demonstrate it. I hate bringing up Dunning-Kruger, but it can be very difficult to be aware of one's own ignorance.
>i'll excuse all the downright resentful and angry end points as you just being angry and resentful because cuckchan
What I resent is having someone who clearly doesn't have a deep understanding of the topic try to lecture me about something I've had an interest in since childhood. It's not hard to tell that you don't know what you're talking about.
>actually show it off instead of alluding to it every next sentence like it's a dragon ball Z outro
The issue is that aside from correcting things, explaining why you're wrong on a fundamental level would require an education, not just a post on an imageboard. I could quite literally write a book about what you've got wrong, condensing it down into just a few pages would be pretty difficult. This isn't like a DBZ outro where they could just answer the question in one sentence (Goku is going to beat whoever the current arc villain is, but not for another 20 episodes).
>>15121
>For those who are interested to learn
This is going to be funny isn't it?
>No-Escape Zone refers to the powered flight envelope of a missile.
no, it absolutely doesn't. It's the zone where a plane is unlikely to evade a missile by maneuvers.
>It’s a bit more complicated of course
this is another example of that sort of cop-out I mentioned earlier. The definition you give is fundamentally wrong, but any response can just be ignored by going "well I said it's a bit more complicated".
>MOST of a missile’s maximum range is OUTSIDE of the NEZ.
A fundamental misunderstanding of the very concept of a no-escape zone will obviously lead to not knowing how to apply it. As an illustrative example, the NEZs for a B-52, stratotanker, or E-7 being targeted by a S-300 are very different from the NEZs of an F-22 or F-15 being targeted by the same.
>To engage at longer ranges, a missile boosts high into the air in a wide ballistic arc
Some systems do that, not all. It's also not very relevant since a missile coming down from a ballistic trajectory is typically moving at fairly high mach numbers.
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>low terminal performance of SAMs being used at long range
Saying that they have low performance at that stage is inaccurate. With all of their potential energy converted into speed and most of their mass burned off meaning that maneuvers will have to overcome less inertia, it's pretty much the hardest time to dodge them.
>The REASON why I named, specifically, Russia’s weak OFFICER CORPS is because
Is because it's a nebulous enough statement that any evidence against it can be ignored, but it can also be used to justify believing whatever negative stereotypes you want, it's like WW1 and WW2 intelligence reports that relied on assessments of "national character" which were just thinly veiled racism.
>It’s a complex human endeavor and without a strong leadership component it will simply fall flat on it’s face. It’s the reason why peasant militaries do so poorly in modern warfare.
You said something reasonable, then immediately followed it with racist hogwash. While I prefer intelligent conversations, I can't deny that seeing someone ping pong between being intelligent and being a fucking moron isn't funny.