>>4915 yo dis nigger be a gaywad

I never find myself agreeing with anyone on this board. It pains yours truly to not find a friend in this world.

>>4938 Well I mean none of us are monarchists. Doesnt mean we arent friends though.

>>4938 And here I thought *I* was your friend, graceposter.

>>4951 your like barely an aquantance. Im his best friend.

>>4958 No, he just said he has no friends, so that can't possibly be true.

>>4961 Its so true its blowing your mind. Also stop spamming the front page. Spamming Alunya on /b/ no one will notice. But spam the front page and your gonna get banned again dude.

>>4964 What's an alundra?

I dread what I could possibly wake up to after sleeping. With the news speculating on the health of the Queen. I hope the people speculating on /pol/ are wrong.

It's disturbing watching the snakes slither out and pouring their venom.

It's not looking good. I'm hit with a barrage of dms.

>>4988 Look I'm not sure about you but where I live we fought a revolution like two hundred years ago that says we don't have to care about the Queen.

>>4991 This is /monarchy/.

>>4993 Yes, but why should I care about that particular queen? She isn't my monarch.

>>4995 The British Monarchy has a special place in the English-speaking world, and the pre-eminence ascribed to the Queens and Kings is unique and unlike any others. You don't have to care, but you are freely welcome to.

>>4998 The English monarchs are completely ceremonial and anyway any future monarchies will be discontinuous from them so I don't see the point of caring.

>>4990 My Condolences. On Behalf of /b/ we offer portraits of the former queen to help you in your grief.

<'ate mixed constitutionalism <'ate tocquevillism <'ate jouvenel <'ate neofeuds <'ate von hallerfags <'ate hoppeans <'ate BAP <'ate anarchists >luv me absolute monarchy >luv me pre-eminence >luv me bodin >luv me dante >luv me king james >luv me filmer, heck ebin luv me hobbes >luv me bossuet >luv me sun king >luv me kim jong un >luv me graceposter

>>5012 <'ate absolute monarchy <'ate constitutional monarchy <'ate anarchists <ate Grace (literally) >luv me HRE >luv me Caesar >luv me feudalism (nuthin' personal just the most likely future form of government) Simple as.

"Four years ago, the Respected Kim Jong Un gave field guidance to the Pyongyang Teachers." "I thought it is the paternal love of the respected Kim Jong Un to make all the children across the country have pure, honest, frank, and upright minds… not only high qualifications and ability, but also noble moral traits." "He provided the children with the homemade schoolbags with his deep paternal love."

Alexander Hamilton >"I will go farther, and assert, that the authority of the British Parliament over America, would, in all probability, be a more intolerable and excessive species of despotism than an absolute monarchy. The power of an absolute prince is not temporary, but perpetual. He is under no temptation to purchase the favour of one part of his dominions, at the expence of another; but, it is his interest to treat them all, upon the same footing. Very different is the case with regard to the Parliament: The Lords and Commons both, have a private and separate interest to pursue. They must be, wonderfully, disinterested, if they would not make us bear a very disproportional part of the public burthens, to avoid them as much as possible themselves" >"You are mistaken, when you confine arbitrary government to a monarchy. It is not the supreme power being placed in one, instead of many, that discriminates an arbitrary from a free government." >"The nations of Turkey, Russia, France, Spain, and all other despotic kingdoms, in the world, have an inherent right, when ever they please, to shake off the yoke of servitude, (though sanctified by the immemorial usage of their ancestors;) and to model their government, upon the principles of civil liberty." This triggers me. I know Jean Bodin wouldn't agree w/ this, b/c he considered these places to be sovereign monarchies. Jean Bodin <But if the prince be an absolute Sovereign, as are the true Monarchies of France, of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkey, Muscovy, Tartarie, Persia, Ethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdoms of Africa, and Asia, where the kings themselves have the sovereignty without all doubt or question; not divided with their subjects: in this case it is NOT lawful for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of justice against the honour, life, or dignity of the Sovereign: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoken; for as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject has no such jurisdiction over his Sovereign prince : of whom depends all power and authority to command: and who may not only revoke all the power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawful for the subject by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassal against his lord; nor the slave against his master; and in brief, if it not be lawful, by way and course of justice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subjects have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their Sovereign prince. Now the subject is not only guilty of treason of the highest degree, who has slain his Sovereign prince, but even he also which has attempted the same; who has given counsel or consent thereunto; yea if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it… And albeit that the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men; but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his Sovereign prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death, notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof. As in proof it fell out with a gentleman of Normandy, who confessed himself unto a Franciscan Friar, to have had a purpose in himself to have slain Francis the first, the French king: of which evil purpose and intent he repenting himself, received of the frier absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof, who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his trial, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards executed. Another passage caught my eye from Hamilton. >"Were there any room to doubt, that the sole right of the territories in America was vested in the crown, a convincing argument might be drawn from the principle of English tenure… By means of the feudal system, the King became, and still continues to be, in a legal sense, the original proprietor, or lord paramount, of all the lands in England.*—Agreeable to this rule, he must have been the original proprietor of all the lands in America, and was, therefore, authorized to dispose of them in what manner he thought proper." Archibald Kennedy >There is, in every Family, a Sort of Government without any fixed Rules; and indeed it is impossible, even in a little Family, to form Rules for every Circumstance; and therefore it is better conceived than expressed; but perfectly understood by every Individual belonging to the Family. The Study of the Father or Master, is for the Good of the Whole; all Appeals are to him; he has a Power, from the Reason and Nature of Things, to check the Insolent, or Indolent, and to encourage the Industrious: In short, the whole Affairs of the Family are immediately under the Care or Direction of the Father or Master; and this is a natural Prerogative, known and acknowledged by every Man living, who has ever had a Family, or been any Ways concerned in a Family, in all Ages and in all Places. His Majesty, as he is our political Father, his political Prerogative, from the like Circumstances and Reasons, is equally necessary. And this political Authority has been allowed the supreme Director, in all States, in all Ages, and in all Places; and without it, there would be a Failure of Justice. Although this author is for a mixed monarchy, this passage here feels absolutist.

Ebenezer Gay >Light is an Emblem of Authority. It is the Firstborn of Things visible: Hath the Pre-eminence among them, or Predominancy over them: >Rulers are the light of a People, and as when the Sun shineth brightly, there is a pleasant Day over the face of the Earth, so when they shine with Wisdom, Justice, Meekness and the like, and shed abroad the reviving Rays and benign Influences of good Govern|ment, there is a chearful Day of Prosperity enjoyed; truly their Light is sweet. >The Law of Gratitude obligeth People continually to pray for their Rulers. They that exercise Authority upon Men are called Benefactors, Luk. 22.25. and if Magistrates duly exercise the Power they have over others, they highly merit this Title from them, for they do a great deal of Good. They are stiled Gods, not only in respect of their Dignity, but because they resemble him in their extensive Beneficence. They are the Pillars of the Common-Wealth, the main Supporters of it, without which the Fabrick would unavoidably sink.— They are the Shields of the Earth, defending a People from their Enemies. They are the Shepherds of Israel, that with tenderness and Compassion feed the People according to the Integrity of their Hearts, and guide them according to the Skilfulness of their Hands. To them under God People are indebted for the Protection of their Lives and Liberties, Names and Estates, for the Preservation of good Order and happy Peace, for the Security and Comfort they have in all their Enjoyments. Rulers are God's Ministers for good to a People, attending continually on this very thing. Rom. 12.— They are vigilant and solicitous for the temporal Interest and spiritual Benefit of their People: studious in contriving, and industrious in prosecuting Measures for the advantage of the Publick. They take much Care and Pains to dispense Judgment, to en|courage Virtue, and suppress Vice. Such Rulers are call'd Lam. 4.20. the Breath of a People's Nostrils, and under their Shadow they enjoy Safety, eat the Fruits of their Labour, "possess the Comforts and Conveniences of Life, with security from Rapine, from Contention, from Solicitude, from continual fears of Wrong and Outrage." >It is true, that unjust and oppressive Rulers do a great deal of Mischief. Prov: 28.15. As a roaring Lion, and a ranging Bear, so is a wicked Ruler over the poor People. In|stead of feeding them as a Shepherd, he terrifies and devours them, like a roaring Lion and hungry Bear. Yet if Rulers are bad, People receive some Good from their Government, at least in comparison of the Mischiefs they would suffer from Anarchy, or a total want of Government. >Magistrates are God's Representatives upon Earth, they bear his Character, and shine with some Rays of his Majesty; and ought therefore to be highly respected according to the dignity of their Station. Much Honour is put upon them by God, and much should be paid unto them by Men. They are the Heads of the Tribes, and more honourable than their Brethren. They are the Protectors of the civil and religious Liberties of a People, the Conservators of the publick Peace, and Revengers to execute Wrath upon those that disturb it; and should be esteemed greatly, and had in Reputation for their Work sake. They are the Fathers of their Country, and the fifth Commandment obligeth us to honour them * When Joseph was made Ruler over all the Land of Egypt, they cried before him, Abrech, tender Father, (which our Translators render, Bow the Knee, Gen. 41.43.) It is the Duty of People to express their Satisfaction in, and Thankfulness for, the wise, just and beneficial Administrations of their Rulers: and commend the Skill and Faithfulness which they discover in the management of arduous and important Affairs. >People should not easily conceive Prejudices, nor utter Complaints against those in Authority. It is written, Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy People, Act. 23.5. It may be as commonly from Ignorance, as ill-Will, that Men speak evil of Dignities: They are wont to accuse, arraign and censure those Proceedings, which they are incompetent Judges of, not having Capacity or Opportunity to know the Reasons thereof. There are Arcana Imperii, the Mysteries of State, which every one cannot penetrate into. People should be willing to believe, that ordinarily their Rulers are able to discern more and farther than they, having greater Advantages therefor. They should be cautious lest they speak evil of those things which they understand not; and not presume that they know the way better than their Leaders. >People should take to themselves their share of the blame of the Mis-Conduct and Mal-Administration of the Government over them, and not impute it all to their Rulers. Much of the Fault is their own. Their Sins incense God's righteous Displeasure, so that he withholds or withdraws his Spirit and Presence from their Rulers, and then thro' the prevalence of Temptations, the Influence of bad Counsel, and the power of their own Lusts and Passions, they are misled into those Courses, which are destructive to the Weal and Tranquillity of a People >And certainly much Praise is due unto good Rulers from an obliged People: It is a just Debt they owe to their Protectors and Benefactors. The prudent and tender Fathers of a Country should be acknowledged and blessed >That our KING is a nursing Father, and our QUEEN a nursing Mother, who have express'd their tender Care of, and Concern for us, their poor but dutiful Children, in these distant parts of their Dominion. Myles Cooper >"Great shade of Locke, immortal Sage! >Bright Glory of thy Land, and Age. >… >The choicest Boon, of bounteous Heaven; >To curb, the lawless Tyrants Rule, >And rescue Slaves from Filmer's School; >Refute what Hobbes, what Oxford dreamt, >And shew the Ends, of Government; >TO ridicule, the biggot Rules, >Which Knaves devis'd to govern Fools; >To prove in spite of pedant claims, >God made not Men, for Charles, or James. >But bid them Tyrant Pow'r control, >Nor let a Part, enslave the Whole; Here's an utter rejection of monarchical pre-eminence. Hail Britannia Immortal beacon shows the way Step forth and seek glory! Hoist your swords high into the clouds Hail Britannia! Our Emperor stands astride this world He'll vanquish every foe! His truth and justice shine so bright All hail his brilliant light!

King James VI & I Speech >What God hath conjoined then, let no man separate. I am the husband, and all the whole isle is my lawful wife; I am the head, and it is my body; I am the shepherd, and it is my flock. I hope therefore no man will be so unreasonable as to think, that I am that am a Christian king under the gospel, should be a polygamist, and husband to two wives, that I being the head, should have a divided and monstrous body, or that being the shepherd to so fair a flock, whose fold hath no wall to hedge it but the four seas, should have my flock parted in two. >So my Sovereignty obliges me to yield to you love, government and protection: Neither did I ever wish any happiness to myself, which was not conjoined with the happiness of my people. I desire a perfect Union of Laws and persons, and such a Naturalizing as may make one body of both Kingdoms under me your King, that I and my posterity (if it so please God) may rule over you to the world's end; Such an Union as was of the Scots and Picts in Scotland, and of the Heptarchie over here in England. And for Scotland I avow such an Union, as if you had got it by Conquest, but such a Conquest as may be cemented by love, the only sure bond of subjection or friendship: that as there is over both but unus Rex, so there may be in both but unus Grex & una Lex >First, by my descent lineally out of the loins of Henry the seventh, is reunited and confirmed in me the Union of the two Princely Roses of the two Houses of Lancaster and Yorke, whereof that King of happy memory was the first Uniter Hobbes on the aim of James VI & I >And this was it our most wise King, King James, aimed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civil wars, which make both those Kingdoms at this present, miserable.

"Our father is Marshal Kim Jong Un, Our Home is the Party's embrace" "With the Respected Marshal who loves people most and regards his trouble for the people as his joy as our father in the harmonious great family we are assisting each other in the warm cherished house, our socialist homeland"

"The Household / Family well ordered is the true image of the Commonwealth." -Jean Bodin "My old home the Monarchy, alone, was a great mansion with many doors and many chambers, for every condition of men." -Joseph Roth "Socialism is the phantastic younger brother of Despotism, which it wants to inherit. Socialism wants to have the fullness of state force which before only existed in Despotism." -Friedrich Nietzche "A family being nothing else but a small Kingdom, wherein the paterfamilias had Regal power… and a Kingdom being nothing else but a great family." -Gryffith Williams "For as household management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule is the household management of a city, or of a nation, or of many nations." -Aristotle "The rule of a household is a monarchy, for every house is under one head." -Aristotle "Visitor: Well then, surely there won't be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between the character of a great household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small city on the other? – Young Socrates: None. – It's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any quarrel with him." -Plato "So that Aristotle following Xenophon, seems to me without any probable cause, to have divided the Economical government from the Political, and a City from a Family; which can no otherwise be done, than if we should pull the members from the body; or go about to build a City without houses… Wherefore as a family well and wisely ordered, is the true image of a City, and the domestical government, in sort, like unto the sovereignty in a Commonwealth: so also is the manner of the government of a house or family, the true model for the government of a Commonwealth… And whilest every particular member of the body does his duty, we live in good and perfect health; so also where every family is kept in order, the whole city shall be well and peaceably governed." -Jean Bodin

"The best Prince is the best Father." -Jean Bodin "The Prince, whom you may justly call the Father of the Country, ought to be to every man Dearer and more Reverend than any Father, as one Ordained and Sent unto us by God." -Jean Bodin "It may seem absurd to maintain, that Kings now are the Fathers of their People, since Experience shews the contrary. It is true, all Kings be not the Natural Parents of their Subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed the next Heirs to those first Progenitors, who were at first the Natural Parents of the whole People, and in their Right succeed to the Exercise of Supreme Jurisdiction." -Robert Filmer "If we compare the Natural Rights of a Father with those of a King, we find them all one, without any difference but only in the Latitude and Extent of them: as the Father over one Family, so the King as Father over many Families extends his care to preserve, feed, cloth, instruct and defend the whole Commonwealth. His War, his Peace, his Courts of Justice, and all his Acts of Sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferior Father, and to their Children, their Rights and Privileges; so that all the Duties of a King are summed up in an Universal Fatherly Care of his People." -Robert Filmer "To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Sovereign Lord, with power over him of life and death." -Hobbes "But Kings are the Fathers of Families… [the Public Good / education of subjects], the care of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other essential Right of the Sovereignty." -Hobbes (from the context of Pastors / schoolmasters / public education & propaganda) "Kings are also compared to Fathers of families: for a King is truly Parens patriae, the politique father of his People." -King James VI & I "Man who, as has been said, saw the image of a kingdom in the union of several families under the leadership of a common father, and who had found gentleness in that life, brought themselves easily to create societies of families under kings who took the place of fathers… it is apparently for that reason that the ancient people's of Palestine called their kings Abimelech, that is to say: my father the king. Subjects took themselves to be children of the Prince: and, each calling him, My father the king." -Bossuet "For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy… it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule." -Aristotle

"O he links his feelings with the people with the blood relationship" -World of Humane Affection "Nobody can cut our bloodline linked with him" -To the End of the Earth "Our ties to the General is as to our own flesh and blood. Like a family to our hearts. Always with him, our whole people as one single mind" -Single-minded people "For high ideals, to become one with him… We are all under his guidance. Nothing in this world can separate us. We came from the same bloodline" -Whether 1000 ri or 10 000 ri "We all share one single heart. His affection is our flesh and blood." -Our Revolutionary Armed Forces Support Only the Marshal's Leadership "And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; …the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood [and suckled 'with the same milk']" -Aristotle, Politics In Christianity, this royal bond prevails when Christians drink the blood of Christ, formally called the Eucharist, exactly what Aristotle said what prevailed for the royal bond. Themistian Concept The Themistian concept of the King as a caring Monarch who loves mankind. It is through the virtue of philanthropia that he is linked to God because of his love of his subjects shows that he is like God. An important aspect of the King's philanthropia is the good King's determination to mitigate the excessive harshness of inflexible statute law with its fixed penalties and its inability to take account of circumstance. The Sovereign demonstrates that 'He himself is Law and above the laws.' It is rooted in the concept of the King as 'ensouled law'. Here the King is both nomos empsuchos and nomos logikos 'By virtue of God's Providence', which has appointed him in his ignorance to be a lawgiver for men. The King is 'superior to the laws' on account of his closeness to God (which is the fundamental reason for his superiority). Dante Alighieri on Monarchy & Philanthropia Moreover, to extent however small that cupidity clouds the mental attitude toward Justice, charity or right love clarifies and brightens it. In whomever, therefore, right love can be present to the highest degree, in him can Justice find the most effective place. Such is the Monarch, in whose person Justice is or may be most effective… That right love should indwell in the Monarch more than in all men besides itself thus: Everything loved is the more loved the nearer it is to him who loves; men are nearer to the Monarch than other princes: therefore thought to be most loved by him."

Bossuet on the Royal Bond / Hereditary State >The people, by themselves, have grown accustomed to this. "I saw all men living, that walk under the Sun with the second young man, who shall rise up in his place." >The second reason which favors this government, is that it makes the authorities who guide the State the ones who are most interested in its preservation. The prince who works for the State works for his children; and the love he bears his kingdom, mixed with that he has for his family, becomes natural to him." >"Thus it is that peoples become attached to royal houses. The jealousy that one naturally feels against those whom one sees above him here turns into love and respect."

THE GREAT FOUNDER As explained by Aristotle in Politics Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual since the whole is of necessity prior to the part… The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the Whole. But He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because He is sufficient for himself, must either be a Beast or a God! A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature. & yet he who first FOUNDED the state was the GREATEST of benefactors! But when a whole family or some individual, happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they should the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation. For, as I said before, to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the FOUNDER of all states… are accustomed to put forward … but accords with the principle already laid down. For surely it would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or… require that he should take his turn in being governed. The Whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of the Whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he should have the supreme power, and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always!

Darius in the Herodotus Debate >But (to conclude the whole matter in one word) tell me, whence and by whose gift came our freedom – from the commonalty or an oligarchy or a single ruler? I hold therefore, that as the rule of one man gave us freedom, so that rule we should preserve Song of General Kim II Sung >He severed the chains of the masses >brought them liberty >The Sun of Korea today >Democratic and free

"So that you may be the readier to defend the Constitution, know this: for all who have preserved their fatherland, furthered it, enriched it, there is in heaven a sure and allotted abode, where they may enjoy an immortality of happiness." -Cicero "For nothing happens in the world more pleasing to that supreme Deity, who governs all the universe, than those gatherings and unions of men allied by common laws, which are called states. From this place do their rulers and guardians set out, and to this place do they return." -Cicero "Exercise this soul in the noblest activities. Now the noblest are cares and exertions for our country's welfare." -Cicero "But when with a rational spirit you have surveyed the whole field, there is no social relation among them all the more close, none more dear than that which links each one of us with our country. Parents are dear; dear are children, relatives, friends; but one native land embraces all our loves; and who that is true would hesitate to give his life for her, if by his death he could render her a service?" -Cicero "Plato himself is for a Divine Power assisting in Human Politics… 'tis a remarkable passage that of his in his Meno. "We may as properly call Governors, or States-men, Divine, as we call those who give out the Oracles, or Prophets or Poets by that name; and we may affirm, that they have a Divine Illumination, and are possessed by the Deity, when they consult for the good of the commonwealth" –William Nichols

"Just as Almighty God cannot create another God equal with himself, since He is infinite and two infinities cannot co-exist, so the Sovereign Prince, who is the image of God, cannot make a subject equal with himself without self-destruction." -Jean Bodin People's Joy Just calling out his name, makes waves of joy Rise up inside our chests Because of this uniquely great man Who guides us through our lives The whole People is overwhelmed with pride Inside his bosom of affection and determination We all stand United The power of our Unity is Infinite The bright shining light of the Sun leads us into our future "We see they cannot admit many kings, nor many lords, however good soever. Solyman emperour of the Turks used this example, hearing the great cries and acclamations of joy which the whole army made unto Sultan Mustapha his son returning out of Persia, he put him to death through jealousy, causing him to be strangled in his withdrawing chamber, and his dead body to be cast out before the whole army: then he made a proclamation, that there was but one God in heaven, and one Sultan upon earth: Two days after he put Sultan Gobe to death, for that he had wept for his brother; and Sultan Mehemet the third brother, for that he fled for fear: leaving but one son living, to avoid the danger of many lords." -Jean Bodin

Jean Bodin on equality & a state as household? >But the error originated with Plato, who, after he had established a popular state, introduced dangerous equalization. Then the Academicians who came from his school amplified his reasons, assuming that society is maintained by harmony, harmony by equality of justice, and equality by a popular state. Then all the citizens are made one and the same in the most perfect equality and likeness, and this should be the aim of human society. Aristotle did not confute the hypothesis of Plato, but he thought that Plato had erred especially in trying to make the citizenship one and the same; in that way the state is destroyed and becomes a family. This reasoning seems to me to be ineffective; but I judge the hypothesis not only absurd, as Aristotle would have it, but also clearly false. >And the ancients (to assure Popular estates) did strive to equal all citizens in goods, honours, power, and rewards: and if any one were more virtuous, more just, or more wise, than the rest, he was banished, as I have showed before, seeking to make an equality, if it were possible: and even Plato did wish, That wives and children should be common to all, to the end that no many might say, This is mine, or, That is thine: for those words of Meum, and Tuum (said he) were the breeders of disc0rd, and the ruin of states. By the which there will grow many absurdities: for in so doing, a city shall be ruined, and become a household (as Aristotle said) although that a household or family (which is the true image of a Commonweal) has but one head. And for this cause, an ancient lawmaker, being importuned by some one, to make his country a Popular estate: Make it (says he) in thine own house. And if they say, That it is a goodly thing so to unite citizens and a city, as to make one household of it, they must then take away the plurality of heads and commanders, which are in a Popular estate, to make a Monarch, as the true fathers of a family; and to cut off this equality of goods, power, honour, and commandment, which they seek to make in a Popular estate; for that it is incompatible in a family. Jean Bodin on Monarchy >If we should inspect nature more closely, we should gaze upon monarchy everywhere. To make a beginning from small things, we see the king among the bees, the leader in the herd, the buck among the flocks or the bellwether (as among the cranes themselves the many follow one), and in the separate natures of things some one object excels: thus, adamant among the gems, gold among the metals, the Sun among the stars, and finally God alone, the prince and author of the world. Moresoever, they say that among the evil spirits one alone is supreme. But, not to continue indefinitely, what is a family other than the true image of a state? Yet this is directed by the rule of one, who presents, not a fictitious image, like the doge of Venice, but the true picture of a king. >If, then, Plato were to change the nature of things and set up several lords in the same family, several heads for the same body, several pilots on a ship, and finally several leaders among bees, flocks, herds (if only the farmers will permit); if at length he would join several gods into an association for ruling, then I would agree with him that the rule of the optimates is better than a kingdom. >But if the entire nature of things protests, reason dissents, lasting experience objects, I do not see why we ought to follow Plato or anyone else and violate nature. What Homer has said, "No good thing is a number of masters; let one man be master, one man be king," Euripides has repeated, "Power belongs to one man in the homes and in the cities." For this reason Sibylla is said to have prophesied in her poems that the safety of the Roman Republic is founded upon a kingdom, that is, the citizens cannot be protected unless they have a king.

Jean Bodin on Equality continued >For if we refer all things to nature, which is chief of all things, it becomes plain that this world, which is superior to anything ever joined together by immortal God, consists of unequal parts and mutually discordant elements and contrary motions of the spheres, so that if the harmony through dissimilarity is taken away, the whole will be ruined. In the same way the best republic, if it imitates nature, which it must do, is held together stable and unshaken by those commanding and obeying, servants and lords, powerful and needy, good and wicked, strong and weak, as if by the mixed association of unlike minds. As on the lyre and in song itself the skilled ears cannot endure that sameness of harmony which is called unison; on the contrary, a pleasing harmony is produced by dissimilar notes, deep and high, combined in accordance with certain rules, so also no normal person could endure equality, or rather democratic uniformity in the state. On the other hand, a state graduated from the highest to the lowest, with the middle orders scattered between in moderate proportion, fits together in a marvelous way through complementary action. It is true this gives rise to that blight of all public affairs, the fact that people who are alike from a certain aspect think that they are altogether unlike; but, those who are in a certain degree unlike, think that they are altogether alike. If, therefore, such is the disparity of men among themselves, such the disparity of natural talent, who would divide authority, resources, honors, and offices on the basis of equality? It is as if the same food and clothing were given to boys, grown men, old men, the sick, and the strong and by this reasoning they think to preserve equality. Hobbes on Equality >The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in their mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security: For if we look on men fullgrown, and consider how brittle the frame of our human body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdom itself perishes with it) and how easy a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equals who can do equal things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can do equal things. All men therefore among themselves are by nature equal. >The question whether of two men be the more worthy, belongs not to the natural, but civil state; for it has been showed before, Cap. I. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equal, and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civil law. I know that Aristotle in the first book of Politics affirms as a foundation of the whole political science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others only to serve; as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptness, that is, a certain kind of natural knowledge, or ignorance; which foundation is not only against reason (as but now has been showed) but also against experience: for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himself, than to yield himself to the government of another; neither if the wiser and stronger do contest, have these ever, or often the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equal by nature, the equality is to be acknowledged, or whether unequal, because they are like to contest for dominion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, that they be esteemed as equal; and therefore it is in the eight place of the Law of nature, That every man be accounted by nature equal to another, the contrary to which Law is PRIDE. >Some there are who are discontented with the government under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many, should so far excel in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from under the Dominion of one God. But this exception against one is suggested by envy, while they see one man in possession of what all desire: for the same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few commanded, unless they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equal Right, surely an Oligarchy must be unreasonable also. But because we have showed that the state of equality is the state of war, and that therefore inequality was introduc'd by a general consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have voluntarily given more to, enjoys more, is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his Unity. >This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Sovereign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of less power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Sovereign appears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Sovereignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. >And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince as his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the Sun. >The inequality of subjects proceeds from the acts of sovereign power, and therefore has no more place in the presence of the sovereign; that is to say, in a court of justice, than the inequality between kings and their subjects in the presence of the King of kings. The honour of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aids they give to men of inferior rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do are not extenuated, but aggravated, by the greatness of their persons, because they have the least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great proceed in this manner. Impunity makes insolence; insolence, hatred; and hatred, an endeavor to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness, though with the ruin of the Commonwealth.

From Homer: Too many kings can ruin an army-mob rule! Let there be one commander, one master only! DPRK Children's Cartoon on single-minded unity: So, the nine men on the boat were all steersmen Too many cooks spoil the broth As there's one guide in the flock, so there should be one steersman on the boat So, there should be one steersman on the boat.

"For even Leo writes in his history, that the people of Africa hold it for an infallible maxim, that a prince which is but weak in forces, shall always defeat a stronger army that has two generals." -Jean Bodin "But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute Monarchy is the best State of government, that not only Kings, but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to Nobles, give the whole command of war to one only, and that so absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way of this must be noted also, that no King can give a General greater authority over his army, than he himself by Right may exercise over all his subjects). Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the Camps. But what else, are many Commonwealths, than so many Camps strengthened with arms…." -Thomas Hobbes

"It is not only Homer, then, who calls the Princes the Shepherds of nations; it is the Holy Ghost. This name sufficiently warns them to provide for the need of the whole flock, that is to say the whole People… It is a royal right to provide for the needs of the People." -Bossuet Most people ardently believe in their politics, because they believe it will provide for them, and that it sustains them. It is the very compelling. When they believe the father provides for his children, that the shepherd feeds his flock, and the household management, that the political authority and state are best expressed and organized by one ruler. Egyptian Teachings of a Man for his Son (Praise extracts): >Praise the King, may you love him, as a worker. He makes radiant by the giving of his powers. He is greater than a million men for the one he has favored. He is the shield for the one who makes him content… Praise the King, adore the King. That is the post before god. Spread his powers, rejoicing when he has decreed and devising plans for what he has desired… He is the bodily health of the nameless. He exercises his body for him. He is the right arm of the man whose arms are weak. Egyptian Loyalist Teaching >He is the sun in whose leadership people live >Whoever is under his light will be great in wealth >He gives sustenance to his followers >He feeds the man who sticks to his path >the man he favors will be a lord of offerings >the man he rejects will be a pauper >He is Khuum for every body "For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved, because the preservation of life being the end for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience to him in whose power it is to save or destroy him." -Thomas Hobbes The Monarch should ideally be seen as a provider, & then also the throne a source of wisdom. Any belief or disbelief in Monarchy pertains to these two things. Notice, how in DPRK, Kim Jong Un is called Teacher, & the WPK firmly believes in his leadership–because they trust in his leadership and his wisdom. And also notice, how Kim Jong Un is called Father, because ideally the Monarch is the caretaker of his people and has a kinship with them. Every household is under one head, & the Monarch as the one ruler will teach its members to live rightly & rule the royal state itself like a political household under one head. The anarchist & democratic worldview don't think that one ruler is important–talk about the conceit of the people to be a body without a head, a family without a father, or sheep without a shepherd. Anyone who sows disbelief in Monarchy says that the Monarch cannot provide for his subjects, like a father cannot provide for his children. But the Monarchist mentality believes in household management (where the term economic originates) and the household is a Monarchy – we firmly believe that by nature, a father provides for his children, and that a shepherd provides for his flock, and that political authority and organization of the state is best expressed by one ruler.

Jean Bodin >As for the right of coining money, it is of the same nature as law, and only he who has the power to make law can regulate the coinage. That is readily evident from the Greek, Latin, and French terms, for the word nummus [in Latin] is from the Greek word nomos, and [the French] loi (law) is at the root of aloi (alloy), the first letter of which is dropped by those who speak precisely. Indeed, after law itself, there is nothing of greater consequence than the title, value, and measure of coins, as we have shown in a separate treatise, and in every well-ordered state, it is the sovereign prince alone who has this power. Thomas Hobbes >And the Right of Distribution of Them – The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the constitution of Mine, and Thine, and His, that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongs in all kinds of Commonwealth to the Sovereign power…. And this they well knew of old, who called that Nomos, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own. >All Estates of Land Proceed Originally – From the Arbitrary Distribution of the Sovereign – In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land itself: wherein the Sovereign assigns to every man a portion, according as he, and not according to any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Commonwealth in the Wilderness, but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise, which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their General: Who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made nevertheless but twelve portions of the Land… And though a People coming into possession of a land by war, do not always exterminate the ancient Inhabitants, (as did the Jews) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as of the people of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour. Dante Alighieri >And I urge you not only to rise up to meet him, but to stand in reverent awe before his presence, ye who drink of his streams, and sail upon his seas; ye who tread the sands of the shores and the summits of the mountains that are his; ye who enjoy all public rights and possess all private property by the bond of his law, and no otherwise. Be ye not like the ignorant, deceiving your own selves, after the manner of them that dream, and say in their hearts, 'We have no Lord'. King James VI & I >It is evident by the rolles of our Chancellery (which contain our eldest and fundamental Laws) that the King is Dominus omnium bonorum [Lord of all goods], and Dominus directus totius Dominii [Direct lord of the whole dominion (that is, property)], the whole subjects being but his vassals, and from him holding all their lands as their overlord. From An Appeal to Caesar wherein gold & silver is proved to be the King Majesty's royal commodity by Thomas Violet >The Gold and Silver of the Nation, either Foreign coin, or Ingot, or the current Coin of the Kingdom, is the Soul of the Militia, and so all wise men know it, that those that command the Gold and Silver of the Kingdom, either Coin, or Bullion, to have it free at their disposal, to be Judges of the conveniency and inconveniency, or to hinder, or to give leave to transport Gold and Silver at their pleasure, is the great Wheel of the State, a most Royal Prerogative inherent in Your Majesty, Your Heirs and Successors, (and none other whomsoever, but by Your Majesty's License, and cannot be parted with to any Persons, but by Your Majesty most especial Grant;) your Majesty, and your Privy Councel being by the Law the only proper Judges Alexander Hamilton >"Were there any room to doubt, that the sole right of the territories in America was vested in the crown, a convincing argument might be drawn from the principle of English tenure… By means of the feudal system, the King became, and still continues to be, in a legal sense, the original proprietor, or lord paramount, of all the lands in England.*—Agreeable to this rule, he must have been the original proprietor of all the lands in America, and was, therefore, authorized to dispose of them in what manner he thought proper."

Q: What will it take for people to believe in Royal Monarchy? A: Firstly, the Monarch should be a source of Wisdom, like a Teacher; secondly, the Monarch should be a provider/caretaker, like a Father; thirdly, the Monarch should be a Protector, like a Soldier; fourthly, the Monarch should make the people believe there is a blood relation “of the same blood & suckled by the same milk” for the nation under a king, that king is kin, that the king is father of the people, that the palace is the center of political life, & a lifelong royal bond of King & Country, that is firmly political–"And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; …the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood [and suckled 'with the same milk']" -Aristotle, Politics ; fifthly Pre-eminence of Monarchy & Majesty, being the whole in relation to the part, “I am the State.”. The state should be ordered like a political household under one ruler: “If we consider the household, whose end is to teach its members to live rightly, there is a need for one called the pater-familias, or for some one holding his place to direct and govern.” -Dante Alighieri “When the interests of mankind are at stake, they will obey with joy the man whom they believe to be wiser than themselves… You may see how the sick man will beg the doctor to tell him what he ought to do, how a whole ship's company will listen to the pilot, how travellers will cling to one who knows the way better, as they believe, than they do themselves. 'You would have me understand', said Cyrus, 'that the best way to secure obedience is to be thought wiser than those we rule?' 'Yes', said Cambyses, 'that is my belief.'” -Xenophon, Cyropaedia “None quicker, my lad, than this: wherever you wish to seem wise, be wise.” -Xenophon, Cyropaedia “Well, my son, it is plain that where learning is the road to wisdom, learn you must, as you learn your battalion-drill, but when it comes to matters which are not to be learnt by mortal men, nor foreseen by mortal minds, there you can only become wiser than others by communicating with the gods through the art of divination. But, always, whenever you know that a thing ought to be done, see that it is done, and done with care; for care, not carelessness, is the mark of the wise man.” -Xenophon, Cyropaedia “For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of monarchy to be paternal rule.” -Aristotle (Comment: Take notice of “since the father cares for his children”, for caretaker/provider, being an ideal for Monarchy, like a father) “The rule of a father over his children is royal, for he rules by virtue both of love and of the respect due to age, exercising a kind of royal power. And therefore Homer has appropriately called Zeus 'father of Gods and men,' because he is the king of them all. For a king is the natural superiour of his subjects, but he should be of the same kin or kind with them, and such is the relation of elder and younger, of father and son.” -Aristotle Monarchists should also believe in the Pre-eminence of Monarchy like stated for the Great Founder. “And yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors…” -Aristotle – This ties in with Household rule, & the royal monarch who establishes the state (whether it be a city or country or empire or any political bond) as the Great Founder. A city made like a great household, an Absolutist would see (in disagreement w/ Aristotle here, but confirming that royal rule is household rule. A great monarch knows his pre-eminence when he is the Great Founder who established the state, & became the progenitor of a people. As God & New Jerusalem, Akhenaten & Amarna, Ramses II & Pi-Ramses, Alexander the Great & Alexandria, Romulus & Rome, Constantine & Constantinople, Louis XIV & Versailles, Emp. Peter I & St. Petersburg, revealed this pre-eminence.

A Bumper Harvest in the Chongsan Plain Who has brought this happiness? Our Party has brought it. Who has brought this happiness? It is thanks to the Leader!

The reason why Emperors and other rulers have their faces on coins is to signify how they are providers. It is another means for the State to teach its values, since people should believe whatever provides for them. So imagine you go to get your daily bread, with money bearing the visage of your Sovereign. Joseph de Maistre >Everyone knows the famous line, <The first king was a fortunate soldier >This is perhaps one of the falsest claims that has ever been made. Quite the opposite could be said, that <The first soldier was paid by a king

Robert Filmer / Directive Power >The first Father had not only simply power, but power monarchical, as he was a Father, immediately from God. For by the appointment of God, as soon as Adam was created he was monarch of the world, though he had no subjects; for though there could not be actual government until there were subjects, yet by the right of nature it was due to Adam to be governor of his posterity: though not in act, yet at least in habit. Adam was a King from his creation: and in the state of innocency he had been governor of his children; for the integrity or excellency of the subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the governor. >but as for directive power, the condition of human nature requires it, since civil society cannot be imagined without power of government: for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of Adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done; yet things indifferent, that depended merely on their free will, might be directed by the power of Adam's command. Political & Economic, No Different >Aristotle gives the lie to Plato, and those that say that political and economical societies are all one, and do not differ specie, but only multitudine et paucitate, as if there were 'no difference betwixt a great house and a little city'. All the argument I find he brings against them is this: 'The community of man and wife differs from the community of master and servant, because they have several ends. The intention of nature, by conjunction of male and female, is generation. But the scope of master and servant is only preservation, so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished. Because nature does not work like the cutlers at Delphos, for she makes but one thing for one use.' If we allow this argument to be sound, nothing doth follow but only this, that conjugal and despotical [lordly / master] communities do differ. But it is no consequence that therefore economical and political societies do the like. For, though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities, yet it follows not that a family and a commonwealth are distinct, because, as well in the commonweal as in the family, both these communities are found. What I think by both communties, – means the State likewise has public servants. That an economic household, with its division of labors and servants, like a chef, tutor for the master's children, and maids, are no less modeled for the City: there's no difference between political (the city) and the household (economic). >Suarez proceeds, and tells us that 'in process of time Adam had complete economical power'. I know not what he means by this complete economical power, nor how or in what it doth really and essentially differ from political. If Adam did or might exercise in his family the same jurisdiction which a King doth now in a commonweal, then the kinds of power are not distinct. And though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other, yet since the like difference is also found in political estates, it follows that economical and political power differ no otherwise than a little commonweal differs from a great one. Next, saith Suarez, 'community did not begin at the creation of Adam'. It is true, because he had nobody to communicate with. Yet community did presently follow his creation, and that by his will alone, for it was in his power only, who was lord of all, to appoint what his sons have in proper and what in common. So propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him, and it is the duty of a Father to provide as well for the common good of his children as for their particular. This is why I'm not so "right libertarian" (among many other reasons) or see economics as separate from politics. So I use the term political economy. The economy itself is a kind of governance, and also the State governs through the economy and by these means. Play a city management game or tycoon and this is all apparent, I guess. Thomas Hobbes – That a Family is a little City >"Propriety receiv'd its beginning, What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in the Fathers of Families, that objection is vain, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City. For the Sons of a Family have propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht indeed from the rest of the Sons of the same Family, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Father, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things." Maistre on Sovereignty >If sovereignty is not anterior to the people, at least these two ideas are collateral, since a sovereign is necessary to make a people. It is as impossible to imagine a human society, a people, without a sovereign as a hive and bees without a queen: for, by virtue of the eternal laws of nature, a swarm of bees exists in this way or it does not exist at all. Society and sovereignty are thus born together; it is impossible to separate these two ideas. Imagine an isolated man: there is no question of laws or government, since he is not a whole man and society does not yet exist. Put this man in contact with his fellowmen: from this moment you suppose a sovereign. The first man was king over his children; each isolated family was governed in the same way. But once these families joined, a sovereign was needed, and this sovereign made a people of them by giving them laws, since society exists only through the sovereign. >There was a people, some sort of civilization, and a sovereign as soon as men came into contact. The word people is a relative term that has no meaning divorced from the idea of sovereignty: for the idea of a people involves that of an aggregation around a common center, and without sovereignty there can be no political unity or cohesion….

"They who compare a City and its Citizens, with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City, is the relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man. But it appears by what has been already said, that he who is endued with such a power (whether it be a man, or a Court) has a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soul to the body. For it is the soul by which a man has a will, that is, can either will, or nill." -Hobbes >Hobbes expressed society as a combination of the people, as the body of the society, and the monarchy, as the soul of the society, making a healthy commonwealth. Without the soul the body dies and so it is with society for Hobbes. Civil war should be avoided because it is "the process of a society losing its soul". "The other error in this his first argument is that he says the members of every Commonwealth, as of a natural body, depend one of another. It is true they cohere together, but they depend only on the sovereign, which is the soul of the Commonwealth" -Hobbes "The error concerning mixed government has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifies not the concord, but the UNION of many men.." -Hobbes "No otherwise than Theseus his ship, which although it were an hundred times changed by putting in of new planks, yet still retained the old name. But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly bears up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no no longer a ship, but an ill favoured houp of wood; even so a Commonwealth, without a sovereignty of power, which UNITES in one body ALL members and families of the same is no more a Commonwealth, neither can by and means long endure. And not to depart from our similitude; as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people into diverse places dispersed, or be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that makes the city, but the UNION of the people under the same sovereignty of government." -Jean Bodin >Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power…. being indeed about to become much more happy if they had a sovereign prince, which with his authority and power might (as doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so unite and bind them fast in happiness together. >For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one sovereign prince in every Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend >Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens "But as a ship, if the keel (which strongly bears up the prow, the poup, the ribs, and tacklings) be taken away, is no longer a ship, but an ill favoured houp of wood." -Jean Bodin "And not to depart from our similitude; as a ship may be quite broken up, or altogether consumed with fire; so may also the people into diverse places dispersed, or be utterly destroyed, the City or state yet standing whole; for it is neither the walls, neither the persons, that makes the city, but the UNION of the people under the same sovereignty of government." -Jean Bodin Basically saying, the ship is well defined by the unity of the ship – so likewise the State. So the City / the Political / the State has all concerning the upbringing of its citizens. And this is no less arranged AND orchestrated in the Free World than in totalitarian regimes.

States are defined by an individual, indivisible, and majestic power, called Sovereignty, being the unity itself and the supreme power. To be a Monarch is to be supreme. Political Supremacy is the foundation of political order. Anons might say, Gracefag, you self-contradict Thinking of >>5034 the 3rd screencap. About the not self-sufficing individual, but also the Pre-Eminent Monarch who founded the State, taught men a social bond, and became the soul of this Commonwealth, sufficient for himself? How is it that one person like monarchy becomes the soul or has the relation of the whole apart from many like democracy, when we consider an individual insufficient for himself? Or master of the State itself? Woof. Woof. I will explain myself on why the Pre-eminent Monarch is the exception to the rule. As I said the State as a bond is defined by an individual, indivisible, majestic power, called Sovereignty. And also Hobbes went on to say, that the Commonwealth has one soul. Also, they depend upon the sovereign. My view of Monarchy is it is a political form of State. The Pre-Eminent Monarch is the State. I do not deny the political in this respect. Bodin also made the case that the Pre-Eminent Monarch should govern with laws. >Wherefore Aristotle is deceived, in deeming the Commonweale then to be happy, when it shall chance to have a prince of so great virtue and wisdom, as that he both can and will with greatest equity, govern his subjects without laws. For why, the law is not made for the prince, but for the subjects in general. The law being a strong social force. Woof, I also point to Must be either a BEAST or a God line. Think about Monarchy. This is one person set above myriads of people. One ruler alone with a relationship either on par with or that of a superior to myriads of people and to command them. It's for this reason Louis XIV's motto was Nec Pluribus Impar or Not Unequal to Many or Hobbes said that this Leviathan was a Mortal God or that Bodin talked about the Dictator's edicts being religiously observed. Bodin also asserted that the Sovereign Monarch has the relationship of a superior. Pretty much as if it were the case with Monarchy. Bodin says, "It is one thing to bind all together, and to bind every one in particular: for so all the citizens particularly swore to the observation of the laws, but not all together [meaning, the People itself is absolute]; for that every one of them in particular was bound unto the power of them all in general. But an oath could not be given by them all: for why, the people in general is a certain universal body, in power and nature divided from every man in particular. Then again to say truly, an oath cannot be made but by a lesser to the greater, but in a popular estate nothing can be greater than the whole body of the people themselves. But in a monarchy it is otherwise, where every one in particular, and all the people in general, and (as it were) in one body, must swear to the observation of the laws, and their faithful allegiance to one sovereign monarch; who next unto God (of whom he holds his scepter & power) is bound to no man. For an oath carries always with it reverence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still given unto a superiour."

No Motherland Without You >We are unable, to survive without you >Our nation cannot, exist without you >Our fate, and ambitions, depends on you >Peoples' fates depend on you, Comrade Kim Jong-il

The City of Rome was founded by Romulus Who was raised by a dog. The first King of Rome, in this instance, was like the pre-eminent person who founded the State, but more BEAST than God.

States are totalitarian by their very nature. If the State upholds the relation of the Whole before all else, that is, the Total. It must be totalitarian. And if men are political animals, like Aristotle ascribes to Bees and Ants, then they are orchestrated and arranged no less in a totalitarian fashion and not independent from the State; and if the State is itself a great household and composed of various households, with diverse unities and one unity to make them one bond as a city as a total / whole, they depend on their unity, like the body depends on the soul. So the household itself is defined by the unity of the father; so likewise the State is defined by the unity of the Sovereign. Forget whether it is a city-state, nation-state, or empire, what matters is the bond and unity of that political power; we simply take the state principle and extend it beyond. These are all semantics of size of the State, but in the world there can be city-states, nation-states, and empires, like we see today. >Further, the State is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. The chicken comes before the egg, in this sense. When families are isolated and there is inbreeding, the family suffers. When a family keeps children to themselves and doesn't allow children to benefit from learning valuable skills, the family suffers. When you drink water and the body itself and all parts receive water, it is good. When you drink water and water only goes to some parts and denies the body itself, it is bad. When the water benefits all parts and the body itself, that is the common good; the common good is what benefits all involved in a general and particular way. It wouldn't benefit it if the vast majority (like a democracy) benefited without benefiting the whole itself; so it must be a sovereign body, being the unity itself, where all parts depend, before it could be considered for the common benefit. The family does need a good pot of soil to prosper, like parents consider where they will move, the neighborhood, and the conditions surrounding them, before they deem it a place their family could prosper. >families independent Families are generally not independent, unless they are so great and powerful they are like a state themselves. It is conceded that the family itself is a little city, in a true micro-macro fashion. Though generally the body-politic comes first. Many people make a pretense of all kinds of independent bodies, family included, but man being a political and totalitarian animal is not independent from the political order. The family is part of the State anatomy as a whole; as you don't go building a city without houses, and the family is usually a colony of a greater body with generations upon generations of people. ... There are many guilty parties (like Hallerfags) and rightwing anarchists who scoff the name civilization itself or "civil society" or think of the tyranny of the common good... but these traditionalists are going against the grain rather than with the grain and they will suffer for it by their own folly. For many who don't understand or see the State anatomy will conjure up a "Deep State" or go amiss, seeing double and not making out the connection all these things have, because they don't understand like Plato and Bodin affirm that political and economical are no different.

>>5057 They conjure up a "universalist slippery slope" also, but it doesn't have to be this way. Like Bodin rightly points out, we must revere what we have in general and in particular, that Bodin also criticized in Plato for seeing all things in common. As long as we understand what we have in general and in particular, there is harmony in the State. As the State itself is a union of things general and in particular, the particular buildings themselves and the various economic industries, though seen in private, serve the common benefit; and the common benefit and flow of goods benefits each in particular. And like a sense of propriety, but also public property and and private property as particulars. ... The particulars of the body, however, depend on the body itself, and that is why the particular households of a city depend on the city itself; and why traditionalists are in folly to think that though they go innawoods and make a pretense of being independent, simply because they go a distance from the city, that they'll be independent... when they don't even figure in their post-apc farmville scenario the long-term consequences of civilization falling apart, where they first started to receive and benefit with all the seeds, tools, supplies and all the experience of other people and their professions... would harm them in the long-term. ... For like Bodin says, it's not the walls or the persons that makes a city, but their union. They could be scattered and dispersed, even dead; we could look upon a bunch of dead denizens of an establishment, the same way a tattered ship is discerned and understood by the composition itself.

The whole has a superior relationship to the part, like the relationship of general to particular, like greater to lesser. Though that doesn't mean there isn't what we have general and particular. ... There's also a misconception that corporations and various industries and private entities are independent from the governance; though like we say we don't go about building a city without houses. These various industries benefit the City and in fact ARE the governance of the State, being in relation of the State anatomy itself, composed of masters and servants, and those who provide and receive; it is for the benefit of a city, that various employments deliver substance for its parts and work for the benefit of their common bond. These are all a governance of the State; how many hours you work, and what you are instructed and taught by these corporations, what you are told to behave and mimic... these are without a doubt part of the State governance in teaching its citizens or subjects. ... This folly only persists because these anarchists (both left & right) try their hardest to imagine the State without a Master. They try to imagine a family without a father. A shepherd without a flock. A body without a head. A political body without a State. All because they are so conceited in self-governance and having no directing power to arrange and orchestrate these all. It is the same thing over and over, with the democratic view of all having a hand in their affairs; though if it would be conceded that people are self-governing, it will not be without a union or sovereign power, to direct and govern, like Filmer says, but as for the directive power, the condition of human nature requires it, since civil society cannot be imagined without power of government and Archibald Kennedy says, And this political Authority has been allowed the supreme Director, in all States, in all Ages, and in all Places; and without it, there would be a Failure of Justice.

The means by which any sovereign could govern could change – it's not something that is really fixed. Keep in mind, that the Sovereign Monarch from the absolutist stance is seen as the unity itself, and not as a symbol of that unity (as ceremonialists would have it). And that the Sovereign Monarch is the State and political unity, and that the Sovereign Monarch's government IS his method of governing, that could be mixed, whereas the State is unmixed. To understand this point of view from Absolutism, you should recognize the Royal Weaver & how it is related to the idea of the indivisibility of Sovereignty. The Sovereign Monarch is the Royal Weaver. He is an indivisible power, has the relationship of the general to particular, meaning pre-eminence and an infinite majesty. For the meaning of Sovereignty is also Majesty. He is the State, and the government is his method of governing – that's how I would say, it does differ from the constitutionalist view. Traditionalists don't really disagree with constitutionalism in principle, but only that it is written and their view of conscience and rights. And that the Written Constitutionalism is a Protestant rehash of Sola Scriptura. They still pretty much are for the mixed constitution. Whereas the constitutionalist narrative is that it has effectively replaced absolutism, and borrowed its concept of sovereignty and of unity… I obviously am not convinced or sold on that narrative, and also believe that they haven't taken that view of Sovereignty from absolutists wholeheartedly since they deny pre-eminence and since they don't believe in the indivisibility of the Sovereign. "In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the government so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kinds of Estates, or Commonweales. For we have before shewed, that there is a great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of a government of a Monarchy, to be Oligarchic and Popular." -Bodin "Wherefore let us firmly set down and resolve there are but three forms of Commonweals, and no more, and those simple also, and without any confused mixture of the with another, albiet that the government be sometimes contrary to the state. As a Monarchy is contrary to a Democracy or popular estate; and yet nevertheless the sovereignty may be in one only prince, who may popularly govern his estate, as I have before said; and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popular estate with a Monarchy, which are states of themselves incompatible, but is well (as it were) combining of a Monarchy with a popular government, the most assured Monarchy that is." -Jean Bodin

On the Indivisibility of Sovereignty: https://arcade.stanford.edu/rofl/indivisibility-sovereignty

"Whenever Sovereignty seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights of which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution." -Rousseau

John Cook, regicide and lawyer from the trial of King Charles I. Cook writes here, Greater than any one, but less than all I have a few responses to this doctrine. Aristotle >and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of the Whole to a part The pre-eminent Monarch is a whole other ballpark. He brings up the Duke of Venice, what I guess John Cook means to say an elective kingdom and mixed state, and surely says this cannot refer to absolute Monarchs. Yet an absolute Monarch has the relationship of the Whole, the State being unmixed and the Monarch a superior, not taking any turn or being mixed/ A mixed State (which absolutists deny) would set the Monarchy as a mere part, not a whole, in equal basis with other forms of state, mixed with them as another mere component and not as the whole itself. This could be a Monarchy where the monarch is a subject of a superior form of state, whether it be oligarchy or democracy. Jean Bodin >But in a monarchy it is otherwise, where every one in particular, and all the people in general, and (as it were) in one body, must swear to the observation of the laws, and their faithful allegiance to one Sovereign Monarch,; who next unto God (of whom he holdeth his scepter and power) is bound to no man. For an oath carries with it reverence unto whom, or in whose name it is made, as still given unto a superiour. So the Monarch is a superior to both the people in particular and in general on Bodin's terms. Has a pre-eminence, or majesty, called Sovereignty. Francis Theobald (3rd pic) >"That the King is greater than any particular single man, but less than the whole body of men in a nation." >"If there be any force in this way of arguing, by the same reason it will follow, that a flock of sheep are more excellent than a man, because the shepherd is found out for the sheep, and not the sheep for the shepherd; for if there were no flocks of sheep, there would be no need of a shepherd." Thomas Hobbes >This great Authority being indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Sovereignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Sovereign Kings, though they be Singulis Majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis Minores, of less power than them all together. For if by All Together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then All Together, and Every One, signify the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by All Together, they understand them as one Person (which person the Sovereign appears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Sovereign's power; and so again the speech is absurd; which absurdity they see well enough, when the Sovereignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Sovereignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed. What I think John Cook is referring to is the food argument / water argument, that one wise man might outwit each person from a council, regardless they all together can bring more "food" to the table in terms of knowledge. My opinion is pre-eminence is another ballpark: the pre-eminent Monarch has the relationship of the whole and like Aristotle says is a kind of god or beast; that's why Hobbes calls the Leviathan a "Mortal God". The question of pre-eminence is always whatever justifies this Monarch to be a superior or on par to them all in general and has the relationship of the general to particular.

My dislike of Jouvenel is an antipathy run wild. Jouvenel always making slants against monarchical absolutism in his writings and under the influence of Tocquevillism. Everything I like about Monarchy, Jouvenel writes off as ugly and undesirable, modernity and atomization, condemns the pre-eminence of one. No thanks to them, traditionalists are the most ardent enemies of monarchists such as myself who stress the pre-eminence of one and absolute monarchy. >"Where will it all end? In the destruction of all other command for the benefit of one alone – that of the State. In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority, a freedom the price of which is complete submission to the State. In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master – the State. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the State, and in denial of every pre-eminence which is not approved by the State. In a word, it ends in the atomization of society, and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is now their common bondage to the State. The extremes of Individualism and Socialism meet: that was their predestined course." Bertrand De Jouvenel >Destruction of all other command for the benefit of one alone It is the fundamental law of monarchy, that one person is the sovereign authority. One person alone is deemed to be pre-eminent and a kind of superior in a state monarchical. >In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority Aristotle in Politics writes that households make up the State. Family is part of the State infrastructure, and like Bodin says we cannot imagine a city without houses. That's how the State functions. >In the complete equality as between themselves of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master The Sovereign Monarch humbles both great and small, rich and poor, great nobles and great multitudes. Hobbes on the humility of all subjects before a Sovereign [Monarch]: >And as the power, so also the honour of the sovereign, ought to be greater than that of any or all the subjects. For in the sovereignty is the fountain of honour. The dignities of lord, earl, duke, and prince as his creatures. As in the presence of the master, the servants are equal, and without any honour at all; so are the subjects, in the presence of the sovereign. And though they shine some more, some less, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the Sun >and in denial of every pre-eminence There is only one pre-eminence. Pre-eminence is synonymous with the State. That's why Louis XIV says, "I am the State". Aristotle says, >The proof that the State is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the Whole. And yet says for the prince of pre-eminence: >and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of the Whole to a part >and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man That's a contradiction, a tie is a common bond. I conjecture it is "atomization" to focus on what they have in private rather than in common. Take a family and it's good that children have a particular bond to their parents, but it is also very good they mingle with other children. A family tree benefits from a good pot of soil. How should children have future lives, if parents forbid their children to associate with other children? They would be atomized and it would be the children's detriment for not learning social skills from their peers. Jean Bodin makes the case for what we have in particular and in general. If everyone had been kings in general, we would have no king in particular, and vice versa: There can be no kings, if every man was a king. Hobbes stressed the need for parents to educate their children. >whose only bond is now their common bondage to the State That's what the State has, their bond in general and particular. Jouvenel rants to Hobbes how man is a political animal, so this is pretty much natural. Making any pretense about "State apparatus" and "machine government" puts cookies in Hobbes' cookie jar rather than against it. >The extremes of Individualism and Socialism meet I consider this a good thing. That's exactly what I have in mind for Monarchy. The individual thumb and the collective fingers meet to their benefit.

The state of Monarchy has to be asserted. The traditionalists hate the pre-eminence of one. They demand an Oligarchy, of myriad petty kinglets and nobles. They have an inability to understand Majesty as in a Monarchy. That's why Monarchy must be re-asserted with masterly power. That's why Homer & Caligula said, "Let there be one Lord, one King." There was a time when being king was among many other kings, and nothing especial with pre-eminence. Others consider this a natural state of kingship, back when there were many families, like Bossuet, but later coalesced into the grand estate of Monarchy, when a Monarch ruled supreme and brought the pre-eminence of one. The traditionalists today want to go back to myriad petty kings. "So also might we say of the state of Lacedemonians, which was a pure Oligarchy, wherein were two kings, without any sovereignty at all, being indeed nothing but Captains and Generals for the managing of their wars: and for that cause were by the other magistrates of the state, sometimes for their faults condemned to fines… And such were in ancient times the kings of the cities of the Gauls, whom Caesar for this cause oftentimes called Regulos, that is to say little kings: being themselves subjects, and justiciable unto the Nobility, who had all the sovereignty." -Jean Bodin O - People believe and follow him with one mind There is mention early pre-eminence of one. The task of Monarchists is to re-create the pre-eminence of one. by whatever means, whether raveling back to its natural majesty or artificially inflating it like a balloon.

The task of Monarchists is to re-create the pre-eminence of one. by whatever means. I reject the idea that Monarchy is not to be distinguished as its own form of State. Or simply another aristocrat or one among equals; the Sovereign Monarch is a kind of superior to everyone and is but one person. There are 3 forms of State: Monarchy (one), Oligarchy (few), Democracy (many) As not only Bodin ascribes, but also as far-reaching as the classic Herodotus Debate that outlines three State forms between Monarchy, Oligarchy, and Democracy. An absolutist is keen on upholding this tradition of political thought. Aristocracy and Tyranny could be ascribed to these forms of State, but aren't forms of State in themselves. There is such a thing as a tyrannical Monarchy or a royal Monarchy; but that could be characteristic of democracies and oligarchies as well. Monarchy itself is among the rule of the best, and it is acknowledged the virtues of a few men: but the pre-eminence of one, and that great unity of the State, is not to be denied. "There can be no fourth, and indeed none can be conceived, for virtue and viciousness do not create a type of rule. Whether the prince is unjust or worthy, nevertheless the state is still a monarchy. The same thing must be said about oligarchy and the rule of the people, who, while they have no powers but the creation of magistrates, still have the sovereignty, and on them the form of government necessarily depends. We shall then call the form one of optimates, or else popular (let us use these words in order that we may not rather often be forced to use the names aristocracy, oligarchy democracy, ochlocarcy, according to the type of virtue of vice)." -Jean Bodin What is worse than the harshest tyranny in the world Jean Bodin calls Anarchy.

Carefully acknowledge these definitions Aristocracy = Rule of the Best Oligarchy = Rule of Few Plutocracy = Rule of Wealthy Nobility = Class ranks and honors Royalty = Rule by Kings / Queens (a kind of nobility) Monarchy = Rule of One But I only acknowledge 3 forms of State: Monarchy, Oligarchy, Democracy. Oligarchy, in the sense, as simply the few, not whether these few men are good or bad. In the same way, there can be a Monarchy, with a king or a tyrant; or even without a king. It doesn't necessarily have to be a King or even wear a crown to be called Monarchy. So long as there is one person invested with majesty (or sovereignty) with the relationship of general to particular and is perpetual, then this person is a Sovereign Monarch. It doesn't matter what this person is wearing. Since all rulers seem to have the same expertise, whether this be a statesman, a king, a household manager or despot, or even a dictator, it doesn't matter -- it is for us whether it be but one statesman, one king, one household manager, or one dictator with a perpetual sovereignty and relationship of general to particular, formally called pre-eminence. Two kings would not be a monarchy, but a diarchy (which would be a kind of Oligarchy). It's fairly simple as.

"Republicanism vs Monarchism" distinction wasn't always a thing. Jean Bodin's "Six Books of a Commonwealth" was originally called "Les Six livres de la République", but later as that tension grew on and that distinction developed the English translation changed the word "Republic" to "Commonwealth" in Richard Knolles' translation since by then the "monarchist vs republican" dichotomy had since then developed. "Commonwealth" basically means the "public good" and I have read bloggers who disagree with Bodin strictly because they thought he was "too republican" for his study of the Roman state and the word "Republic" <How is the term "Republic" like "Commonwealth" used in this sense, and why does Bodin use the term "Republic" and "Commonwealth" for Hobbes' Leviathan? Here's an important distinction The term "Republic" is a word for the State itself rather than the "form of state". In my terms, there are 3 forms of state and no such thing as a 4th mixed state, but only 3: monarchy, oligarchy, democracy. <Why the term "Republic" with State itself doesn't bother you? The State itself is synonymous with the political. Hobbes in his works refers to the State sometimes as the "City" and that's how politics in principle extended itself even beyond city-states to being the nature of states in general. Republic is understood in the same way to refer to the City since the City itself is the public good or "commonweal". <how then does Bodin's use of the term "Republic" matter? Because we somewhat universally back what Plato says, that there's no distinction between what is economical (household) or political (city). As if there were no difference between a great household or a small state, that no matter whether it be a king, a statesman, a dictator, or household manager, they all govern and have the same expertise and craft anyways. … Hobbes calls a family a little city and uses that to refute the view that there were families before the institution of commonwealths or cities. The same is understood when we use the term "public servants" for statesmen, since servants are something a household management has, whether it be a domestic master and slave or any business or industry with boss and employee. Aristotle called it an erroneous view to see no difference between a great household and small state, but does mention how a Monarch should treat his subjects like his own kin and offspring and foreigners like slaves (I think) and how a Monarchy rules various kinds of state, like cities, nations, or empires like a household.

>Around 1670, Louis XIV had decided to build a hotel which would house officers wounded in battle or who had fallen into poverty. The edict establishing the Hôtel Royal des Invalides dates from April 1674. The composition presents Royal Wisdom (symbolized by Minerva) and Royal Piety as being at the origin of the creation of the Invalides. >Minerva personifies Royal Wisdom, which is also at the origin of the project for the Hôtel Royal des Invalides. Around 1670, Louis XIV had decided to build a hotel that would house officers wounded in service. The edict of establishment of the hotel dates from April 1674, but the medal of the History of the king which was struck for its inauguration bears the date of 1675. This medal includes a bird's eye view of the building quite close to the painting in the Hall of Mirrors (only the foreground differs). Let us add that the architectural plan is a traditional attribute of Magnificence which is undoubtedly also mentioned here: the word is even used in the text of the Mercure galant of December 1684. >The soldiers seen on the right are the beneficiaries of royal piety: soldiers whom “long service, or the misfortunes of war, had rendered useless” and who were “constrained to seek in the charity of the people, a relief to their miseries” (Mercure galant December 1684). The soldier in the foreground is kneeling with his arms crossed on his chest in deep gratitude; one wonders if he wears a bandage on his left arm or if it is simply the white fabric of his shirt; the one in the background receives the military order of Saint-Lazare of Jerusalem (according to the Mercure galant , but this identification is questioned by Virginie Bar [2003] who writes that the cross of Saint-Lazare “was not white, as is the case here, but purple and green, edged in gold. In fact it seems that the painter represented some decoration which was logically identified with that of Saint-Lazare which, before the creation of the order of Saint-Louis [1693], rewarded the merit of soldiers”). The preparatory drawing kept at the Louvre Museum (inv. 29759) is very close to the description of the Mercure galant (1684) where it is written that Piety gives “the order of S. Lazare to officers” and “money to soldiers”.

>The king is painted on his throne, his feet resting on a red cushion; his right hand rests on the tiller of the government and at the same time points to the Harpyes pursued by Minerva; in his left hand he holds the golden key to the casket of the royal treasury which he hands to Loyalty (this key was added by Charles Le Brun at the very last moment: it does not appear in the box kept in the museum of Louvre, inventory 29950). Fidelity shows the sovereign the books of accounts; suppliant France is on her knees before him; the king is dressed in armor and the fleur-delysed blue mantle. François Charpentier (1684) summarizes the subject by writing: “the care of finances has always occupied the greatest princes, who by this means make themselves formidable to their enemies, and put themselves in a position to relieve their subjects”. >The Harpyes are painted as emaciated old women with bat wings carrying bags and vases of gold coins. In the cartoon preparing the composition, Charles Le Brun represented them placing their clawed hands on the allegory of France, to signify that they were bleeding the kingdom by their prevarications; the Harpyes designate the partisans who were responsible for levying taxes for the benefit of the state but using them in passing. Their flight is undoubtedly an allusion to the court of justice of November 1661 to which the date of "1662" in the inscription certainly alludes; the Mercure galant of December 1684 specifies that the Harpyes appear "the accounts that were made to be rendered to those who had plundered the finances of which they had had the handling" (with each new reign a chamber of justice was responsible for making " give back" to the partisans to satisfy public opinion). >The allegory of Fidelity is painted near the king with the attributes of an account book which she shows to the sovereign, a ruler, a dog and the casket of the royal treasure surmounted by bags of gold coins. The dog is the attribute of Fidelity in Iconology because “experience shows every day that it is the most faithful of animals”. This allegory is certainly an allusion to the reform of the management of finances carried out by Colbert, who had account books established for the king with the receipts opposite the expenditure so that he could himself have control of the expenditure of the monarchy (this is symbolized by the golden key held by the king according to Pierre Rainssant [1687]: "The king holds a golden key, to make it known that he himself wants to be the dispenser of his treasures "); Claude III Nivelon (around 1698) moreover indicated that Fidelity "represents the minister [Colbert] to whom has since been entrusted the care and economy of these treasures [of the monarchy]". Colbert wanted to highlight his absolute loyalty to the King of France.

>The allegory of France holds the design of the pyramid that Pope Alexander VII had erected at the request of Louis XIV to make reparation for the attack committed in Rome by his Corsican guards against the retinue of the Duke of Créqui, Ambassador of France . The incident took place in August 1662: Louis XIV, in retaliation, immediately occupied Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin, which forced the pope to sign a peace agreement in Pisa on February 12, 1664. In addition to the erection of the pyramid, the pope's nephew, Cardinal Chigi, came to apologize to the King of France during a solemn audience which took place at the Château de Fontainebleau on July 28, 1664 (which justifies the date added to the inscription in his state Boileau- Root). The city of Rome is painted tilted in front of France with its she-wolf in a very humble posture, her back rounded, her ears lowered. >The city of Rome is painted bowing to France. She wears a helmet decorated with the Roman wolf, a large red dress and a shield on which is inscribed the emblem of ancient Rome: S[enatus] P[opulus] Q[ue] R[omanus] (the senate and the people Roman). The Roman wolf snuggles at the feet of France, ears lowered, tongue sticking out. A figure with an expression of sadness on his face is visible behind the allegory of Rome: perhaps an allegory of sadness, that of the pope, of Rome or of the Corsicans "forever excluded from the custody of the pope" (Rainssant 1687) .

The Pre-eminence of France recognized by Spain, 1662 >The allegory of Spain bows before that of France in reparation for a diplomatic incident: when the Swedish ambassador entered the English court in October 1661, the Spanish ambassador, the Baron de Vatteville, had succeeded in having his carriage pass in front of that of France, not hesitating to kill several members of the retinue of the French ambassador, the Comte d'Estrades. It was customary for France to take precedence over other European nations. Louis XIV reacted immediately: Vatteville was dismissed and the Marquis de Fuentès, who had come to France as the King of Spain's extraordinary ambassador, presented Philippe IV's apologies to Louis XIV for this affair on March 24, 1662 at the Louvre. It is these "apologies from Spain" which justify the date of the inscription which appears in the Boileau-Racine statement. >The allegory of France is painted from the front: she wears a plumed helmet surmounted by the rooster, symbol of France, and decorated with a crown of fleur-de-lis; she is dressed in a blue fleur-de-lysé coat; his left hand is resting on the axe, elbow out, in a gesture of authority; she holds a scepter in her right hand, which rests on a shield adorned with three golden fleur-de-lis. France faces Spain, which recognizes its preeminence and apologizes to it for the violent dispute over precedence between the ambassadors of France and Spain which took place in London in October 1661. A preparatory drawing kept in the Louvre (inv. 29854) shows that Charles Le Brun had first planned to represent Louis XIV alongside France. >Spain is painted in front of France, slightly tilted; she wears a red tunic with gold brocade and a plumed helmet adorned with a crown of clover; she has her left hand on her chest to mark the sincerity of the apologies she presents to France for the behavior of her ambassador: when the Swedish ambassador entered the English court in October 1661, the Spanish ambassador, Baron de Vatteville, managed to get his carriage past that of France, not hesitating to kill several members of the retinue of the French ambassador, the Comte d'Estrades. It was customary for France to take precedence over other European nations (“by an immemorial possession” wrote François Charpentier in 1684). Louis XIV reacted immediately: Vatteville was dismissed and the Marquis de Fuentès, who had come to France as the King of Spain's extraordinary ambassador, presented Philippe IV's apologies to Louis XIV for this affair on March 24, 1662 at the Louvre. Spain points with her left hand to her lion, which lies down obediently at the feet of France, its tail between its legs; according to François Charpentier (1684), this means that “the pride of this nation had been obliged to bend in this encounter”.

Jean Bodin concerning popes >But I think no man doubts, but that the king even before his consecration enjoys both the possession and propriety of the kingdom, not by inheritance or his fathers right, and much less by the country of the bishops or peers, but by the royal law and custom of the realm, as was long since decreed of the French men, that no man should think the power of the king to depend on the pleasure of the bishops; not for that the Senat ever doubted the power of the king before his coronation; but that those vain quirks of the bishops might be utterly reselled. For it is an old proverb with us, '''That the king doth never die, but that so soon as he is dead, the next male of his stock is seized of the kingdom, and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him by succession of his father, but by virtue of the law of the land; least the succession of the kingdom should be uncertain, then which nothing can be more dangerous in a Commonweal. >And to show a greater submission of the emperors unto the popes, the subscription of the emperor's letters unto the pope, is this, I kiss the hands and feet of your Holiness. So used always the emperor Charles V to subscribe to his letters, when he writ unto pope Clement the seventh. Which he did not upon a feigned courtesy, but indeed in most humble and servile manner kissed the Pope's feet, in open sight of the people, and the greatest assemblies of many noble princes, at Bononia, Rome, and last of all at Marsielles in Provence, where were met together the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of France and Navarre, the dukes of Savoy, of Buillon, Florence, Ferrara, Vitemberg the Grand Master of Malta, with many other princes and great lords, who all kissed the Pope's feet, except the dukes of Buillon and Vitemberg, Protestant princes, who had forsaken the rites and ceremonies of the church of Rome. In far more base sort did that duke of Venice humble himself (who of the Venetians themselves is called a dog) for that he with a rope about his neck, and creeping upon all four like a beast, so craved pardon of Pope Clement the 5th. But nothing was more base, than that which almost all historiographers which write of the Pope's affairs, report of the Emperor Frederick the Second, who to redeem his son out of prison, lying prostrate upon the ground at the feet of the Pope Alexander the Fourth, suffered him to tread upon his head, if the histories be true. Whereby it is well to be perceived, the Majesty of the Emperors, by the power (should I say) or by the outrageousness of the Bishops of Rome, to have been so diminished, as that scarce the shadow of their ancient majesty seems now to remain. They also say themselves to be greater than the emperors, and that so much greater, as is the Sun greater than the Moon: that is to say, six thousand six hundred forty and five times, if we believe Ptolemy and the Arabians. And that more is, they have always pretended a right unto the empire: for the imperial seat being vacant, they have given the investitures unto them which held of the empire, and received of them their fealty: as they did of John and Luchin, viscounts of Milan, the imperial seat being empty in the year 1341, who are in the records called vassals of the church of Rome, and not of the empire; and are forbidden their obedience unto Lewes of Bavaria the Emperor, who was then excommunicated, as we have before said. For which cause the Canonists have maintained, that the emperor cannot give up his imperial dignity unto any, but unto the pope. >But howsoever the Bishop of Rome pretended to have a sovereignty over all Christian princes, not only in spiritual, but also in temporal affairs, whether they got it by force of arms, or by the devotion and grant of princes; or by long possession and prescription: yet could not our kings even for any most short time endure the servitude of the Bishop of Rome, nor be moved with any their excommunication, which the Popes used as firebrands to the firing of Christian Commonwealths. For these Popes interdictions, or excommunications, were wont with other nations, to draw the subjects from the obedience and reverence of their prince: but such has always been the love of our kings towards their people (and so I hope shall be forever) and loyalty of the people towards their kigns: that when pope Boniface the Eight saw himself nothing to prevail by his excommunication, nor that the people were to be drawn from the obedience of their king, after he had publically excommunicated Philip the Fair, he in like manner excommunicated all the French nation, with all them which took Philip for a king. But Philip having called together an assembly of his princes, and other his nobility, and pereceving in his subjects in general a wonderful consent for his defense of his state and sovereignty: he thereupon writ letters unto Boniface (which are common in every man's hand) to reprove him of his folly: and shortly after sent Nogaret with his army into the Pope's territory, who took the Pope prisoner, (giving him well to understand that the King was not his subject, as he had by his Bull published) but seeing him through impatience to become furious and mad, he set him again at liberty. Yet from that the Pope's interdiction, the King by the advice of his nobility and Senat, appealed unto a general council, which had power over the Pope, abusing the holy cities. For the king next unto Almighty God had none his superior, unto whom he might appeal: but the Pope is bound unto the decrees and commands of the council. And long times before Philip the Victorious, and his realm being interdicted by Pope Alexander the Third, who would have brought him into his subjection: answered him by letters, That he held nothing of the pope, nor yet of any prince in the world. Benedict the third, and Julius the second, had used the like excommunication against Charles the seventh, and Lewes the twelfth (who was called the Father of his country) that so as with firebrands they might inflame the people to rebellion: yet failed they both of their hope, the obedience of the subjects being nothing diminished, but rather increased: the Bull of excommunication which the Popes legat brought into France, being by the decree of the parliament of Paris openly torn to pieces, and the legat for his presumptuousness cast in prison… True it is, that they which have thought better to assure the majesty of the Kings of France against the power of the Pope, have obtained the Pope's bulls whilest they yet stat in the city of Auignion to be exempted from their power. And namely there is in the records of France a Bull of Pope Clements the Fifth, whereby he not only absolved Philip the Fair and his subjects from the interdiction of Boniface the Eight, but also declared the King and the realm to be exempted from the Pope's power. Pope Alexander the Fourth also gave this privilege unto the realm of France, That it could not for any cause be interdicted, which was afterward by seven Popes successively confirmed by Gregory, Clement the fourth, Urban the fifth, and Benedict the twelfth, whose bull yet remain in the records of France: which yet seem unto me not to increase, but rather to diminish the majesty of our Kings, who were never in any thing beholden unto the Popes. And that more is, the court of parliament of Paris, has been by many decrees declared the clause, By the authority Apostolical; usually inserted into the Popes rescripts sent into France, to be void, mere abusive, and to no purpose: and therefore it behooved him, that would help himself by any such the popes rescript, to protest in judgment, That he would not any way take benefit of that clause. By all which things it is plainly to be understood, not only the kings, but the Kingdom of France also, to have been always free from the Pope's power and command.

Jean Bodin on popes continued >Upon this difference cast themselves into the protection of the Kings of France, who were the GREATEST Monarchs of Christendom; wherein they were not of their hope deceived. For hereupon, Pipin, Grand M. of France (a man of great wealth and power, who then disposed of all the affairs of the realm) with a great army passing over the Alps, overthrew and discomfited the power of the Lombards, and afterward going to Rome, was the first that gave unto Pope Zacharie, part of the seignorie of Italy, who had before crowned him King of France, forbidding the peers and people of France to make of any choice of any other for their kings but of the house of Pipin, having publicly pronounced King Childeric for his sottishness to be unable for the government. Whereunto the people of France made so much the less resistance, for that Pipin then had the nobility and the army of France at command: and for that the Pope (who as then was esteemed as a God upon earth) was the author thereof, unto whom Pipin had before solemnly promised, and given him letters pattents thereof, That if he should become victorious over the Lombards, he should give unto the Church of Rome the Exarchate of Ravenna, which contained thirty cities, and the province of Pentapole, which contained sixteen cities moe; which he after the victory performed, laying the keys of the said cities upon Saint Peter's altar; yet reserving unto himself and his successors in the crown of France, the sovereignty of both the provinces; and that more is, power also to choose the Popes. Whereunto the Pope not only willingly granted, but almost persuaded Pipin to take upon him the name of an emperor: which title none then used, but the emperors of Constantinople. But Pipin being dead, the Lombards again took up arms, to the great disquiet of the Popes, who again had recourse unto the French Kings, as unto ta most sure sanctuary. Whereunto Charles, Pipin his son (for his many and worthy victories surnamed the Great) with a strong army passing the Alps, not only overthrew the king of the Lombards, but even their kingdom also: and having surely established the power of the Roman bishops, was by them called Emperor: and they again by Charles so long as he lived, all chosen bishops of Rome. But after the death of this Charlemagne, they which were of great credit in Rome, caused themselves to by chosen pope by the clergy, whether it were for the distrust they had to obtain that dignity of the Kings of France, having no favor in the court; or through the negligence of the French Kings, who had thereof no great care; or that it was by reason of the great civil wars which arose betwixt the children of Lewes the Gentle, wherewith the French Kings busied, lost the prerogative they had in choosing of the chief Bishop. Yet Guitard, a great antiquary, who lived in the same time writes, 3 Popes successively to have come into France to excuse themselves to Lewes the Gentle, That they had been by the clergy of Rome constrained to accept the papal dignity, beseeching him to confirm the same: which he either as a man not desirous of glory, or else fearing to provoke the clergy (being then in great authority) did: of which his error he afterwards though to late full sore repented him; being by the college of cardinals constrained to yield up his Crown, & to make himself a monk, and his wife a nun, shut up apart from her husband in a cloister with other nuns, who yet were again afterwards delivered by the princes and nobility of France, (disdaining to see the pride of the clergy) and so again restored unto their former honors. But after the death of this Lewes the Gentle (who was Emperor of France, of Germany, and of greater part of Italy, and Spain) the empire was divided into three kingdoms, which the brethren Charles the Bauld, Lothaire, and Lewes, every one of them held in title of sovereignty, without acknowledging a superiority of one another; and again, the kingdom of Lothaire was divided amongst his children into three parts: unto one fell the kingdom of Lorraine, unto another the kingdom of Arles, and to the third the kingdom of Italy: Lewes holding Germany, and Charles the Emperor, France. So their divided power began to decay, and the wealth of the bishops of Rome greatly to increase: they now succeeding one another by way of election, and in nothing acknowledging the majesty of the French kings, as they ought to have done: which came to pass especially in the time of Pope Nicholas the First, who better understood to manage matters of state than his predecessors, and was the first that used the rigors of excommunication against princes, having excommunicated Lothaire the younger brother of Lewes king of Italy." >Howbeit that in truth the right of choosing of the pope belonged to the Kings of France, and not unto the German princes, who have but usurped the name and title of emperors, got by the prowess and force of Charlemagne king of France and by him left unto his successors the kings of France, and not unto the kings of Germany; for so they were called in all the ancient treaties and histories of Germany and France, and not emperors, except those which were crowned by the popes. But after that the power of the German kings was far spread in Italy, they then sought to usurp unto themselves that right of choosing of the bishops of Rome: whether it were for the increasing of their own wealth and power, or for to take away the ambition and foul corruption then used in voices giving, and in their elections. For the emperor Henry the third thrust out of his papacy Gregory the sixt, chosen pope by the clergy, and set Clement the second in his place, and afterwards compelled the clergy to swear, not from thenceforth to admit any into the papacy, without the consent of the German emperors; as we have learned out of the Vatican records. But Clement the second being dead, the college of cardinals sent ambassadors unto the emperor to appoint whom he thought good to be pope, who appointed Pepon, afterwards called Damasus the second; who dead, the clergy again sent ambassadors unto the emperor, for the creating of a new pope.

Jean Bodin, like Voltaire, on the HRE "The way in which the Germans define a monarchy is absurd, that is, according to the interpretation of Philip Melanchthon, as the most powerful of all states. It is even more absurd that they think they hold the empire of the Romans, which of course would seem laughable to all who have well in mind the map of the world. The empire of the Romans was most flourishing under Trajan." "The Germans, however, hold no part of the Roman Empire except Noricum and Vindelicia. Germany is bounded by the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula, the Carpathian Mountains, and the ocean, but all authority ends at the foothills of the Alps in the south; by the Rhine and a few cities this side of the Rhine in the west; by Silesia, in turn, on the east; by the Baltic regions on the north. How much truer it is of the king of the Turks, who took Byzantium, the capital of the empire, from the Christians, the region of Babylon, which is discussed in the book of Daniel, from the Persians, and joined a great part of his dominion beyond the Danube, up to the mouth of the Dnieper, to the old Roman provinces? Now, if we identify monarchy with force of arms, or with great wealth, or with fertility of areas, or with the number of victories, or with the size of population, or with etymology of the name, or with the fatherland of Daniel, or with the seat of the Babylonian empire, or with the amplitude of sway, it will be more appropriate, certainly, to interpret the prophecy of Daniel as applied to the sultan of the Turks."Turning to foreign nations, what has Germany to oppose to the sultan of the Turks? Or which state can more aptly be called a monarchy? This fact is obvious to everyone–If there is anywhere in the world any majesty of empire and of true monarchy, it must radiate from the Sultan. He owns the richest parts of Asia, Africa, and Europe, and he rules far and wide over the entire Mediterranean and all but a few of its islands. Moreover, in armed forces and strength he is such that he alone is the equal of almost all the princes, since he drove the armies of the Persians and the Muscovites far beyond the boundaries of the empire. But he seized provinces of the Christians and the empire of the Greeks by force of arms, and even devastated the lands of the Germans. I shall not discuss the prince of Ethiopia, called by his people Jochan Bellul, that is, precious gem, whose empire is little less than all Europe. What of the emperor of the Tartars, who rules tribes barbarous in their savagery, countless in number, unconquered in strength? If you compare Germany with these, you compare a fly to an elephant."

"Finally, all the peoples of the earth except Germans, Swiss with their allies, Venetians, Ragusans, Lucchese, and Genoese, who are ruled by the power of Optimates or have Popular governments. But if so many people are uncivilized because they have hereditary kings, oh, where will be the abode of culture? The fact that Aristotle thought it disastrous, however, seems to me much more absurd. For in the first place an interregnum is clearly dangerous, since the State, like a ship, without a pilot, is tossed about by the waves of sedition and often sinks. This happened after the death of Emperor Frederick II. The country, in a state of anarchy, was without an emperor for eighteen years on account of the civil war among the princes."

"Whenever Sovereignty seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights of which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution." -Rousseau If Rousseau can say that the division of Sovereignty is an illusion, & Jean Bodin called the HRE (which many people here appraise to be the most "decentralized" thing in existence) a unified State oligarchy, then notions of "centralization" & "decentralization" are an illusion to me. Each state has a unified social power, individual and indivisible, no matter how much "decentralized" since this is applied universally to all states. They imagine for themselves a stateless society because it is "decentralized", as if because you have men assembled in one room, like a senate that they call "centralized" it's a whole other thing when you take those same men assembled and put them in various parts "decentralized" -- it's not so. A body-politic has its center and its parts, there is no body decentralized without a center or center without its respective parts. The whole body itself has a superior relationship. ... When you talk about the "Age of Absolutism" and historiography as historians laid out, and I talk about the politics of absolute monarchy as Bodin expressed, we talk about two different things. Because I deem every age to be an age of absolutism. It was a universal political outlook. It discerns all states in general and for all ages. I get hammered over and over with the term "bureaucracy", but pretty much every state has its officials and public servants to accompany them. If you think because it is complex for one man to govern, that these lands divided among peers wouldn't also entail management of their territories, with the cities and their councils? As long as we acknowledge the State anatomy to be of a household, this whole point about there being public servants or "bureaucracy" is nil. Since a household has a number of servants and a vast array of rooms... We could disagree on the amount of servants therein, but nevertheless as time goes on there will be these servants for whatever task at hand and any number necessary for said task. Like I also said before, paradoxically, the more "decentralized" they become, the more "centralized" it seems to be. Yet even Jean Bodin looked at the HRE, what many anons call the holy mother of "decentralized" and considered it a state oligarchical, that assembled then and again. To talk about all the people and land in general, there is a reference to a common bond they share together, and those who have a share in that want some unity with the others to maintain their harmony. This prompts those with control of the lands to concede to each with each other in a unison for it all to function. Consider the antics of Philip the Fair, not long after Saint Louis, and you'll have a testimony. Kings in the Middle Ages had civil servants too and those invested in the affairs of their states. I wouldn't even go as far as to call the ancien regime of Louis XIV that much of a bureaucracy, but regardless I think the term "bureaucracy" is abused to death. It isn't the number of bureaucrats or civil servants that defines absolutism, grumble, but an indivisible and sovereign power, perpetual and pre-eminent, absolute in the respect it is not divided against itself, likewise the infinite, for what majesty alludes to, and since sovereignty is a word synonymous with majesty. ... (commiecat) <And so he did not need intermediaries to handle day to day operations independently In a state oligarchical, although the land could seem so much divided, these great notables who have land don't see themselves too independently from each other: for absolutist view is that powers divided destroy one another, and so these notables have some kind of concord, that being a unity, and have need to assemble and guide the state respective to each other, like I say, although you would make all kinds of pretensions of them being entirely independent because they are "decentralized"--civil servants are no different assembled than as notables with great estates, who will still take a seat at the table to correspond with one another in relation to their state.

We have heard Aristotle's water argument, that one droplet of water corrupts more easily than an ocean of water… I have a few counter-narratives. From Dante "Cupidity is impossible when there is nothing to be desired, for passions cease to exist with the destruction of their objects. Since his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean, there is nothing for a Monarch to desire… So we conclude that among mortals the purest subject for the indwelling of Justice is the Monarch." "Moreover, to extent however small that cupidity clouds the mental attitude towards Justice, charity or right love clarifies and brightens it. In whomever, therefore, right love can be present to the highest degree in him can Justice find the most effective place. Such is the Monarch, in whose person Justice is or may be most effective… That right love should indwell in the Monarch more than in all men besides itself thus: Everything loved is the more loved the nearer it is to him who loves; men are nearer to the Monarch than other princes; therefore they ought to be most loved by him." (Keep the Themistian concept in mind for that one) From Darius in the Herodotus Debate "Nothing can be found better than the rule of the one best man; his judgment being like to himself, he will govern the multitude with perfect wisdom, and best conceal plans made for the defeat of enemies. But in an oligarchy, the desire of many to do the state good service sometimes engenders bitter enmity among them; for each one wishing to be chief of all and make his counels prevail, violent enmity is the outcome, enmity brings faction and faction bloodshed; and the end of bloodshed is monarchy; whereby it is shown that this fashion of government is best. Again, the rule of commonalty must of necessity engender evil-mindedness; and when evil-mindedness in public matters is engendered, bad men are not divided by enmity but united by close friendship; for they that would do evil to the commonwealth conspire together to do it," Hobbes on oligarchic passions "This inconvenience therefore must be derived, not from the power, but from the affections and passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject; by which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss. And because an oligarchy consists of men, if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from passion will be greater in an oligarchy, than a monarchy." So while you might say, that a monarch is more prone to being corrupt, I will say that for multi-party democracy, the scheme of it lends itself to in-fighting and factionalism that is worse than any corruption of a monarch… because whole swaths of the population are seen as mortal enemies, divided into political parties and animosity, where the violence of a cruel Monarch might extend to a very small number of unlucky courtiers or officials, it is worse with the enmity seen here that is extended to vast percentages. So that itself becomes more of a corruption even if the expertise of these men are good and incorruptible. And like Bodin says, that although there might be a league of many great nobles, one tyrant could still best them by the unity of being one. "For even Leo writes in his history, that the people of Africa hold it for an infallible maxim, that a prince which is but weak in forces, shall always defeat a stronger army that has two generals. And more ineffectual, being divided, and impotent in multi-party democracy… whereas the Monarch becomes like a teacher, where many teachers would be confusing to an entire classroom, they are able to focus on real issues at hand and see the whole body-politic itself, as one man himself appears before them. So there is less confusion.

Jean Bodin's talking points "As for the other point, That they must give the sovereignty unto the most worthy, It is true; but the argument makes more for a Monarchy, than for an Oligarchy; for among the most noble, the most wise, the most rich, and the most valiant, there is always some one that does excel the rest, to whom by that reason the sovereignty does belong." (That Monarchy is Aristocracy; the sole aristocrat, or the best man – aristocracy, meaning, rule of the best, rather than the few, like oligarchy). "But Plato had another argument for an Aristocratical estate, saying, That it was very hard to find any one man so wise and virtuous, as was requisite for the government of an an estate, and by that means a Monarchy were not sure. But this argument is captious, and may be used against himself: for if it be hard to find any one prince so wise as he desires, how shall they find out so great a number as is needful in a Seigneurie. And Peter Soderin Gongalonier of Florence, speaking unto the people against an Aristocratical estate, he used the same argument which Maecenas did before Augustus against Marcus Agrippa, saying, That the government of dew lords, is the government of few tyrants: and that it was better at all events to have but one tyrant. For if any one will say, that among many there will haply be some number of good men, we must then rather choose a Popular estate, for that in a great number there will be found more virtuous than in a less. But both the one and the other is unprofitable: for as well in all Aristocratical and Popular estates, as in all corporations and colleges, the greatest part does still over-rule the sounder and the better: and the more men there be, the less effects are there of virtue and wisdom (even as a little salt cast into a great lake, loses his force:) so as the good men shall be always vanquished in number by the vicious and ambitious: and for one tyrant there shall be a hundred which will cross the resolution of the lesser but of the sounder part: as it is always seen as well in diets or assemblies of the princes of Germany, whereas the spiritual princes of the empire, being the greatest number, have always crost the princes temporal; so as by their means the emperor Charles the Fifth, caused the empire to declare itself an enemy of the house of France, the which had not been in so many ages: to the end the temporal princes should have no hope of any succours from France in their necessities, whereinto they soon after fell. And to make short, it has been always seen, that the more heads there be in a Seigneurie, the more controversies arise, and less resolution." "There is no reason to balance the cruelties and extorsions of a tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know well that a peaceable Optimacy and wisely governed, if it may be, is better than a cruel tyranny. But the question is, whether it be better to ahve a just and upright king, or many good lords: and whether a tyranny of fifty tyrants be not more dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in a Popular or Aristocratical estates. than in a Monarchy. Yea it is most certain that a tyrannical Monarchy is sometimes more to be desired than a Democracy or Optimacy, how good soever: For if many wise and skillful pilots hinder one another in striving to govern the helm; even so will many lords do, every one seeking to govern the Commonweal, be they never so wise and virtuous. Although it be not needful to insist much upon this proof, that a Monarchy is the most sure, seeing that a family which is the true image of the Commonwealth can but have one head."

"And the more men there be, the less effects are there of virtue and wisdom (even as a little salt cast into a great lake, loses his force:) so as the good men shall be always vanquished in number by the vicious and ambitious: and for one tyrant there shall be a hundred which will cross the resolution of the lesser but of sounder part: as it is always seen as well in the diets and assemblies of the princes of Germany, whereas the spiritual princes of the empire, being the greatest number, have always crost the princes temporal: so as by their means the emperor Charles V, caused the empire to declare itself an enemy to the House of France. the which had not been so in many ages: to the end the temporal princes should have no hope of any succours from France in their necessities, whereinto they soon after fell. And to make short, it has been always seen, that the more heads there be in a Seigneurie, the more controversies arise, and less resolution. And therefore the Seigneurie of Venice to avoid these inconveniences, commits all affairs of state to the managing of a dozen persons, and most commonly to seven, especially to keep their affairs secret, wherein consists the health and preservation of an estate." -Jean Bodin And the more men there be, the less effects are there of virtue and wisdom (even as a little salt cast into a great lake, loses his force:) so as the good men shall be always vanquished in number by the vicious and ambitious And as for the food on the table argument that Aristotle makes, that though one wise man could outwit some members of an assembly, they could as a whole outwit him (where I think John Cook gets the greater than some, less than all idea). Bodin says that a Monarch with a council could always receive their wisdom, and that an absolute monarchy is the surest form of State and its ability to command. 3rd pic is attributed to Filmer, but Bodin actually said it.

I know someone who didn't believe in a mixed State. Jean Bodin >All the ancients agree that there are at least three types of commonwealth. Some have added a fourth composed of a mixture of the other three. Plato added a fourth type, or rule of the wise. But this, properly speaking, is only the purest form that aristocracy [rule of the best] can take. He did not accept a mixed state as a fourth type. Aristotle accepted both Plato's fourth type and the mixed state, making five in all. Polybius distinguished seven, three good, three bad, and one composed of a mixture of the three good. Dionysius Halicarnassus only admitted four, the three pure types, and a mixture of them. Cicero, and following his example, Sir Thomas More in his Commonwealth, Contarini, Machiavelli, and many others have held the same opinion. This view has the dignity of antiquity. It was not new when propounded by Polybius, who is generally credited with its invention, nor by Aristotle. It goes back four hundred years earlier to Herodotus. He said that many thought that the mixed was the best type, but for his part he thought there were only three types, and all the others were imperfect forms. I should have been convinced by the authority of such great names, but that reason and common sense compels me to hold the opposing view. One must show then not only why these views are erroneous but why the arguments and examples they rely on do not really prove their point… Bodin claims Herodotus & tries to snatch Plato (despite crediting the mixed state w/ the dignity of antiquity) >Then I think this–that the type of state of the Romans in the age of Polybius, and much more in the time of Dionysius and Cicero, was entirely popular. When they had driven the kings from the city, the first law about the government proposed by Brutus to the people was this, that annual consuls were to be created by the people. This Livy and Dionysius reported. From this it is evident that all consular authority ought to be sought and asked from the people. >"But here might some man object, That the Senat of Rome had power to make laws, & that the more part of the greatest affairs of estate, in peace or war, were in the power of the Roman Senat to determine of. But what the authority of the Senat is, or ought to be in every Commonweal, we shall in due place declare. But by the way to answer that it is objected, I say, that the Senat of Rome, from the expulsion of the kings, until the time of the emperors had never power to make law, but only certain decrees and ordinances: which were not in force past a year, wherewith for all that the common people were not bound, and so much less the whole body and estate of the people. Wherein many are deceived and especially Conan, who says, That the Senat had power to make a perpetual law: for Dionysius Halycarnasseus, who had diligently read the Commentaries of Marcus Varro, writes, That the decrees of the Senat had not any force, if they were not by the people confirmed: and albeit that they were so confirmed, yet if they were not published in form of a law, they then had force but for one year. No more than the city of Athens, where the decrees of the Senat were but annuall, as says Demosthenes in the Oration which he made against Aristocrates: and if it were a matter of importance, it was referred unto the people to dispose thereof as they thought good: which Anacharsis the philosopher seeing merrily said, The wise and grave propound matters at Athens, and fools and mad men resolve thereof. And so the Senat in Rome did but consult, but the people command: For so Livy oft times says, Senatus decreuit, populus tussit, The Senat hath decreed, and the people commanded. Yet true it is, that the magistrates, and namely the Tribunes, oft times suffered the decrees of the Senat, in a manner to have the force of laws, if the matter seemed not to impair the power of the people, or to be prejudicial unto the majesty of the estates in general." And says, at the last line, "Majesty in the people in general" which matters – because like I said before, sovereignty is seen as having the authority of general to particular. Bodin says that majesty is sovereignty. >"Wherefore let us firmly set down and resolve there are but three forms of Commonweals, and no more, and those simple also, and without any confused mixture of the with another, albiet that the government be sometimes contrary to the state. As a Monarchy is contrary to a Democracy or popular estate; and yet nevertheless the sovereignty may be in one only prince, who may popularly govern his estate, as I have before said; and yet it shall not be for that a confusion of the popular estate with a Monarchy, which are states of themselves incompatible, but is well (as it were) combining of a Monarchy with a popular government, the most assured Monarchy that is." >Let us therefore conclude, never any Commonwealth to have been made of an Oligarchy and popular estate; and so much less of the three states of Commonweals, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodotus first most truly said amongst the Greeks, whom Tacitus amongst the Latins imitating, saith, The people, the nobility, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities. >Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of sovereignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweales, but rather the corruption of Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truly written. Thomas Hobbes >"For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturnius, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy." >"The third opinion: that the sovereign power may be divided, is no less an error than the former, as hath been proved, Part II. chap. XX, sect. 15. And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. chap. I. De Republica, that they are not rightly to be called commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. … And though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty hath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind of government; yet monarchs have been thereby diverse times thrust out of their possession. But the truth is, that the right of sovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they would, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest. As for example: if we should suppose the people of Rome to have had the absolute sovereignty of the Roman state, and to have chosen them a council by the name of the senate, and that to this senate they had given the supreme power of making laws, reserving nevertheless to themselves, in direct and express terms, the whole right and title of sovereignty (which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable connection between the sovereign power and the power of making laws), I say, this grant of the people to the senate is of no effect, and the power of making laws is in the people still… The error concerning mixed [State] has proceeded from want of understanding of what is meant by this word body politic, and how it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men. Rousseau >"Whenever Sovereignty seems to be divided, there is an illusion: the rights of which are taken as being part of Sovereignty are really all subordinate, and always imply supreme wills of which they only sanction the execution."

Junction of the two seas >The allegory of the Atlantic joins hands with that of the Mediterranean to symbolize the creation of the Canal du Midi which joins both. The Atlantic is painted as a crowned Neptune holding his trident in his left hand, and who has a whale behind him. In Louis XIV's Metallic History ( Médailles… 1723 [1701]), the creation of the canal is represented by Neptune opening the earth with his trident to form "a communication between the two seas" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canal_du_Midi

>Wherefore we conclude the majesty of a prince to be in nothing altered or diminished by the calling together or presence of the states: but to the contrary his majesty thereby to be much greater. Jean Bodin >The People is somewhat ths is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the people Commands; for the People will by the will of one man >This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense. Thomas Hobbes >Even if 10 million people speak, it's the voice of One >Even if walking in 10 million ranks, it's the step of One >Now concord is the uniform movement of many wills; and unity of will, which we mean by uniform movement, is the root of concord, or rather concord itself. For just as we should call many clods concordant because all descend together toward the centre, and many flames concordant because they ascend together to the circumference, as if they did this voluntarily, so we call many men concordant because they move together by their volition to one end formally present in their wills… All concord depends upon unity in wills; mankind is at its best in concord of a certain king. For just as one man at his best in body and spirit is a concord of a certain kind, and as a household, a city, and a kingdom is likewise a concord, so it is with mankind in its totality. Therefore the human race for its best disposition is dependent on unity in wills. But this state of concord is impossible unless one will dominates and guides all others into unity Dante Alighieri >One for All, All for One

Elon Musk tweeted that the State is the largest corporation, not far from the truth. "And though in the charters of subordinate corporations, a corporation be declared to be one person in law, yet the same has not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics observed any such union." -Hobbes So like Hobbes says, for his "Artificial Person of the State" is a kind of Monarch itself, being One Personification. And like Bossuet says, "All Israel went out as one man. All the multitudes as one man, were forty-two thousand three hundred and sixty. Behold, such is the unity of a people."

>>5092 Absolutists are not against the idea of there being parliaments or assemblies either. As that screencap shows. Despite the myth, Bodin says that the majesty is increased when the people are assembled together. Nobody in the absolutist fold as far as these thinkers are concerned wanted to do away with them. In fact, Bodin and Hobbes ascribe a great intelligence to assemblies. And suggest that a Sovereign Monarch shouldn't go long without some kind of assembly or council (whether this be like a privy council, senate, or parliament, variably) although they can without.

Disease of Commonwealth; Obstruction of Veins and Blood Flow [Keep in mind for context of the English Civil Wars & Charles I, along w/ the term power of the purse] By Thomas Hobbes >Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by strategems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common-wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole of a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth. >Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered together in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches. >Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man.

Dialogue Hobbes speaks through P >L: But I know, that there be statutes express, whereby the King hath obliged himself never to levy money upon his subjects without the consent of his Parliament. One of which statutes is 25 Edw. 1. c. 5, in these words: We have granted for us, and our heirs, as well to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, and other folk of holy Church, as also to earls, barons, and to all the commonalty of the land, that for no business from henceforth, we shall take such aids, tasks, or prizes, but by the common consent of the realm. There is also another have been since that time confirmed by diverse other Kings, and lastly by the King that now reigneth. >L: In the said statutes that restrain the levying of money without consent of Parliament, is there any thing you can take exceptions to? >P: No, I am satisfied that kings that grant such liberties, are bound to make them good, so far as it may be done without sin: but if a King find that by such grant he be disabled to protect his subjects, if he maintain his grant, he sins; and therefore may, and ought to take no notice of the said grant. For such grants, as by error or false suggestion are gotten from him, are, as the lawyers do confess, void and of no effect, and ought to be recalled. Also the King, as in on all hands confessed, hath the charge lying upon him to protect his people against foreign enemies, and to keep the peace betwixt them within the kingdom: if he do not his utmost endeavour to discharge himself thereof, he committeth a sin. >P: Nor do I hereby lay any aspersion upon such grants of the King and his ancestors. Those statutes are in themselves very good for the King and the people, as creating some kind of difficulty for such Kings as, for the glory of conquest, might spend one part of their subjects' lives and estates in molesting other nations, and leave the rest to destroy themselves at home by factions. That which I here find fault with, is the wrestling of those, and other such statutes, to the binding of our Kings from the use of their armies in the necessary defense of themselves and their people. The late Long Parliament, that in 1648 murdered their King, (a King that sought no greater glory upon earth, but to be indulgent to his people, and a pious defender of the Church of England,) no sooner took upon them the sovereign power, than they levied money upon the people at their own discretion. Did any of their subjects dispute their power? Did they not send soldiers over the sea to subdue Ireland, and others to fight against the Dutch at sea; or made they any doubt but to be obeyed in all that they commanded, as a right absolutely due to the sovereign power in whomsoever it resides? I say not this as following their actions, but as testimony from the mouths of those very men that denied the same power to him whom they acknowledged to have been their sovereign immediately before >P: I know what it is that troubles your conscience in this point. All men are troubled at the crossing of their wishes; but it is our own fault. First, we wish impossibilities; we would have our security against all the world upon right of property, without paying for it; this is impossible. We may as well expect that fish and fowl should boil, roast, and dish themselves, and come to the table, and that grapes should squeeze themselves into our mouths, and have all other contentments and ease which some pleasant men have related of the land of Cocagne. Secondly, there is no nation in the world where he or they that have the sovereignty, do not take what money they please for the defense of those respective nations, when they think it necessary for their safety. The late Long Parliament denied this; but why? Because there was a design amongst them to depose the King. Thirdly, there is no example of any King of England that I have read of, that ever pretended any such necessity for levying money against his conscience. The greatest sums that ever were levied, comparing the value of money, as it was at that time, with what it is now, were levied by King Edward III and King Henry V; kings in whom we glory now, and think their actions great ornaments to the English history >P: All this I know, and am not satisfied. I am one of the common people, and one of that almost infinite number of men, for whose welfare Kings and other sovereigns were by God ordained: for God made Kings for the people, and not people for Kings. How shall I be defended from the domineering of proud and insolent strangers that speak another language, that scorn us, that seek to make us slaves, or how shall I avoid the destruction that may arise from the cruelty of factions in civil war, unless the King, to whom alone, you say, belongeth the right of levying and disposing of the militia by which only it can be prevented, have ready money, upon all occasions, to arm and pay as many soldiers, as for the present defense, or the peace of the people, shall be necessary? Shall not I, and you, and every man, be undone? Tell me not of a Parliament, when there is no Parliament sitting, or perhaps none in being, which may often happen. And when there is a Parliament, if the speaking and leading men should have a design to put down monarchy, as they had in the Parliament which began to sit the third of November, 1640, shall the King, who is to answer to God Almighty for the safety of the people, and to that end is intrusted with the power to levy and dispose of soldiery, be disabled to perform his office, by virtue of these acts of Parliament which you have cited? >And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the less grieved with the Contributions necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themsleves have the less cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of foraign Enemies

Jean Bodin on the same >As for the right to impose taxes, or imposts upon the subjects, is as proper unto sovereign majesty, as is the law it self: not for that Commonwealth cannot stand without taxes and tallages, as the President the M. hath well noted, that taxes were not levied in this realm, but since the time of Saint Louis the king. But if it must needs be that they must for the public necessity be levied or taken away; it cannot be done but by him that hath the sovereign power; as it hath been judged and by a decree of parliament, against the duke of Burgundy; and many times since, aswell in the high court of parliament, as also in the privy council. >But here might some object and say, "That the estates of England suffer not any extraordinary charges and subsidies to be laid upon them, if it be not first agreed upon and consented unto in the high court of parliament: for so it is provided by an ancient law of Edward the first, king of England, wherewith the people as with a buckler hath been oftentimes seen to defend itself against the prince. Whereunto mine answer is, "That the other kings have in this point no more power than the kings of England: for that it is not in the power of any prince in the world, at his pleasure to taise taxes upon the people, no more than to take another man's goods from him; as Philip Commines wisely showed in the parliment holden at Tours, as we read in his Commentaries: and yet nevertheless if the necessity of the Commonwealth be such as cannot stay for the calling of a parliament, in that case the prince ought not to expect the assembly of the states, neither the consent of the people; of whose good foresight and wisdom, next unto God, the health & welfare of the whole state dependeth. >And yet for all that the just Monarchy, hath not any more assured foundation or stay, than the Estates of the people, Communities, Corporations, and Colleges: For if need be for the king to levy money, to raise forces, to maintain the Estate against the enemy, it cannot be better done, than by the estates of the people, and of every Province, Town, and Community. For where can things for the curing of the diseases of sick Commonwealth, and of the members thereof; there are heard and understood the just reforming of the Estate, be better debated and handled, than before the Prince in his Senate before the people? There they confer of the affairs concerning the whole body of the Commonwealth, and of the members thereof; there are heard and understood the just complaints and grievances of the poor subjects, which never otherwise come unto the prince's ears; there are discovered and laid open the robberies and extortions committed in the Prince's name; whereof he knoweth nothing, there the requests of all degrees of men are heard. Besides that, it is almost a thing incredible to say, how much the subjects are eased, and how well they are also pleased, to see their king to sit as chief in the assembly of the estates, and to hear him discouring; how every man desirabeth to be seen of him, and if it please him to hear their complaints, and to receive their requests, albeit that they be often times denied the same; yet O how it pleaseth them to have had access unto their Prince…[Although] Our Kings do not so often call together the assemblies of their estates, as do the kings of England.

Pre eminence in King Lear– King Lear Let it be so; thy truth, then, be thy dower: For, by the sacred radiance of the sun, The mysteries of Hecate, and the night; By all the operation of the orbs From whom we do exist, and cease to be; Here I disclaim all my paternal care, Propinquity and property of blood, … I do invest you jointly with my power, [and] Pre eminence, and all the large effects That troop with majesty. Ourself, by monthly course, With reservation of an hundred knights, By you to be sustain'd, shall our abode Make with you by due turns. Only we still retain The name, and all the additions to a king; The sway, revenue, execution of the rest, Beloved sons, be yours: which to confirm, This coronet part betwixt you.

If sovereignty is beholden to, and indeed stems from the monarch only, then sovereignty is an idiosyncratic relation; for no one else could have a greater or lesser part of it if they do not partake in it, thereby never needing or wanting it; ergo it's not at all clear that anyone depends on it, never needing or wanting it at all. It's manifest that the consequences of such doctrine are absurd; yet if we nevertheless adduce that sovereignty is depended upon by the commonweal, then it's the premise and not the conclusion that is wrong. I propose then that it's not the person of the monarch/king or even the persons of nobility, which in common with humanity are wretched and ignorant, that constitute sovereignty, but the idea of kingship and nobility respectively, which are reducible to the more general idea of justice itself, truly having the relationship of the general (absolute justice) to the particular (just things/persons). Sovereignty is to be held in common by all men, for not only are they born of the same earth but compelled by their rational nature to seek the idea that engenders it; yet it is to be shared in geometrical, not arithmetical fashion, for philosophers are owed a greater measure of it than the more vulgar, crass disposition of warriors and craftsmen. Whether king or nobility rule is of no concern to me; so long as they are imbued with the spirit of philosophy, all are one.

>>5100 >for no one else could have a greater or lesser part of it if they do not partake in it They are lesser in comparison to the Monarch's pre-eminent status. They don't have to partake in it to be considered lesser or greater. What they partake in is his government, but the State & sovereignty the Sovereign Monarch is the bonding agent of. >I propose then that it's not the person of the monarch/king or even the persons of nobility, which in common with humanity are wretched and ignorant, that constitute sovereignty, but the idea of kingship and nobility respectively, which are reducible to the more general idea of justice itself, truly having the relationship of the general (absolute justice) to the particular (just things/persons) Sovereignty corresponds to Almighty God, being One God in the first sense, then there is the Sovereign Monarch, being One ruler. >I propose then that it's not the person of the monarch/king or even the persons of nobility The Sovereign Monarch is not the same with the nobility; for while Aristotle says they have an eminance, it is not the same eminence when we speak of pre-eminence. >which are reducible to the more general idea of justice itself, truly having the relationship of the general (absolute justice) to the particular (just things/persons) The Sovereign Monarch who has the relationship of the State is hailed as having the relationship of Justice itself. As Bossuet says. Bossuet >One must, then, obey princes as if they were justice itself, without which there is neither order nor justice in affairs… Only God can judge their judgments and their persons… It is for that reason that St. Gregory, Bishop of Tours, said to King Chilperic in a council: "We speak to you, but you listen to us only if you want to. If you do not want to, who will condemn you other than he who has that he was justice itself?" …It follows from this that he who does not want to obey the prince, is not sent to another tribunal; but he is condemned irremissibly to death as an enemy of public peace and of human society… "Whosoever shall refuse to obey all your orders, may he die." It is the people who speak thus to Joshua. The nature of sovereignty has its origin in the political sense in the household: the father of the household has the power of life and death. The structure of the household is a monarchy. As for the share of sovereignty itself, it would be either a monarchy (where one person has the share), oligarchy (where a few persons have the share), or democracy... where all men have sovereignty in common, that has been said in the Hobbesian sense, ascribing to it a popular sovereignty... There can be different kinds of States, nonetheless. What you say about the relationship of the general and particular doesn't rule out there being different kinds of States as distinguished between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy. And while you make the classic point in politics that Justice is the bond of the State, nevertheless the State itself between Monarchy, Oligarchy, and Democracy, we find those who have mastery of the State and those who don't. As it isn't the case in a household that each share in the command, as it is acknowledged the father has the supreme authority and the household is a monarchy; when a oligarchy has become masters of the State, a few men are masters; when democracy, like DPRK upholds, the people are called masters. A monarch who is a tyrant nevertheless has a masterly relationship and still considered a kind of monarchy.

The Sovereign Monarch alone holds the scepter and orb, instruments representing the measure (the rod) of justice and the weight (from the orb).

When the tyrant breaks the laws of God and Nature, he is going against the divine justice; sometimes a tyrant is commissioned and called for even to punish a people with wrath. Nevertheless, the fatherly power (where I say the origin of sovereignty has its case with nature) is a bond that cannot be dissolved no matter what. And it is still unjust and against the law of the State itself to not regard him as having that fatherly power. And while many people are skeptical to see a Monarch as their natural parents, they are still regarded as the parent of the state itself, still to be obeyed because they have this superior relationship. It is still his law, as an unruly father would still have his household rules. >But when I perceived on every side that subjects were arming themselves against their princes; that books were being brought out openly, like firebands to set Commonweals ablaze, in which we are taught that princes sent by providence to the human race must be thrust out of their kingdoms under the pretense of tyranny, and that kings must be chosen not by their lineage, but by the will of the people; and finally that these doctrines were weakening the foundations not only of this realm only but of all states, then I denied that it was the function of a good man or of a good citizen to offer violence to his prince for any reason, however great a tyrant he might be; and contended that it was necessary to leave this punishment to God, and to other princes. And I have supported this by divine and human laws and authorities, and most of all by reason which compel assent. >But if it be so that the soldier which had only broken the vine truncheon of his Captain, beating him by right or wrong, was by the law of arms to be put to death: then what punishment deserves the son which lays hand upon his father? And again. >now if it be not lawful for the subject by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassal against his lord; nor the slave against his master; and in brief, if it not be lawful, by way and course of justice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subjects have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their Sovereign prince. Now the subject is not only guilty of treason of the highest degree, who has slain his Sovereign prince, but even he also which has attempted the same; who has given counsel or consent thereunto; yea if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it

They cannot lawfully convene without the Monarch's mace. That's a great example demonstrating how the Monarch is regarded as Justice itself. It is not theirs without this mace in their presence. I think King Charles II started that tradition of there being a royal mace in their sessions.

>>5101 >They are lesser in comparison to the Monarch's pre-eminent status That's not permissible if by your own admission they are not sovereign, for no one would need or want that of which one has no disposition. Things are only comparable if they have something in common; they are not comparable otherwise. >The Sovereign Monarch who has the relationship of the State is hailed as having the relationship of Justice itself Is the king of one city the king of another? If not, then we must infer, from your own argument, that the king is and is not king; he is king in one city and not in another. If the king is justice, absolute justice, then justice is both justice and injustice; it is justice in one city and injustice in another; justice then becomes a relative term and no longer absolute, ergo no less a part than anything else, insofar as it's contingent on it's relations and thereby a part of it. The conclusion is absurd, so absolute justice is sought, but not possessed by the particular king; neither is the form of kingship, which is merely instantiated by the many kings. >The nature of sovereignty has its origin in the political sense in the household The household is only one effluence of the body politic; sovereignty originates in the tripartite soul, which is the paradigm of all politics. Man is a political animal, for he seeks unity and coherence in his parts through the rational self in conjunction with his body; hence the Delphic maxim "know thyself". The parts, like horses in a chariot, are always subordinate to the intellectual whole; for the parts come and go with the body, and suffer it's vicissitudes, thereby incapable of ruling by themselves. Only then, in the eternal unity of Soul, is there true sovereignty, of which anything else is just a temporal projection. >A monarch who is a tyrant nevertheless has a masterly relationship Every tyrant was once the darling of democracy; indeed, the tyrant is nothing more than an orator who has gained excessive power. The tyrant reveals the degeneracy and debauchery that democratic tapestry, the checks and balances democrats so often prattle about, conceals; he signals the complete evanescence of prudence in the State (as even the democrats preserve some of the temperance they inherited from the ascetic plutocrats who preceded them). The tyrant is he who has no mastery over himself, much less others; he is subject to all manners of vice, bringing only infirmity to the soul and the body politic; he's the ruin of the State. >still considered a kind of monarchy The tyrant is not necessarily alone, for there can be at once many tyrants. What distinguishes tyranny from monarchy/aristocracy (rule of the philosopher king/rule of philosopher kings) is indiscriminate action, which is an affection of appetite (epithymia) and not of reason (logismos).

>wake up >go to work >take care of first few tasks; get some downtime >decide to see if Graceposter has accepted his rightful role in society today >peruse catalogue >notice this thread has far more responses than yesterday >absolute walls of text Bruh what are you doing?

>>5105 I don't distinguish the different forms of government by number of rulers (one or many); I distinguish them by affections of the soul involved, as well as the predominance of each. Monarchy and aristocracy are essentially the same; then follows timocracy, and plutocracy, and democracy, and finally tyranny. Monarchy/aristocracy will always be elitist, for it always tends towards unity/knowledge and not plurality/opinion.

>>5101 >for no one would need or want that of which one has no disposition That's not my own admission. I said that they don't have to partake in the same to be regarded as lesser. In the same sense that greater men are given different rewards from their lessers. >Things are only comparable if they have something in common I disagree. You can take two different things and see their differences apart from one another. >If the king is justice, absolute justice, then justice is both justice and injustice; He has the justice of his State, yes. It is the law of nature that the father of the family has this relationship; whether he rules unjustly or justly doesn't disregard the justice of this design, that gives him the supreme power. Different kings, although having different customs and different laws, can still nevertheless breach that absolute justice. The problem is there's nobody else except other sovereignties that has the power to thereby seize upon their persons, as Bodin concedes with the exception of other princes (but not the subject). >The household is only one effluence of the body politic The household is the very image of the body-politic itself. >sovereignty originates in the tripartite soul There is one soul, that unites all these parts as well as having a superior relation to command the body. >Only then, in the eternal unity of Soul, is there true sovereignty Which, again, is what we appeal to. >The tyrant is not necessarily alone, for there can be at once many tyrants. Yes, but the tyrannical monarch nevertheless could still be a monarch; and I never said that there weren't other tyrannical forms. Those are imperfect kinds. What I appeal to is Herodotus, the father of history, who says that there was but 3 forms of State, the rest being imperfect. >What distinguishes tyranny from monarchy/aristocracy (rule of the philosopher king/rule of philosopher kings) is indiscriminate action, which is an affection of appetite (epithymia) and not of reason (logismos). I would phrase that in terms of what distinguishes tyranny from aristocracy. But nevertheless you can have perfect and imperfect forms of State. And a tyrannical (bad) monarch and an aristocrat (good) monarch. >>5106 This is my thread for posting. >>5108 That's where we disagree, then. I do distinguish forms of State this way. This Monarchist heritage goes back to Herodotus in his Herodotus Debate.

>>5109 >this is my thread for posting I understand that, but what's the point of posting walls of text? That's /leftypol/ shit and it's the reason why they're so retarded.

>>5108 I prefer the name 'aristocracy' over 'monarchy'; for the "best" (aristos) needn't be many.

>>5111 I am more specifically inclined to one-man rule. That's where I differentiate myself from traditionalists who speak vaguely of "aristocracy", but I'm very specific for what I have in mind.

Monarchy... and... Oligarchy are two different forms of State. Perhaps you could ascribe the name of Aristocracy to them both, but you could also ascribe the name of Tyranny. As you concede, there can be many tyrants. As far back as the Herodotus Debate, the oldest of monarchist sources, has this distinction been made; it's nothing new or revolutionary, that we distinguish between the rule of one man and the rule of a few men. The reason traditionalists want to blur this distinction as of late is they're caught under the wind of Tocquevillism, which reinforces the latter, that is, the oligarchic persuasion.

>>5111 >for the "best" (aristos) needn't be many. On the contrary, there is the example of nationalism which takes the democratic perspective to uplift a master race (as it's typically called) or a caste of people. And then inferior peoples from a racial standpoint.

Extracts from Bossuet Monarchy is Best >It is by the sole authority of government that union is established among men. This effect of legitimate command is marked to us by these words, so often repeated in the Scriptures: at the command of Saul, and of the legitimate authority "all Israel went out as one man. All the multitudes as one man, were forty-two thousand three hundred and sixty. Behold, such is the unity of a people, when each one renouncing his own will, transfers and reunites it to that of the prince and the magistrate. Otherwise there is no union; the people become wanderers, like a flock dispersed. "May the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, provide a man that may be over this multitude, and may go out and in before them, and may lead them out, or bring them in; lest the people of the Lord be as sheep without a shepherd." >Thus the Sovereign Magistrate has in his hands all the strength of the nation, which submits to, and obeys him. "And they made answer to Joshua, and said: All that thou hast commanded us we will do: and withersoever thou shalt send us we will go. he that shall gainsay thy mouth, and not obey all thy words, that thou shalt command him, let him die; only take thou courage, and do manfullly >All strength is transferred to the Sovereign Magistrate; every one strengthens him to the prejudice of his own, and renounces his own life in case of disobedience. The people gain by this; for they recover in the Person of the Supreme Magistrate more strength than they yielded for his authority, since they recover in him all the strength of the nation reunited to assist them. >Thus an individual is at ease from oppression and violence, because in the Person of the Prince he has an invincible defender, and much stronger beyond comparison than all those who may undertake to oppress them. >Monarchical government is the best. It is also the most opposed to division, which is the essential evil in states, and the most certain cause of their ruin… When states are formed, one seeks for unity, and one is never so unified as under a single leader. In addition one is never stronger, because everything happens in concert. Bossuet & Absolutism >Royal authority is absolute… The prince need account to no one for what he ordains… "Observe the mouth of the King, and the commandments of the oath of God. Be not hasty from his face, and do not countinue in an evil work: for he will do all that pleaseth him. And his word is full of power; neither can any man say to him: Why dost thou so? He that keepth the commandment, shall find no evil." …Without this absolute authority, he can neither do good nor suppress evil: his power must be such that no one can hope to escape him; and, in fine, the sole defense of individuals against the public power, must be their innocence… This doctrine is in conformity with the saying of St. Paul: "Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good." >This is what Ecclesiasticus is made to say: "Judge not against a judge." For still stronger reasons [one must not judge] against the sovereign judge who is the King. And the reason which is given is that, "he judgeth according to that which is just." It is not that he is always so judging, but that he is assumed to be so judging: and that no one has the right to judge or review after him. >One must, then, obey princes as if they were justice itself, without which there is neither order nor justice in affairs… Only God can judge their judgments and their persons… It is for that reason that St. Gregory, Bishop of Tours, said to King Chilperic in a council: "We speak to you, but you listen to us only if you want to. If you do not want to, who will condemn you other than he who has that he was justice itself?" …It follows from this that he who does not want to obey the prince, is not sent to another tribunal; but he is condemned irremissibly to death as an enemy of public peace and of human society… "Whosoever shall refuse to obey all your orders, may he die." It is the people who speak thus to Joshua. Personal Power & Public Person; Majesty in Monarchy >I do not call majesty that pomp which surrounds kings or that exterior magnificence which dazzles the vulgar. That is but the reflection of majesty and not majesty itself. Majesty is the image of the grandeur of God in the Prince… God is infinite, God is all. The Prince, as Prince, is not regarded as a private person: he is a public personage, all the State is in him; the will of all the People is included in his. As all perfection and all strength are united in God, so all the power of individuals is united in the Person of the Prince. What grandeur that a single man should embody so much! >The power of God can be felt in a moment from one end of the world to the other: the royal power acts simultaneously throughout the Kingdom. It holds the whole Kingdom in position just as God holds the whole word… If God were to withdraw his hand, the entire world would return to nothing: if authority ceases in the Kingdom, all lapses into confusion… Consider the Prince in his cabinet. From thence flow the commands which coordinate the efforts of magistrates and captains, of citizens and soldiers, of provinces and armies, by land and by sea. It is the image of God, who directs all nature from his throne in the highest heaven. >Finally, gather together all that we have said, so great and so august, about royal authority. You have seen a great nation united under one man: you have seen his sacred power, paternal and absolute: you have seen that secret reason which directs the Body Politic, enclosed in one head: you have seen the image of God in kings, and you will have the idea of majesty of kingship… God is holiness itself, goodness itself, power itself, reason itself. In these things consists the divine majesty. In their reflection consists the majesty of the Prince… So great is this majesty that its source cannot be found to reside in the prince: it is borrowed from God, who entrusts it to the Prince for the good of his People, to which end it is well that it be restrained by a higher power…

The State is Me By Bossuet >One owes the Prince the same service one owes his country… No one has any doubts about this, since we have seen that the whole State is in the Person of the Prince. In him is found the will of the whole people. It is for him alone to make everything converge in the public good. One must render concurrent the service which one owes to the Prince and that which one owes to the State, viewed as inseparable things. >It is only public enemies who separate the interest of the Prince from the interest of the State… In the ordinary style of sacred Scripture, the enemies of the State are called the enemies of the King. We have already observed that Saul called his enemies, the Philistines, enemies of the people of God… Thus one should never think that he can attack a people without attacking its King, nor that one can attack a King without attacking a people… To flatter a people in order to separate it from the interests of its King, is to make the cruellest of all wars upon it, and to add sedition to its other misfortunes… Let the nations then detest the Rabsaces and all those who pretend to love them, while they attack their King. One never attacks the body so much as when one attacks the head, though one can seem for a while to flatter the other members. >The Prince must be loved as a public good, and his life is the object of people's good wishes… From this comes the cry, Long live the King! Which has been passed from the people of God to all the peoples of the world. At the election of Saul, at the coronation of Solomon, at the rite of Joas, one heard this cry from the whole people: Long live the King, long live the King, long live King David, long live King Solomon! … The Prince is a public good whom each must preserve jealously… The life of the Prince is viewed as the SALVATION of the whole people: this is why each is careful of the life of the Prince as if it were his own, or rather more than his own… "The anointed of the Lord, whom we regard as the breath of our mouth.": that is to say, who is dear to us as the air we breathe. It is thus Jeremiah spoke of the King. "Then David's men swore unto him, saying: "Thou shalt go no more out to us to battle, lest thou put out the lamp of Israel" … See how the Prince is loved: he is the light of the whole kingdom. What is loved as much as light? It is the joy and greatness of the universe… Thus a good subject loves his prince as he loves the public good, as he loves the safety of the whole State, as he loves the air he breathes, the light of his eyes, his life and more than his life.

Bossuet on the true riches of a King >Men are the true riches of a king… One is delighted when he sees, under good kings, the incredible multitude of people and the astonishing largeness of the armies. By contrast one is ashamed of Achab and of the kingdom of Israel exhausted of people, when one sees his army encamp "like two little flocks of goats"–while the Syrian army which faced it covered the face of the earth… In the enumeration of the immense riches of Solomon, there is nothing finer than these words: "Judah and Israel were innumerable, as the stand of the sea in the multitude."…But here is the pinnacle of felicity and of richness. It is that this whole innumerable people "ate and drank of the fruit of its hands, every one under his vine and under his fig-tree, and rejoicing. " For joy makes bodies healthy and vigorous

>>5109 >That's not my own admission Then the alternative hypothesis is that subjects do have some sovereignty, even if lesser in comparison to the king. >You can take two different things and see their differences apart from one another But different in regards to what? If they are only different in a certain respect, then they are not wholly different, making them comparable; if they are wholly different, then it's no longer a comparison but a negation. This is different from comparing a thing and it's opposite, for even an opposite bears some relation to a certain thing so as to merit it being opposite to it. >whether he rules unjustly or justly doesn't disregard the justice of this design Yes, but that was not my point; my point is that if the king is justice, absolute justice, and the king is both king not king, insofar as he is king in one city but not another, then justice is both justice and injustice; that makes justice not absolute (i.e. a law of nature) but relative, ergo not a law of nature but a convention. Since that is inconceivable, absolute justice is independent from instances of justice, just as the form of kingship is independent from instances of kings. >The household is the very image of the body-politic itself An image is still an effluence, even if the most representative of them. The true body politic (not an image thereof) is the tripartite soul, after which the household is modeled. >What I appeal to is Herodotus, the father of history, who says that there was but 3 forms of State, the rest being imperfect I base it upon Plato's five regimes in the Republic. Plato distinguishes them by the respective affections of the soul, where tyranny differs from aristocracy/monarchy for being concupiscent. It's a more univocal account than just the number of rulers; you yourself admitted that tyrannies can vary in the number of rulers, so it's not a necessary condition for tyranny. >>5114 Nationalism blurs class distinction; it's also a incoherent to speak of castes in term of racial inequality if you don't consider inferior races to be nationals. The best are always the best amongst the State, not foreigners or barbarians, who aren't even citizens to begin with. Aristocracy on the basis of race doesn't work, no matter how opposed you are to race mixing. National identity is important, but not as important as class distinction.

>>5120 >Then the alternative hypothesis is that subjects do have some sovereignty, even if lesser in comparison to the king. The subjects are in relation of the particular and the sovereign that of the general. Just like it is distinguished that there is the body itself and parts of the body; but the sovereign alone has the relationship of the soul over the body, they but parts. This unity is unmixed. >For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one sovereign prince in every Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend >Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power…. >This is different from comparing a thing and it's opposite Then we're just on the wrong foot in terms of making this understood. >my point is that if the king is justice, absolute justice, and the king is both king not king, insofar as he is king in one city but not another, then justice is both justice and injustice; Yes, it is under the King to determine what is good and what is bad under his dominion under his right command (emphasis on right); but nevertheless there is an overreaching justice. The Sovereign is considered justice within his own domain. You haven't addressed that different states have different laws and different customs. Does that mean there is no absolute justice because different states different customs and laws? It's the pact of nature that allows the father to have the power of life and death, like you affirm, to reward and condemn, to make just and unjust. >The true body politic (not an image thereof) is the tripartite soul, after which the household is modeled. There is one soul. And like the household, one unity. Sovereignty appeals to the unity of the soul. When the various states, one of those forms takes the command.

>It's a more univocal account than just the number of rulers; you yourself admitted that tyrannies can vary in the number of rulers, so it's not a necessary condition for tyranny. And again, the condition of tyranny or aristocracy doesn't override that fact that there are monarchies, oligarchies, and democracies; neither does it change the fact that because there is one tyrant, it is nevertheless a monarchy. Whereas the number of rulers does distinguish states in the account of Bodin and Herodotus, and also doesn't do away with the notion of there being perfect and imperfect kinds of these 3 states: like Bodin makes the distinction between 3 kinds of Monarchy. Royal monarchy, lordly monarchy, and tyrannical monarchy.

The state of one ruler produces greatly different effects than a few rulers. Everything I have said about pre-eminence would be bunk and lose its effect, if we did not recognize one person as a supreme ruler; all the great roll out and distinctions and decorations would be meaningless if this person alone wasn't recognized as being supreme alone. Monarchy is a very special form of State and commands in a fashion very different from an oligarchic state or democratic state. It might seem meaningless to a few anons to highly praise the person for being of the number. Yet without there being one person especial, all the scaffolding and pre-eminence falls flat; and like Bodin says, there is One God in Heaven and One Satan in Hell; monarchy goes over those boundaries and commands respects of angels and demons. >"And finally God alone, the prince and author of the world. Moresoever, they say that among the evil spirits one alone is supreme" -Jean Bodin >"That the government of few lords, is the government of few tyrants: and that it was better at all events to have but one tyrant." >"There is no reason to balance the cruelties and extorsions of a tyrant, with the actions of good princes: we know well that a peaceable Optimacy and wisely governed, if it may be, is better than a cruel tyranny. But the question is, whether it be better to have a just and upright king, or many good lords: and whether a tyranny of fifty tyrants be not more dangerous, than of one tyrant alone: And if there be not much more danger in a Popular or Aristocratical estates. than in a Monarchy. Yea it is most certain that a tyrannical Monarchy is sometimes more to be desired than a Democracy or Optimacy, how good soever:"

Bodin was deeply concerned with the question of harmony and order in a very disordered time. For Bodin, the common good depended on order, and order in society could only exist through a well-established and properly functioning monarchy. In Bodin's view the end of law is to secure order in the Commonweale. He even goes so far as to say that it is 'better to have an evil Commonweale than none at all'. The state should be built with relation to the concord of numbers. The three types of progression–arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic–he called the three daughters of Themis, representing order, justice, and peace. The middle term included the other two. The arithmetic progression was more suited to a democratic state, since it denoted equality. Plato, in building an aristocratic state, preferred that it should be governed according to the geometric system. But the harmonic ratio, developed from the other two, portrayed the relationship of overlord and vassal and was therefore suited to a monarchy. It represented peace, and this was the highest objective of all empires. Here Bodin entered upon a discussion of musical intervals, probably drawn from Boethius or Macrobius, which sought to show a parallel between the well-tempered state and concord in music. The conclusion is that a state can best avoid danger from within or from without if it is built on harmonic principles, which for Bodin meant a monarchy administrated in the interests of all. "As for the fact that Plato wished his state to be governed according to geometric ratio, Aristotle decided subtly and cleverly that this concerned rewards only. Arithmetic ratio he related to honoring pledges and to penalties. How rightly, I will not discuss; but about the harmonic ratio neither said anything. Yet I think this ratio, as the most beautiful of all, pertains to the form of the best empire. First because it is developed from arithmetic and geometric ratios alone, yet is unlike each. The harmonic ratio cannot pertain to penalties or rewards, or to pledges, since in pledges an arithmetic equality inheres, in penalties and rewards an equable geometrical similarity. In the harmonic alone inheres the relationship of the superior and the inferior." Of the three kinds of justice, Distributive, Commutative, and Harmonical: and what proportion they have unto an estate Royal, Oligarchic, and Popular. >Let us then say in continuing of our purpose, that it is not enough to maintain, that a Monarchy is the best estate of a Commonweal, & which in it has the least inconvenience; except we also (as we said) add thereunto, a Monarchy Royal. Neither yet suffices it to say, that the Royal Monarchy is most excellent, if we should not also show that unto the absolute perfection thereof it ought to be fast knit together by an Oligarchic and Popular kind of government: which are proper unto the estates Oligarchic, and Popular. In which doing, the estate of the Monarchy shall be simple, and yet the government so compound and mixt, without any confusion at all of the three kinds of Estates, or Commonweales. For we have before shewed, that there is a great difference betwixt the mingling, or rather confounding of the three estates of Commonweales in one (a thing altogether impossible) and the making of a government of a Monarchy, to be Oligarchic and Popular. For as amongst Monarchies, the Royal Monarchy so governed (as I have said) is the most commendable: even so amongst kingdoms, that which holds most, or comes nearest unto this Harmonical Justice, is of others the most perfect. Justice therefore I say to be The right division of rewards and punishments, and of that which of right unto every man belongs. For that by these, as by most certain guides, wee must enter into this most religious and stately temple of Justice. But this equal division which we seek for, can in no wise be accomplished, or performed, but by a moderate mixture, and confusion of equality, and similitude together, which is the true proportion Harmonicall, and whereof no man hath as yet spoken. >Plato having presupposed the best form of a Commonweale, to be that which was composed of a Tyrannicall and Popular estate: in framing the same, is contrary unto himself, hauing established a Commonweale not only Popular, but altogether a∣so Popularly governed; giving unto the whole assembly of his citizens, the power to make, and to abrogate laws, to place and displace all manner of officers, to determine of peace and warre, to judge of the goods, the life, and honour, of every particular man in sovereignty: which is indeed the true Popular estate, and Popularly also governed. And albeit that he had so (as we say) formed his Commonweale, yet neuerthelesse hee said, That the Commonweale could never be happy, if it were not by Geometrical proportion governed; saying that God (whom every wise lawmaker ought to imitate) in the government of the world always useth Geometrical proportion. >Now certain it is, that Distributive, or Geometrical Justice, is most contrary unto the Popular estate and government by Plato set down: the people still seeking after nothing more, than for equalitie in all things; a thing proper unto Commutative, or Arithmetical Justice. Which was the cause for which Xenophon (Plato his companion, and both of them jealous one of another's glory) being of opinion, That Commonweales ought to be framed, and the laws administered according unto Arithmetical proportion and equality, brings in Cyrus yet a boy, corrected and chastised, for that he being chosen king, had changed but the servants garments, appointing better apparel unto them of the better sort, and meaner unto them of the meaner sort: as having therein regard unto decency, and the proportion Geometrical After which chastisement, Cyrus is by his master taught, to give unto every man that which unto him belongs, and to remember that he was a Persian borne, and was therefore to use the Persian laws and customs, which gave unto every man that which was unto him proper: and not the manners and fashions of the Medes, who thought it meet, that to be unto every man given, which was decent and convenient for him. Which writings of Xenophon, Plato having read, and knowing right well that it was himself, and not Cyrus, which had been corrected; forthwith reproved the Cyropaedia, without naming of any partie. This diversity of opinions, betwixt Xenophon and Plato (famous among the Greeks) was the cause of two great factions, the one of the Nobility and richer sort, who held for Geometrical Justice, and the Oligarchical estate; the other of the baser and poorer sort, who maintained Commutative or Arithmetical Justice, and therefore wished to have had all estates and Commonweales Popular. Now of these two factions arise a third, which was of opinion, That in euery Commonweale Arithmetical Justice was to be kept in just equality, when question was of the goods of any one in particular, or for the recompensing of offences and forfeitures: but if question were of common rewards to be bestowed out of the common treasure, or for the division of countries conquered, or for the inflicting of common punishments, that then Distributive, or Geometrical Justice, was to be observed and kept, having regard unto the good or evil deserts, and the qualities or calling of every man: insomuch that these men used two proportions, and yet for all that diversely, sometime the one and some∣time the other: as Aristotle said it ought to be done, but yet not naming either Plato or Xenophon, who yet had both first touched this string.

>So the royal estate also by a necessary consequence framed unto the harmonicall proportion, if it be royally ordered and governed, that is to say, Harmonically; there is no doubt but that of all other estates it is the fairest, the happiest, and most perfect. But here I speak not of a lordly monarchy, where the Monarch, though a natural prince born, holds all his subjects underfoot as slaves, disposing of their goods as of his own: and yet much less of a tyrannical monarchy, where the Monarch being no natural Lord, abuses neuerthelesse the subjects and their goods at his pleasure, as if they were his very slaves; and yet worse also when he makes them slaves unto his own cruelties. But my speech and meaning is of a lawful King, whether he be so by election, for his virtue and religion, by voice chosen, so as was Numa; or by divine lot, as was Saul; or that he haue by strong hand and force of armes, as a conquerour got his kingdome, as have many; or that he have it by a lawful and orderly succession, as have all (except some few) who with no less love and care favours and defends his subjects, than if they were his own children. And yet such a King may nevertheless if he will, governe his kingdome popularly and by equall Arithmetical proportion, calling all his subiects indifferently without respect of persons unto all honours and preferments whatsoever, without making choyce of their deserts or sufficiency, whether it be that they be chosen by lot or by order one of them after another: howbeit that there be few or rather no such monarchies indeed. So the King may also govern his estate or kingdome Aristocratically, bestowing the honorable estates and charges therein with the distribution of punishments and rewards by Geometrical proportion, making still choice of the nobility of some, and of the riches of others, still rejecting the base poorer sort, and yet without any regard had unto the deserts or virtues of them whom he so preferred; but onely vnto him that is best monyed or most noble. Both which manner of governments, howbeit that they bee euill and blameworthy, yet is this Oligarchic and Geometrical proportion of government much more tolerable and more sure, than is that popular and turbulent government, scarcely any where to bee found, as nearer approaching unto the sweet Harmonicall government. For it may be, that the king to assure his estate against the insurrection of the base common people, may have need to strengthen himself with the nobility, which come nee∣rer unto his quality and condition, than doth the base artificers and common sort of people, unto whom he cannot descend, neither with them well have any society at all, if he will in any good sort maintain the maiesty of his royal estate and sovereignty, as it seems he must of necessity do, if he shall make them partakers of the most honourable charges of his estate and kingdome. But such an Oligarchic kind of government is also euill and dangerous, not unto the common people only, but even unto the nobility & prince also: who may so still stand in fear of the discontented vulgar sort, which is always far in number more than is the nobility or the rich: and having got some seditious leader, and so taking up of arms, becomes the stronger part, and so sometimes revolting from their prince, drives out the nobility, and fortify themselves against their princes power: >But now in civil societies there is no mean better to bind and combine the little ones with the great, the base with the noble, the poor with the rich, than by communicating of the offices, estates, dignities, and preferments, unto all men, as well the base as the noble, according unto every mans virtues and deserts, as wee have before declared... but we must also, to make an harmony of one of them with another, mingle them which have wherewith in some sort to supply that which wanteth in the other. For otherwise there shall be no more harmony than if one should separate the concords of music which are in themselves good, but yet would make no good consent if they were not bound together: for that the default of the one is sup∣plied by the other. In which doing, the wise prince shall set his subjects in a most sweet quiet, bound together with an indissoluble bond one of them unto another, together with himself, and the Commonweale. As is in the four first numbers to bee seen: which God hath in Harmonicall proportion disposed to show unto us, that the Royal estate is Harmonicall, and also to be Harmonically governed. For two to three makes a fifth; three to four, a fourth; two to four, an eight; and again afterwards, one to two, makea an eight; one to three, a twelfth, holding the fifth and the eight; & one to four, a double eight, or Diapason: which contains the whole ground and compass of all tunes and concords of music, beyond which he which will passe unto five, shall in so doing mar the harmony, and make an intolerable discord. >Now the sovereign prince is exalted above all his subjects, and exempt out of the rank of them: whose majesty suffers no more division than doth the unity itself, which is not set nor accounted among the numbers, howbeit that they all from it take both their force and power... And as many men for lack of understanding live like beast, smoothed with that only which is present and before them, without mounting any higher unto the contemplation of things intellectual and divine, whom the sacred scriptures call also beasts: even so also the Oligarchic and popular Common∣weales without understanding, that is to say, without a prince, are in some sort able to maintain and defend themselves, though not long: being indeed about to become much more happy if they had a sovereign prince, which with his authority and power might (as doth the understanding) reconcile all the parts, and so unite and bind them fast in happiness together. >For that as of unity depends the union of all numbers, which have no power but from it: so also is one souvereign prince in euery Commonweale necessary, from the power of whom all others orderly depend. But as there cannot bee good music wherein there is not some discord, which must of necessity be intermingled to give the better grace unto the Harmony. So also is it necessary that there should be some fools amongst wise men, some unworthy of their charge amongst men of great experience, and some evil and vile men amongst the good and virtuous, to give them the greater lustre, and to make the difference known (even by the pointing of the finger, and the sight of the eye) betwixt virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance. For when sools, vicious, and wicked men, are contemned & despised, then the wise, virtuous, and good men, receive the true reward and guerdon for their virtue, which is honour. >And it seems the ancient Greeks in their fables, to have aptly shadowed forth unto vs that which wee have spoken of these three kinds of Justice, giving unto Themis three daughters. That is to say, Upright Law, Equity, and Peace: which are referred unto the three forms of Justice, Arithmetical, Geometrical, and Harmonicall:

>But these things thus declared, it remains for us to know (as the chief point of this our present discourse) Whether it be true that Plato saith, God to govern this world by Geometrical proportion: For that he hath taken it as a ground, to shew that a well ordered Commonweale ought (to the imitation of the world) to be governed by Geometrical Justice: Which I have shewed to be contrary, by the nature of the unity, Harmonically referred unto the three first numbers: as also by the intellectual power, compared unto the three other powers of the soul: and by a point compared to a line, a plain superficies, or other solid body. But let us go farther, for if Plato had looked nearer into the wonderfull Fabric of the world, he should have marked that which he forgot in his Timeo, viz. The Great God of nature to have Harmonically composed this world of Matter and Form, of which the one is maintained by the help of the other, and that by the proportion of equality and similitude combined & bound together. And for that the Matter was to no use without the Form, and that the form could have no being without the matter, neither in the whole universal, neither yet in the parts thereof: he made the world equal to the one, and semblance to the other: equall unto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehends all: and semblance or like unto the form, in such sort as is the Harmonicall proportion composed of the Arithmetical and Geometrical proportions equall to the one, and semblable to the other, being one of them separate from another unperfect. >So also a well ordered Commonweale is composed of good and bad, of the rich and of the poor, of wisemen and of fools, of the strong and of the weak, allied by them which are in the mean betwixt both: which so by a wonderfull disagreeing concord, ioin the highest with the lowest, and so all to all, yet so as that the good are still stronger than the bad; so as he the most wise workman of all others, and governor of the world hath by his eternal law decreed. And as he himself being of an infinite force and power rules over the angels, so also the angels over men, men over beasts, the soul over the the body. >Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens; with a certain secure care preserves from destruction this triple world, bound together with a most sweet and Harmonicall consent: unto the imitation of whom, every good prince which wishes his Kingdom and Commonweale not in safety only, but even good and blessed also, is to frame and conform himself.

It was the geometrical method that Hobbes attempted to apply not only to political science but to the whole of science that lead Marx and English to describe Hobbes' materialism as "misanthropic" since it lacked the "poetic glamour" that materialism still possessed in Bacon's writings. Marx and Engels summed up the development of English philosophy in The Holy Family in 1844 "In its further evolution, materialism becomes one-sided. Hobbes is the man who systematises Baconian materialism. Knowledge based upon the senses loses its poetic blossom, it passes into the abstract experience of the geometrician. Physical motion is sacrificed to mechanical or mathematical motion; geometry is proclaimed as the queen of sciences. Materialism takes to misanthropy. If it is to overcome its opponent, misanthropic, fleshless spiritualism, and that on the latter's own ground, materialism has to chastise its own flesh and turn ascetic. Thus it passes into an intellectual entity; but thus, too, it evolves all the consistency, regardless of consequences, characteristic of the intellect." Hobbes on the Artificial Person >For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of Nature, man. For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, Civitas), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; salus populi (the people’s safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation. Plato says on Monarchy, "And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives of the imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?" "Certainly" "And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and king, of oligarches, and aristocracies, and democracies–because men are offended at the one monarch, and can NEVER be made to BELIEVE that any one can be worthy of such authority, or is able and willing in spirit of virtue and knowledge to act justly and holy to all; they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases; for if there could be such a DESPOT as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too GLAD to have him, and that he ALONE' would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State." "To be sure." "But then, as the State is NOT a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavor to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government." Much spoken here in Plato, I believe, explains Hobbes & the Monarchy of the Leviathan, and why Hobbes also says man isn't a political animal like ants are. Firstly, for Plato, stating that the state is not like a beehive and has no natural head. I think much of what everyone criticizes about Hobbes was really Hobbes in reaction to this line. For example, Hobbes criticizing Aristotle and saying that men aren't exactly political like ants or bees… No doubt Hobbes read this from Plato. I personally think that Hobbes' political philosophy was monarchist in origin, and in response to the dilemma put forward by Plato, that naturally, mankind doesn't have a natural head and superior of a Monarch, and could only endeavor to approach this true government… Hence, Hobbes individualism and reaction to this, that all traditionalists despise and lament for his Frankenstein creation of the Leviathan, I believe has a monarchist discrepancy in origin, that most traditionalists wouldn't understand as they lament about Hobbism. I think why Hobbes did what he had done was from a monarchist mentality. In frustration with what Plato said here, he wanted to correct it and re-adjust so that there would be a place for Monarchy under the Sun. So you see the Hobbesian state of nature, and the individualist methodology, and the artificial person of the Leviathan, and leniency towards Monarchy that he did, where the People form this body-politic and find a head who is at once recognized to be a superior by this popular pre-eminence. Struggle for Monarchical Pre-eminence While Bodin, Filmer, & Arthur Schopenhauer said that Monarchy is natural, I think it goes both ways… for Monarchy is also said to be monstrous, or in more polite terms said to be extraordinary or divine or pre-eminent. There have certainly been those who said that Mankind has a place for Monarchy, and like Robert Filmer in Patriarcha marks out a kind of right of fatherhood for various peoples by descent, giving them that natural person at once recognized as a superior. But there are many who will stress how naturally mankind is democratic and has no need for monarchy or any state (like the anarchists) and that there might as well not be any Monarchy. That it is insufficient. That Monarchy is outside the nature of men, and that the people have no need or desire for a monarch. If anyone could understand this sentiment I talk about from a monarchist standpoint, you too would understand this problem.

From Hobbes De Cive >The People is somewhat ths is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the people Commands; for the People will by the will of one man From Generation of a Commonwealth, Hobbes Leviathan >This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN [the People], or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal God, to which we owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defense. Which is the closest, imo, any Western political treatise has come to the Juche doctrine that "The People are God".

"For the power by which the people are to be defended consists in their armies, and the strength of an army in the union of their strength under one command; which command the sovereign instituted, therefore has, because the command of the militia, without other institution, makes him that has it sovereign. And therefore, whosoever is made general of an army, he that has the sovereign power is always generalissimo." -Hobbes, Leviathan

A royal rule is a personal rule. That is why they abuse the term "Cult of Personality". The King is a mirror to his people, and the all people aspire towards a person like a great avatar. The Monarch is personal as they follow him like a shepherd, and his face gives a familial resemblance to them. So monarchical rule is personal like a shepherd who leads his flock with his person. The charm of princes has the same mesmerizing effect. That's why it is said, "When the government is personal, the ruler is a king." That is why I say, A people desire a person

King James I >It is a true old saying, That a King is as one set on a stage, whose smallest actions and gestures, all the people gazingly do behold >Be careful then, my Son, so to frame all your indifferent actions and outward behaviour, as they may serve for the furtherance and forth-setting of your inward virtuous disposition >But it is not enough to a good King, by the scepter of good Laws well execute to govern, and by force of arms to protect his people; if he join not therewith his virtuous life in his own person, and in the person of his Court and company; by good example alluring his Subjects to the love of virtue, and hatred of vice. And therefore (my Son) see all people are naturally inclined to follow their Princes example (as I showed you before) let it not be said, that ye command others to keep the contrary course to that, which in your own person ye practice, making so your words and deeds to fight together: but by the contrary, let your own life be a law-book and mirrour to your people; that therein they may read the practice of their own Laws; and therein they may see, by your image, what life they should lead >I remember Christ's saying, My sheep hear my voice, and so I assure myself, my people will most willingly hear the voice of me, their own Shepherd and King. Jean Bodin on Prince as Mirror to People >For nothing more divine ever was said by a prophet than what was said by Plato, "As are the princes in a state, so will be the citizens." By lasting experience we have found this abundantly true. For examples it is unnecessary to seek farther than Francis I, king of the French. As soon as he began to love literature, from which his ancestors had always turned away, immediately the nobility followed suit. Then the remaining orders studied the good arts with such zeal that never was there a greater number of learned people.

Merneptah's Speech: Lo, his Majesy was enraged at their report, like a lion; he assembled his court, and said to them: "Hear ye the command of your lord; I give–as ye shall do, saying: I am the ruler who shepherds you; I spend my time searching out–as a father who preserves alive his children; while ye fear like birds, and ye know not the goodness of that which he does. Is there none answering… Shall the land be wasted and forsaken at the invasion of every country, while the Nine Bows plunder its borders, and rebels invade every day?" Court eulogizess Ramses II: "We come to thee, lord of heaven, lord of earth, Re, life of the whole earth, lord of duration, of fruitful revolution, Atum for the people, lord of destiny, creator of Renenet, Khnum who fashioned the people, giver of breath into the nostrils of all, making all the gods live, pillar of heaven, support of earth, adjusting the Two Lands, lord of food, plentiful in grain, in whose steps is the harvest goddess, maker of the great, fashioner of the lowly, whose word produces food, the lord vigilant when all men sleep, whose might defends Egypt, valiant in foreign lands, who returns when he has triumphed, whose sword protects the Egyptians, beloved of truth, in which he lives by his laws, defender of the Two Lands, rich in years, great in victory, the fear of whom expels foreign lands, our king, our lord, our Sun, by the words of whose mouth Atum lives. Lo, we are now before they majesty, that thou mayest decree to us the life that thou givest, Pharaoh, breath of life, who makes all men live when he has shone on them." Ramesses II Speech for his Father: "For the son becomes the champion of his father, like Horus, when he championed his father, forming him that formed him, fashioning him that fashioned him, making to live the name of him that begat him." "My heart leads me in doing excellent things… I will cause it to be said forever and ever: 'It was his son, who made his name live.' May my father, Osiris, favor me with the long life of his son, Horus, according as I do that which he did; I do excellent things, as he did excellent things, for him who begat me." Summary of Ramses II's works for his father: "When the Lord of the Two Lands arose as King, to act as champion of his father, on his first voyage to Thebes, he fashioned statues of his father; King Seti I was he; one in Thebes, another in Memphis, in the temple which he built for them… He repeated the restoration of the monuments of his father… fashioning his statues, giving offerings abiding for his august ka–his house, supplying his altars, upbuilding that which was fallen in the house which he loved… His heart kindly disposed towards him that begat him."

'K. James VI & I on King as Royal Physician for Body-Politic >"As every humane body (deare Countrey men) how wholesome soever, is notwithstanding subject, or at least naturally inclined to some sorts of diseases, or infirmities: so is there no Common-wealth, or Body-politicke, how well governed, or peaceable soever it bee, that lackes the owne popular errors, and naturally enclined corruptions:" >"For remedie whereof, it is the Kings part (as the proper Phisician of his Politicke-body) to purge it of all those diseases, by Medicines meete for the same:"

Homer's maxim + Darius in the Herodotus Debate Are the oldest references to Monarchist political thought I know. Let there be one Ruler, one King + What Darius says in the Herodotus Debate Every Monarchist should know these by heart It might seem small and mundane, but I consider them foundational.

Bodin's Anti-Regicide Remarks >But when I perceived on every side that subjects were arming themselves against their princes; that books were being brought out openly, like firebands to set Commonweals ablaze, in which we are taught that princes sent by providence to the human race must be thrust out of their kingdoms under the pretense of tyranny, and that kings must be chosen not by their lineage, but by the will of the people; and finally that these doctrines were weakening the foundations not only of this realm only but of all states, then I denied that it was the function of a good man or of a good citizen to offer violence to his prince for any reason, however great a tyrant he might be; and contended that it was necessary to leave this punishment to God, and to other princes. And I have supported this by divine and human laws and authorities, and most of all by reason which compel assent. >But if it be so that the soldier which had only broken the vine truncheon of his Captain, beating him by right or wrong, was by the law of arms to be put to death: then what punishment deserves the son which lays hand upon his father? >But if the prince be an absolute Sovereign, as are the true Monarchies of France, of Spain, of England; Scotland, Turkey, Muscovy, Tartarie, Persia, Ethiopia, India, and of almost all the kingdoms of Africa, and Asia, where the kings themselves have the sovereignty without all doubt or question; not divided with their subjects: in this case it is NOT lawful for any one of the subjects in particular, or all of them in general, to attempt any thing either by way of fact, or of justice against the honour, life, or dignity of the Sovereign: albeit that he had committed all the wickedness, impiety, and cruelty that could be spoken; for as to proceed against him by way of justice, the subject has no such jurisdiction over his Sovereign prince: of whom depends all power and authority to command: and who may not only revoke all the power of his Magistrates; but even in whose presence the power of all Magistrates, Corporations, Colleges, Estates, and Communities cease, as we have said, and shall yet more fully in due place say. Now if it be not lawful for the subject by way of justice to proceed against his prince; the vassal against his lord; nor the slave against his master; and in brief, if it not be lawful, by way and course of justice to proceed against a king, how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact, or force. For question is not here, what men are able to do by strength and force, but what they ought of right to do: as not whether the subjects have power and strength, but whether they have lawful power to condemn their Sovereign prince. Now the subject is not only guilty of treason of the highest degree, who has slain his Sovereign prince, but even he also which has attempted the same; who has given counsel or consent thereunto; yea if he have concealed the same, or but so much as thought it… And albeit that the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men; but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity: yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his Sovereign prince, although he have attempted nothing, they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death, notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof. As in proof it fell out with a gentleman of Normandy, who confessed himself unto a Franciscan Friar, to have had a purpose in himself to have slain Francis the first, the French king: of which evil purpose and intent he repenting himself, received of the frier absolution, who yet afterward told the king thereof, who sending for the gentleman, and he confessing the fact, turned him over to the parliament of Paris for his trial, where he was by the decree of that high court condemned to death, and so afterwards executed.

>One must not however label as evidence of tyranny the executions, banishments, confiscations, and other deeds of violence that mark a restoration [or transition] in a commonwealth. Such changes are necessarily violent, as was illustrated by what happened at the establishment of the Triumvirate in Rome, and at the election of many of the Emperors. It is not proper, either, to call Cosimo de Medici a tyrant for building a citadel, surrounding himself with foreign guards, and taxing his subjects heavily for their upkeep, after the assassination of Alessandro, Duke of Florence. Such medicine was necessary to a commonwealth ravaged by so many seditions and insurrections, and for a licentious and unruly populace, everlastingly plotting against the new duke, though he was accounted one of the wisest and most virtuous princes of his age. >Not only is the subject guilty of high treason who kills his prince, but so also is he who has merely attempted it, counselled it, wished it or even considered it… We read that the most holy doctors that the Jews ever knew, those who were known as the Essenes or experts in the law of God, held that Sovereign princes, of whatever character, should be regarded by their subjects as sacred and inviolable, and given of God. One cannot doubt that David, king and prophet, was informed by the spirit of God if ever man was, having always before his eyes the law of God. It was he who said, "Slander not the Prince, nor speak evil of the magistrate." Nothing is more insisted on in the Holy Writ than the wickedness of compassing the death of the prince, or any responsible magistrate, or even making any attempt against their life or honour, even though, adds the Scripture, they be evil men. >O how many Tyrants should there be, if it should be lawful for Subjects to kill Tyrants? How many good and innocent Princes should be as Tyrants perished by the conspiracy of their subjects against them? He that should of his subjects but exact subsidies, should be then, as the vulgar people esteem him, a Tyrant: He that should rule and command contrary to the good licking of the people, should be a Tyrant: He that should keep strong guard and garrisons for the safety of his person, should be a Tyrant: He that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his State, should be also counted a Tyrant. How should good Princes be assured of their lives, if under colour of Tyranny they might be slain by their subjects, by whom they ought to be defended? >And in this, the princes much deceive themselves [and namely they which give reward to them that have slain Tyrants, to make them a way unto the sovereignty]. For they shall never assure themselves of their own lives, if they severely punish not the conspirators against their own prince and murderers of him, although he was never so great a Tyrant. As most wisely did Severus the emperour, who put to death all them which had any part in the murder of the emperour Pertinax: which was the cause (as says Herodian) that there was no man which durst attempt his life. So also Vitelliu the emperour put to death all the murderers and conspirators against Galba, who had presented requests signed with their own hands unto the emperour Otho, to have had of him reward for their disloyalty. And Theophilus emperour of Constantinople caused them all to be called together, who had made his father emperour, after they had slain Leo the Armenian, as if he would have well recompensed them for so great a turn: who being come together with many other, who though not partakers of the murder, were yet desirous to be partakers of the reward; he caused them altogether to be slain. And that more is, the emperour Domitian put to death Epaphroditus, Nero his servant, and secretary to the state, for having helped Nero to kill himself, who most instantly requested him so to do, being thereby delievered from the executioner's hands, and cruel exemplary death. And these things we read not only Tyrants, but even good kings also to have done, not so much in regard of their own safety, as of the dignity of them who were slain. As David did unto him who in hope of reward brought him his father in law's head cut off, but slain by his enemies. And Alexander the Great caused cruelly to be put to death him who had murdered king Darius, abhorring the subject which durst to lay hand upon his king: although Alexander himself by lawful war sought after his life and state, as being his lawful enemy. The same, I'll add, happened to a notable conspirator against Caligula, Cassius Chaerea.

Bodin on Wars of Religion: >"No greater proof of a stable state exists than was shown recently in the religious wars that flamed throughout all France. Although the leaders of the parties devastated everything with slaughter and fire, yet the splendor and prestige of the courts and of the greatest cities strangely enough was undiminished. Then many battles and great tumults were quieted in a short time by an edict of the best of kings, as swarms of bees may be checked by the throwing of a little dust. The prince forgot all injuries. Goodness of such a nature is innate in the race of the Valois." Against Anarchy >"For under the pretext of an exemption from charges, and popular liberty, they induce the subjects to rebel against their natural princes, opening the door to a licentious anarchy, which is worse than the harshest tyranny in the world."

King James VI & I >"For if the King want, the State wants, and therefore the strengthening of the King is the preservation and the standing of the State; And woe be to him that divides the weal of the King from the weal of the Kingdom. And as that King is miserable (how rich soever he be) that reigns over a poor people, (for the hearts and riches of the people, are the King's greatest treasure.)" Thomas Hobbes >"From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies." Dante Alighieri "Bear this further in mind, that the guardian of the Roman Empire, the triumphant Henry, elect of God, thirsting not for his own but for the Public Good [common good], has for our sakes undertaken his heavy task."

Thomas Hobbes on Instruction / Propaganda (basically) for those people who talk about institutional control and propaganda today: >"Another thing necessary, is rooting out from the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to justify, and give pretense of right to rebellious actions… that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign power… and because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of time are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the sudden: they must therefore be taken away also, by time and education. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private and public teaching, and those teachers have received from grounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities…" >"Instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty… it is his duty to cause them [his subjects] to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also." >"Whereas the common people's minds, unless they be tainted with dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever the public authority shall be imprinted in them." >"But Kings are the Fathers of Families… [the Public Good / education of subjects], the care of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other essential Right of the Sovereignty." (from the context of Pastors / schoolmasters / public education & propaganda) >And, to descend to particulars, the people are to be taught, first, that they ought not to be in love with any form of government that they see in their neighbor nations, more than with their own, nor, whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they, to desire change. For the prosperity of a people ruled by an oligarchical or democratical assembly comes not from Oligarchy, nor from Democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects: nor do the people flourish in Monarchy because one man the has right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of state the obedience, and consequently the concord of the people, and they shall not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience to do no more than reform the Commonwealth shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus, in the fable, which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him in pieces and boil him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change is like the breach of the first of God's Commandments: for there God says, Non habebis Deos alienos: "Thou shalt not have the Gods of other nations," and in another place concerning kings, that they are gods. >For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-in-formed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise. >I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion. The Use of Universities >As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so may Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them… It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. Nor Adhere (Against The Soveraign) To Popular Men >Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be seduced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them In Facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets:

>"Promote then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened." George Washington, Farewell Address >"Instruction of the people in the essential rights which are the natural and fundamental laws of sovereignty... it is his duty to cause them [his subjects] to be instructed; and not only his duty, but his benefit also." >"But Kings are the Fathers of Families... [the Public Good / education of subjects], the care of which they stand so long charged withal, as they retain any other essential Right of the Sovereignty." >For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends... [Such as] of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defense, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his duty, to let the people be ignorant, or misinformed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essential Rights >"It is his Duty, to cause them to be so instructed; and not only his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security..." Hobbes on Instruction

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_of_the_Four_Corners Lord of the Four Corners was a title of great prestige claimed by powerful monarchs in ancient Mesopotamia. Though the term "four corners of the world" does refer to specific geographical places within and near Mesopotamia itself, these places were (at the time the title was first used) thought to represent locations near the actual edges of the world and as such, the title should be interpreted as something equivalent to "King of all the known world", a claim to universal rule over the entire world and everything within it. Thutmose I Universal Triumph >He brought the ends of the earth into his domain; he trod its two extremities with his mighty sword, seeking battle; but he found no one who faced him. He penetrated valleys which the royal ancestors knew not, which the wearers of the double diadem had not seen. His southern boundary is as far as the frontier of this land, his northern as far as that inverted water which goes downstream in going up-stream. The like has not happened to the other kings; his name has reached far as the nether world; the oath is taken by it (viz, his name) in all lands, because of the greatness of the fame of his majesty. They (viz, the lands) were not seen in the archives of the ancestors since the Worshipers of Horus, who gives breath to the one that follows him, his offerings to the one that treads his way. His Majesty is Horus, assuming his (Horus's) kingdom of myriads of years, subject to him are the isles of the Great Circle, the entire earth is under his two feet; bodily son of Re, his beloved, Thutmose I, living forever and ever. Amon-Re, king of the gods is his father, the creator of his beauty, beloved of the gods of Thebes, who is given life, stability, satisfaction, health, joy of his heart, upon the throne of Horus, leading all the living like Re, forever. >I made the boundaries of Egypt as far as that which the sun encircles. I made strong those who were in fear; I repelled the evil from them. I made Egypt superior to every land… Favorite of Amon, Son of Re, of his body, his beloved Thutmose I, Shining like Re, beloved of Osiris, First of the Westerners; Great God, lord of Abydos, ruler of eternity; given life, stability, satisfaction, and health, while shining as King upon the Horus-throne of the living; and joy of his heart, together with his ka, like Re, forever. Hobbes' Behemoth on Deposing of Atahualpa >But in Peru, when Atabalipa was King, the friar told him, that Christ being King of all the world, had given the disposing of all the kingdoms therein to the Pope, and that the Pope had given Peru to the Roman Emperor Charles the Fifth, and required Atabalipa to resign it; and for refusing it, seized upon his person by the Spanish army there present, and murdered him. You see by this how much they claim, when they have power to make it good. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hakk%C5%8D_ichiu Hakkō ichiu (八紘一宇, "eight crown cords, one roof", i.e. "all the world under one roof") >The term was coined early in the 20th century by Nichiren Buddhist activist and nationalist Tanaka Chigaku, who cobbled it from parts of a statement attributed in the chronicle Nihon Shoki to legendary first Emperor Jimmu at the time of his ascension. The Emperor's full statement reads: "Hakkō wo ooute ie to nasan" (八紘を掩うて宇と為さん, or in the original kanbun: 掩八紘而爲宇), and means: "I shall cover the eight directions and make them my abode".

Political Letter VI >Part 1 Dante Alighieri, a Florentine undeservedly in exile, to the most iniquitous Florentines within the city. Written from beneath the springs of Arno, on the confines of Tuscany, on the thirty-first day of March in the first year of the most auspicious passage of the Emperor Henry into Italy. The gracious providence of the Eternal King, who in his goodness ever rules the affairs of the world above, yet ceases not to look down upon our concerns here below, committed to the Holy Roman Empire the governance of human affairs, to the end that mankind might repose in the peace of so powerful a protection, and everywhere, as nature demands, might live as citizens of an ordered world. And though the proof of this is to be found in holy writ, and though the ancients relying on reason alone bear witness thereto, yet is it no small confirmation of the truth, that when the throne of Augustus is vacant, the whole world goes out of course, the helmsman and rowers slumber in the ship of Peter, and unhappy Italy, forsaken and abandoned to private control, and bereft of all public guidance, is tossed with such buffeting of winds and waves as no words can describe, nay as even the Italians in their woe can scarce measure with their tears. Wherefore let all who in mad presumption have risen up against this most manifest will of God, now grow pale at the thought of the judgement of the stern Judge, which is nigh at hand, if so be the sword of Him who saith, 'Vengeance is mine', be not fallen out of heaven. But you, who transgress every law of God and man, and whom the insatiable greed of avarice has urged all too willing into every crime, does the dread of the second death not haunt you, seeing that you first and you alone, shrinking from the yoke of liberty, have murmured against the glory of the Roman Emperor, the king of the earth, and minister of God; and under cover of prescnptive right, refusing the duty of submission due to him, have chosen rather to rise up in the madness of rebellion? Have you to learn, senseless and perverse as you are, that public right can be subject to no reckoning by prescription, but must endure so long as time itself endures? Verily the sacred precepts of the law declare, and human reason after inquiry has decided, that public control of affairs, however long neglected, can never become of no effect, nor be superseded, however much it be weakened. For nothing which tends to the advantage of all can be destroyed, or even impaired, without injury to all – a thing contrary to the intention of God and nature, and which would be utterly abhorrent to the opinion of all mankind. Wherefore, then, being disabused of such an idle conceit, do you abandon the Holy Empire, and, like the men of Babel once more, seek to found new kingdoms, so that there shall be one polity of Florence, and another of Rome? And why should not the Apostolic government be the object of a like envy, so that, if the one twin of Delos have her double in the heavens, the other should have his likewise? But if reflection upon your evil designs bring you no fears, at least let this strike terror into your hardened hearts, that as the penalty for your crime not only wisdom, but the beginning of wisdom, has been taken from you. For no condition of the sinner is more terrible than that of him who, shamelessly and without the fear of God, does whatsoever he lists. Full often, indeed, the wicked man is smitten with this punishment, that as during life he has been oblivious of God, so when he dies he is rendered oblivious of himself. But if your insolent arrogance has so deprived you of the dew from on high, like the mountain-tops of Gilboa, that you have not feared to resist the decree of the eternal senate, and have felt no fear at not having feared, shall that deadly fear, to wit human and worldly fear, not overwhelm you, when the inevitable shipwreck of your proud race, and the speedy end of your deeply to be rued lawlessness, shall be seen to be hard at hand? Do you put your trust in defences, in that you are girt about by a contemptible rampant? O you of one mind only for evil! O you blinded by wondrous greed! What shall it avail you to have girt you with a rampant, and to have fortified yourselves with bulwarks and battlements, when, terrible in gold, the eagle shall swoop down upon you, which, soaring now over the Pyrenees, now over Caucasus, now over Atlas, ever strengthened by the support of the host of heaven, gazed down of old on the vast expanse of ocean in its flight? What shall these avail you, most wretched of men, when you stand confounded in the presence of him who shall subdue the raging of Hesperia?

>>5123 >the sovereign alone has the relationship of the soul over the body Which sovereign? If only the king, then we could say that no one else has a soul; for how it can be that a body be acted upon by the soul without being ruled by it? Wouldn't the inference be that an unruly body is merely a soulless one, since the soul is always, in relation to the body, a ruler? If only the king has a soul, it is not eternal either, as it only comes to be with the king; if the king is king of some but not of others, then he both has and has not a soul, which contradicts the assertion that the king has a soul, as well as that he has a relationship of soul over body; if sovereignty consists in having a relationship of soul over body, then the king is not a sovereign either as the statement, that the king has a soul, is false; even if we were speaking of a king in abstracto, we already concluded that the soul is not eternal as a consequence of it being contingent on the king, ergo the king both has and has not a soul, as the soul is always (like the king himself, on account of being mortal) becoming, and all the previous consequences follow. This is clearly absurd, so I assert instead that the sovereign is the rational self, latent in every man though made manifest only by an elite of philosophers. >Does that mean there is no absolute justice because different states different customs and laws? That is not a detriment to my argument, since I've always acknowledged an absolute justice apart from space & time which is only sought after by the philosopher king; it is a detriment to those who consider the king to be the exclusive purveyor of justice or even justice itself. Now we could talk about the king in abstracto, but even then the king only leads us to justice, and is not justice himself; by his love of justice he becomes just, and we become just by heeding his counsel. It remains also that kingship is independent of the king, as the king is only framed after the model of a king, and is not kingship himself. A tyrant to me is no king, for he is not capable of ruling himself, much less others; he does not possess the character of a king, and therefore is not one himself. >There is one soul The tripartite soul is one, just as a chariot is one. Between two cubes there are two mean proportionals p²q and pq², and between two extremes there are at least two means, one exceeding the lesser and another falling short of the greater; so it is with the soul, where the two parts are either more akin to the body or more akin to the rational self, being three in total since the body is not psychical.

Political Letter VI >Part 2 The hopes which you vainly cherish in your unreason will not be furthered by your rebellion; but by this resistance the just wrath of the king at his coming will be but the more inflamed against you, and mercy, which ever accompanies his army, shall fly away indignant; and where you think to defend the threshold of false liberty, there is sooth shall you fall into the dungeon of slavery. For by the wondrous judgement of God, as we must believe, it sometimes comes to pass that by the very means whereby the wicked man thinks to escape the punishment which is his due, he is the more fatally hurried into it; and that he who wittingly and willingly is a rebel against the divine will, is unwittingly and unwillingly a soldier in its service. The buildings which you have raised, not in prudence to serve your needs, but have recklessly altered to gratify your wantonness, these, encircled by no walls of a renovated Troy, to your grief you shall see crumble beneath the battering-ram, and devoured by the flames The populace which now, divided against itself, rages indiscriminately, some for you, some against you, you shall then see united in their imprecations against you, for the starving mob knows nothing of fear. With remorse, too, you shall behold the spoliation of your temples, thronged daily by a concourse of matrons, and your children doomed in wonder and ignorance to suffer for the sins of their fathers. And if my prophetic soul be not deceived, which announces what it has been taught by infallible signs and incontrovertible arguments, your city, worn out with ceaseless mourning, shall be delivered at the last into the hands of the stranger, after the greatest part of you has been destroyed in death or captivity; and the few that shall be left to endure exile shall witness her downfall with tears and lamentation. Those sufferings, in short, which for liberty's sake the glorious city of Saguntum endured in her loyalty, you in your disloyalty must undergo with shame but to become slaves. And beware of gathering confidence from the unlooked for success of the men of Parma, who under the spur of hunger, that evil counsellor, murmuring to one another, 'Let us rather rush into the midst of battle and meet death', broke into the camp of Caesar while Caesar was absent. For even they, though they gained a victory over Victoria, none the less reaped woe from that woe in a way not like to be forgotten. But bethink you of the thunderbolts of the first Frederick; consider the fate of Milan and of Spoleto; for at the remembrance of their disobedience and swift overthrow your too swollen flesh shall grow chilI, and your too hot hearts shall contract. O most foolish of the Tuscans, insensate alike by nature and by corruption, who neither consider nor understand in your ignorance how before the eyes of the full-fledged the feet of your diseased minds go astray in the darkness of night! For the full-fledged and undefiled in the way behold you standing as it were on the threshold of the prison, and thrusting aside any that has pity on you, lest haply he should deliver you from captivity and loose you from the chains that bind your hands and your feet. Nor are ye ware in your blindness of the overmastering greed which beguiles you with venomous whispers, and with cheating threats constrains you, yea, and has brought you into captivity to the law of sin, and forbidden you to obey the most sacred laws; those laws made in the likeness of natural justice, the observance whereof, if it be joyous, if it be free, is not only no servitude, but to him who observes with understanding is manifestly in itself the most perfect liberty. For what else is this liberty but the free passage from will to act, which the laws make easy for those who obey them? Seeing, then, that they only are free who of their own will submit to the law, what do you call yourselves, who, while you make pretence of a love of liberty, in defiance of every law conspire against the Prince who is the giver of the law? O most wretched offshoot of Fiesole! 0 barbarians punished now a second time! Does the foretaste not suffice to terrify you? Of a truth I believe that, for you simulate hope in your looks and lying lips, yet you tremble in your waking hours, and ever start from your dreams in terror at the portents which have visited you, or rehearsing again the counsels you have debated by day. But if, while alarmed with good reason, you repent you of your madness, yet feel no remorse, then, that the streams of fear and remorse may unite in the bitter waters of repentance, bear this further in mind, that the guardian of the Roman Empire, the triumphant Henry, elect of God, thirsting not for his own but for the public good, has for our sakes undertaken his heavy task, sharing our pains of his own free will, as though to him, after Christ, the prophet Isaiah had pointed the finger of prophecy, when by the revelation of the Spirit of God he declared, 'Surely he hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows'. Wherefore you perceive, if you be not dissemblers, that the hour of bitter repentance for your mad presumption is now at hand. But a late repentance after this wise will not purchase pardon, rather is it but the prelude to seasonable chastisement. For 'the sinner is smitten so that he shall surely die'.

>>5147 >Which sovereign? If only the king, then we could say that no one else has a soul Not just the king; this is applied to all forms of States. The form of State that has the sovereignty has that command. The body we're talking about is the body-politic. <for how it can be that a body be acted upon by the soul without being ruled by it? That's exactly it, the sovereignty rules over it. >as the statement, that the king has a soul, is false The Sovereign Monarch is the soul. It's not whether he has one or not. >the soul is not eternal as a consequence of it being contingent on the king It is said, again, that the King never dies, and that the power is a perpetual power. >since I've always acknowledged an absolute justice apart from space & time which is only sought after by the philosopher king; it is a detriment to those who consider the king to be the exclusive purveyor of justice or even justice itself. No, that doesn't answer it at all, that what pertains to the law in various states pertains to the justice itself; and there are different states, different laws, different customs, different religions... There is an absolute justice, but also justice among men and states; in the same way there are other kinds of laws, such as divine law, the natural law, and human laws. You would have us confuse divine law, natural law, and human laws apparently since among men the pre-eminent monarch is the supreme law-giver, and in the natural world it is nature, and for divinity it is God. >tyrant to me is no king, for he is not capable of ruling himself, much less others; he does not possess the character of a king, and therefore is not one himself. This is not denied. There can be one king and one tyrant.

Philalethes: >Somewhat. I heard this Evening-Prayer from our Pastor in his Catechistical Expositions upon the fifth Commandment, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother: who taught, that under these pious and reverent appellations of Father and Mother are comprised not only our natural Parents, but likewise all higher Powers; and especially such as have Sovereign Authority, as the Kings and Princes of Earth. Theodidactus: <Is this Doctrine so strange unto you, as to make you muse thereat? Philalethes: >God forbid; for I am well assured of the truth thereof, both out of the Word of God, and from the Light of Reason. The Sacred Scriptures do style Kings and Princes the nursing Fathers of the Church, and therefore the nursing Fathers also of the Commonweal: these two Societies having so mutual a dependence, that the welfare of the one is the prosperity of the other. >And the Evidence of Reason teaches, that there is a stronger and higher bond of Duty between Children and the Father of their Country, than the Fathers of private Families. These procure the good only of a few, and not without the assistance and protection of the other, who are the common Foster-fathers of Families, of whole Nations and Kingdoms, that they may live under them an honest and peaceable life. Also, there is no such thing as kingship without there being any kings. There being a king without kingship is simply a tyrant; being king isn't independent from kingship, otherwise there would be no king. He does become a tyrant. However, the King or the Tyrant do not cease to be a Monarch and do not cease to be a Sovereign.

I don't see how anyone would tell a prince to model himself after a king if being king was independent from kingship. King and Kingship obviously go together.

But like an Albion Oak, I'm sown in British soil, and grown, not for myself, but reared with single purpose meant. My cells and organs constitute this land. "For it is an old proverb with us, That the king doth never die, but that so soon as he is dead, the next male of his stock is seized of the kingdom, and in possession thereof before he be crowned, which is not conferred unto him by succession of his father, but by virtue of the law of the land; least the succession of the kingdom should be uncertain, then which nothing can be more dangerous in a Commonweal." -Jean Bodin This should be a testimony to people who suggest that their loyalty has nothing to do with the King but with the Crown. (A doctrine upheld by faggots here in the past, blegh). Since even before being crowned, his person is seized and immediately recognized to be King with the body-politic. Like this clip says, My cells and organs constitute this land. So the maxim of the State, 'The King Never Dies. The Egyptian story of Osiris, whose body was cut up into diverse pieces, would later be re-assembled and reincarnated. This is evident in how there are various crowns with various kings; some even without crowns. Though it could be attributed that a crown has always been there. I'm of the opinion that the name of Caesar as a title is thanks to the person of Caesar, not the other way around. Though it could be said that the crown is represents the State itself, the corporation of the body-politic, that has all things in propriety in sense, along with meum and tuum as particulars and those held in common. Doesn't that hold sway, because like Bodin says, by the law of the land he is seized to be King. I'm of the opinion that the natural person of the King is with the political person of the King. The Monarch is synonymous with the State, the crown itself is a symbol of the King himself rather than the the reverse: Monarchy is a personal form of State. Don't let the term "Cult of Personality" and "personal rule" dissuade you; because the Monarch truly is a mirror to his people, truly rules personally and co-ordinates with his person, like a shepherd guiding a flock with his person. To quote from a pamphlet I have read, W. P. Esq. >"Yet both Bodies make but one individual Body." & with the coronation in mind, it should be remembered that the most fundamental law is keeping the Monarchy itself, where one person is supreme and has the relation of pre-eminence, with an absolute power and majesty. >"The Law of Royal Government is a Law Fundamental." To make pretenses of a crown (a fancy hat) and reject the king is idolatry at the end of the day. To use this as an mechanism to institute rule by turns is even worse, a rejection of monarchy on a fundamental level. >The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman, I hate that I have to elaborate on this so hard. It should be self-evident to monarchists everywhere, but people are deceived so heavily and sticking their noses up. It's even worse when you realize the enemies of royalism have clung to this doctrine just as adamantly. >After the sending of these propositions to the King, and his Majesty's refusal to grant them, they began, on both sides, to prepare for war. The King raised a guard for his person in Yorkshire, and the Parliament, thereupon having voted that the King intended to make war upon his Parliament, gave order for the mustering and exercising the people in arms... for the defence of the King and Parliament, (meaning by King, as they had formerly declared, not his person, but his laws). It should be remembered that the King is himself a living law; and if we recognize majesty in reverence to the King, the King is rightfully regarded as a superior, and not as they would have you believe to be superior to some but inferior to them all. Since the Sovereign Monarch is a superior (or, at least the very least, on par) with the people in general.

>>5154 If the King refusing the coronation is to be understood as a refusal of monarchy, then I would phrase it in terms of abdication (having already been King). But regardless I'm more inclined to favor the King, since some royalists take it for granted that every monarchy has a crown when in fact some don't. And it is only for a moment that the royalty wear any crowns when they do, but for the rest of the reign we are left with their persons.

>>5150 >The body we're talking about is the body-politic So the tripartite soul, whence all forms of State stem. Everyone is in a relationship of soul over body with themselves, whereupon they become subjects or rulers of others based on their respective merits; to be clear, I don't mean voting by 'merit', as that would entail arithmetical, not geometric justice. >that what pertains to the law in various states pertains to the justice itself The law does not define absolute justice, for it has no cognizance thereof; it only dictates what isn't just, which is different from a positive definition of what is just, lest we turn justice into a relative term. We may, in our particularity, not know what is ultimate justice as certain problems only apply to certain circumstances, but we can know what isn't; that's the purpose of the law. Human laws dictate what is antisocial; natural laws dictate what is unnatural; divine laws dictate what is impious; in general, laws dictate what is unlawful. >>5152 >there is no such thing as kingship without there being any kings Then how are there any kings at all? For, as you conceded, one king may be king of some but not of others; if so, he both is and is not king, ergo the statement that the king is a king is false. We could only say that a king is king if there be some objective criteria for kingship that is independent from the kings themselves, ergo it follows necessarily that there's a form of kingship apart from kings.

>>5156 Listen, I don't want to catfight and argue back and forth all day. >Then how are there any kings at all? Then how is there any kingship at all? >one king may be king of some but not of other There is Christ the King, being a universal king of kings, for example. This is back to general and particular; which again, I say, for that very basis that regardless the Sovereign Monarch has that relationship of the general to particular. What you try to deny is simply because the Monarch has a relation of a person would make him the offspring of the idea, but that doesn't deny that they aren't the embodiment of it and can't have that relationship in terms of politics. >We could only say that a king is king if there be some objective criteria for kingship that is independent from the kings themselves If kings themselves were independent from kingship, then they wouldn't be called kings and if kingship itself were independent from kings then the whole practice would be scrapped. There is ultimately the King of Kings. >ergo it follows necessarily that there's a form of kingship apart from kings Who apart from kings has kingship? That's irrelevant anyways to the conversation... I am not here to bicker back and forth about kings alone. There are various others such as emperors, popes, and dictators. >it only dictates what isn't just From what we know that isn't just, we infer what is also just. To know bad also delves into knowing the opposite of bad, that is, good. To know that stealing is unjust also knows to have what is your own is just. What I'm telling you is that when we say if the Monarch forbid to steal -- that isn't his law, but the divine law, that tells us to not steal. However, the main point is that there are divine laws and human laws. The framework of justice allows divine laws and human laws. For example, the commandments tell you not only what is not just, but also what is just; like to honor your parents is commanded and deemed just.

After your next response, I'm going to tie this up. Because I'm not interested in having this argument all day. At the end of the day, we both know you'll continue down your path and I'll stick to mine anyways. I can tell we're both stubborn enough.

>>5157 >I don't want to catfight and argue back and forth all day Sure; I don't consider it a fight though. >Then how is there any kingship at all? By definition there's only one form of kingship; otherwise the predicate 'king' would imply something else than the condition of being 'king', which is absurd. >There is Christ the King, being a universal king of kings, for example Well I'm not Christian, but if you believe that you could say that Christ is the form of kingship that transcends space & time; after all, he's called the Logos in John's gospel, a principle that transcends creation. >that doesn't deny that they aren't the embodiment of it and can't have that relationship in terms of politics Well, yes; though I wouldn't go so far as to say that necessitates there being one ruler, I agree in that philosopher kings best exemplify kingship and are therefore more apt to rule (in regards to the wider context of politics, that is). >Who apart from kings has kingship? Assuming the nominal definition of a king, as someone who is legally denominated as such, then the answer is anyone who possesses the spirit of a king; otherwise, I say one becomes a king by participating in the form of kingship, including emperors, popes, and whatnot. >From what we know that isn't just, we infer what is also just No, we only know something in particular is not just, and not generally what is just so as to judge with certainty whether something is just. >To know bad also delves into knowing the opposite of bad If bad is the opposite of Good, how do I know whether something is bad if the knowledge thereof is contingent on the knowledge of Good? If that were the case then, not knowing what is good, absolute Good, I wouldn't know what is bad either. By definition, I would only know what is bad if I knew what is not good, since what is bad is not good. >stealing is unjust also knows to have what is your own is just Not necessarily true; you could illegally own things without ever having stolen them, and generally your ownership could be unjust in other ways. From the unjust we only know what is not just, by definition.

>>5159 >how do I know whether something is bad if the knowledge thereof is contingent on the knowledge of Good? You yourself say that there is an innate knowledge; so it could be said that men know in their hearts what is good. >Well, yes; though I wouldn't go so far as to say that necessitates there being one ruler It's not about whether it necessitates one ruler; like I said earlier, the politics discussed here is a doctrine about politics in general. That means concerning all forms of states. There could very well be different states. Except we ascribe so much to monarchy here on /monarchy/. >By definition there's only one form of kingship; otherwise the predicate 'king' would imply something else than the condition of being 'king', That's what I'm saying; kingship implying something else other than king is absurd. >but if you believe that you could say that Christ is the form of kingship that transcends space & time In the same sense that the Monarch is called a living law, so the teacher who introduces the subject gets credit for it; like Confucius introduces Confucianism. The King who becomes the embodiment of kingship becomes an inspiration and ideal for all kings to aspire towards. >I say one becomes a king by participating in the form of kingship, including emperors, popes, and whatnot. I would say it differently. The first Pope, such as St. Peter, becomes the inspiration for the office of the Pope and becomes synonymous with that ideal. Remember that the pre-eminent person is also the one who established and introduced that idea; in the same way that Christ is hailed as the firstborn of Mankind and as the alpha and omega. The idea of Caesar became the inspiration for all Caesars through Caesar. It wouldn't be otherwise, that there would be this succession of Caesars in the Roman Empire without Caesar himself. >Assuming the nominal definition of a king, as someone who is legally denominated as such Yes, it is as you say, that the spirit of the King is transferred to them; they are treated as if they are the re-incarnation. Though sometimes I would argue that it is steadfast and sealed; you can be a bad father, but nevertheless still be revered as a father, despite all your misdeeds. Your position is a superior no matter what. You can face consequences for that, but it is within your right to be esteemed father of the family and master of the household. It's not just for the woman or children to assume the superior position even if the father is one bad example of a father. Bodin says that it's simply assumed, that by nature, a father has the interests of his family in mind and wouldn't do this. This is the end of my conversation. If you respond, I'll probably be somewhere else today. I'm losing interest in conversing too much, so I'll just give you the sources for my inspiration. Because at this point I'm just idly doing Q&A and carrying the conversation along. You can read Bodin's Six Books & History here: Six Books of a Commonwealth: https://archive.org/details/sixbookesofcommo00bodi/page/n3/mode/2up & I'll give the pdf. Really, Bodin is a far better conversationalist than myself and is more accurate in describing his politics. You can read his views pertinent towards your conversation, I think, on arithmetical and geometic and harmonical justice towards the end of both these books.

As for the rhetoric about one soul, I borrow that a lot from Hobbes. Though it has a feature in Bodin, certainly, towards the end. I borrow mostly irrespective of their philosophies. This with knowledge of Hobbes materialist & nominalist philosophy. Mostly because I feel it is appropriate to give the sovereignty that supreme relationship, not because I am delving into those diverse philosophies. Since I usually go back and forth between the authors I dabble in, whether it's Bodin, King James, Filmer, Hobbes, Bossuet, I'll give a bit of an overview. Starting with Hobbes. >As here have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty >Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive Faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. >For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortal) Soule >To be uncovered, before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence, is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the stoole, or place, but the Person; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry. (This point, I think, is relevant to what I said about a crown, btw). >But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a Man is dead and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the Figure, and Colour, and Tast of a peece of Bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no Bread: And upon the same ground they say, that Faith, and Wisdome, and other Vertues are sometimes powred into a man, sometimes blown into him from Heaven; as if the Vertuous, and their Vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of Subjects on the Soveraign Power of their Countrey. >But it appeares by what hath been already said, that he who is endued with such a power, (whether it be a man, or a Court) hath a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soule to the body. For it is the soule by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the City hath a will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is rather to be compared with the head, or one Counsellor, whose only Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsell, as the soules is to command. >It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City, First, that there be some who may as near as may be, search into, and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it. For discoverers to Ministers of State, are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule, and we may more truly say in vision politicall, than naturall, that the sensible, and intelligible Species of outward things, not well considered by others, are by the ayre transported to the soule, (that is to say to them who have the Supreme Authority) and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State, than the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man; or if they be compared to Spiders webs, which extended on all sides by the finest threds, doe warn them, keeping in their small holds, of all outward motions; They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their Subjects without Spies, than those Spiders can when they shall goe forth, and whether they shall repair, without the motion of those threds. >Next, those Philosophers who said, that God was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that is to say, a part of it) spake unworthily of God, for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being. For by the word God we understand the Worlds cause; but in saying that the World is God, they say, that it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like manner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but eternall; because there can be no cause of an eternall thing, In denying the world to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a God.

>>5160 > so it could be said that men know in their hearts what is good I wouldn't say they know exactly, only that they once knew and their experiences help them awaken memories of the absolute good, but not to the point where they are fully cognizant of it; for then there would be no evil in the world, and everyone would be perfect and not in need of correction, thereby extinguishing the need for governance. >It's not about whether it necessitates one ruler; like I said earlier, the politics discussed here is a doctrine about politics in general If you say so. >The idea of Caesar became the inspiration for all Caesars through Caesar The Caesar is king in everything but name, even if they did not call themselves such owed to the association with Etruscan influence. Like every other king, Caesars became kings by participating in the form of kingship, which, being beyond space & time, precedes them. >they are treated as if they are the re-incarnation It's not so much a matter of "reincarnation" but divine madness (as Plato explains in the Meno and Ion) that, through the example of one king, inspires his successors towards the right opinion and thereby becoming kings; yet an opinion, being many, can be either right or wrong, and thus is not always correct. The result is that not all successors are inspired, so that one successor fails to become king down the line, even if he be nominally elected as such. The philosopher is most sovereign; for only he is knowledgeable, and therefore the true statesman and king. >This is the end of my conversation Ok. >You can read his views pertinent towards your conversation, I think, on arithmetical and geometic and harmonical justice towards the end of both these books I'll get to it.

>>5162 Oh, and I forgot to mention: >you can be a bad father, but nevertheless still be revered as a father If a father consistently exemplifies fatherhood, in spite of being a bad one, I'd say he is still a father; however if his status as a father deteriorates such that he is incapable of exercising his role as a father, he ceases being one entirely even if nominally regarded as such; one who is incapable of ruling himself, much less others, ceases to be a king if he is still regarded as such. That is the difference between king and tyrant, though the former may deteriorate into the latter.

(This subject Bodin also discusses at the end of the PDF I gave; though keep in mind, Bodin and Hobbes are different thinkers in many respects). >Wherefore what the unity is in numbers, the understanding in the powers of the soul, and the center in a circle: so likewise in this world that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible, in purity most holy, exalted far above the Fabric of the celestial Spheres, joining this elementary world with the celestiall and intelligible heavens (This last passage being Bodin's opinion). https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A16275.0001.001?c=eebo;c=eebo2;g=eebogroup;rgn=main;view=fulltext;xc=1 ^this is a better way to read the Six Books. Which I haue shewed to be contrarie, by the nature of the vnitie, Harmonically referred vnto the three first numbers: as also by the intellectuall power, compared vnto the three other powers of the soule: and by a point compared to a line, a plaine superficies, or other solid bodie. But let vs goe farther, for if Plato had looked neerer into the wonderfull Fabrike of the world, hee should haue marked that [ H] which hee forgot in his Timeo, viz. The Great God of nature to haue Harmonically composed this world of Matter and Forme, of which the one is maintained by the helpe of the other, and that by the proportion of equalitie and similitude combined & bound together. And for that the Matter was to no vse without the Forme, and that the forme could haue no being without the matter, neither in the whole vniuersall, nei∣ther yet in the parts thereof: he made the world equall to the one, and semblable to the other: equall vnto the matter whereof it is made, for that it comprehendeth all: and semblable or like vnto the forme, in such sort as is the Harmonicall proportion com∣posed of the Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportions equall to the one, and sem∣blable to the other, being one of them separate from another vnperfect. >euery Commonweale must needs euen like the powers of the soule and mind needs so fall into all manner of reproch and filthinesse of vices. So that nothing is more like vnto a well gouerned Commonweale, than that most faire and fit compari∣son of the soule and the powers thereof, there being therein so established a most Har∣monicall proportion of iustice, which giueth to euerie part of the soule that which vn∣to it of right belongeth. The like whereof we may say also of the three estates of a Commonweale, guided by Wisedome, Fortitude, & Temperance: which th•…ee mo∣rall [ D] vertues vnited together, and with their king, that is to say, the intellectuall and con∣templatiue vertue, there is thereby established a most faire and Harmonicall forme of a Commonweale. For that as of vnitie dependeth the vnion of all numbers, which haue* no power but from it: so also is one soueraigne prince in euerie Commonweale neces∣sarie, from the power of whome all others orderly depend. >Whereof the mind or vnderstanding like vn∣to [ A] the vnitie in numbers indiuisible, pure, and simple, is of it selfe free from all concreti∣on, and from all the other faculties of the soule apart separated and diuided: the angry power with desire of reuenge resting in the heart, representeth the souldiors and other martiall men: and sensuall lust and desire resting in the liuer vnder the midriffe, be•…oke∣neth the common people. And as from the liuer (the fountaine of bloud) the other members are all nourished, so husbandmen, marchants, and artificers doe giue vnto the rest of the subiects nourishment. >And as there are three principall parts in the soule of man, that is to say, the imagina∣tiue or common sence, reason, and the intellectuall part, euen so in euery well ordered Commonweale the Priests and Philosophers are imployed in the search of diuine and hidden sciences, being as it were the hart of the citie, the magistrates and officers to commaund, iudge, and prouide for the gouernment of the State, being as it were the reason of the citie: and the common people applie themselues to labour and [ C] mechanicall arts, the which is conformable to common sence. >Neither yet for all that doe we make that chiefe good of a man, or of a common weale, to be a thing confused, or mixt: For albeit that man be composed of a bodie which is fraile and mor∣tall, and of a soule which is eternall and immortall; yet must it needs be confessed the cheiefe goodnesse of man to rest and be in that part which is more excellent than the rest, that is to say, the Mind. For if it be true (as true it is) that this our bodie is com∣pact and framed of flesh and bones, to serue the soule; and our desires to obey reason: who can doubt the chiefe felicitie of man wholy to depend of the most excellent ver∣tue thereof, which men call the action of the mind? For although Aristotle, accor∣ding [ H] to the opinion of the Stoiks, had placed the chiefe goodnes of man in the action of vertue; yet he the same man was of opinion, that the same action was still to bee re∣ferred vnto the end of contemplation: otherwise (saith hee) the life of man should bee more blessed than that of the Gods, who not troubled with any actions or businesse, enioy the sweet fruit of eternall contemplation, with a most assured repose and rest. And yet not willing to follow the doctrine of his maister Plato, and also accounting it* a shame to depart from the opinion by himselfe once receiued and set downe; for as much as he at the first had put the blessed life in action; he afterward with great ambi∣guitie of words, hath placed the chiefe felicitie of man, in the action of the mind, which is nothing else but contemplation: to the intent he might not seeme to haue put the [ I] chief good, both of men and commonweals, in things most contrary vnto themselues; motion (I say) and rest, action and contemplation. And yet hee neuerthelesse seeing men and commonweals to be still subiect vnto motion, and troubled with their neces∣sary affaires, would not plainly put that chiefe good or happinesse which we seeke af∣ter, in contemplation onely; which for all that he must of necessitie confesse. For all beit that the actions whereby mans life is maintained, as to eat, to drinke, to sleepe, and such like, are so necessarie, as that a man cannot long want them: yet is no man so sim∣ple, as in them to put mans chiefe good or felicitie. The moral vertues also are of much more worth and dignitie than they: for that the mind by them (or by the vertue di∣uine) purged from all perturbations, and affections, may bee filled with the most sweet [ K] fruit and cleare light of contemplation. Whereby it is to be vnderstood, the morall vertues to be referred vnto the intellectuall, as vnto their end. Now that can in no wise be called the chiefe good or happinesse, which is referred vnto a farther thing, better and more excellent than it selfe: as the bodie vnto the soule, appetite vnto reason, motion vnto quiet rest, action vnto contemplation. And therefore I suppose that Marcus Varro, who deemed man his chiefe good to bee mixt, of action and contem∣plation; might (in mine opinion) haue more aptly and better said mans life to haue need of both; yet the chiefe good and felicitie thereof to consist in contemplation:

>Although some are so stupid that they believe their souls die along with their bodies, yet as long as they live they think posterity's opinion is of the utmost importance, and they often pray that a conflagration of the world may follow their death >This, in its turn, comes from elements affected unequally by external forces. The elements are disturbed by the power of the celestial bodies, while the human body is encompassed in the elements, the blood in the body, the spirit in the blood, the soul in the spirit, the mind in the soul. Although this last is free from all materiality, yet it is very much influenced by the closeness of the association. >Perhaps this is why we are told by the poets that Saturn was driven from power by Jupiter, which means that in early times wise and pious men were created kings for the sake of dispensing justice. Although men thought that through the perf ormance of duty alone they could continue in office, nevertheless they could not succeed in this way, since of course very many were influenced neither by awe of the divine nor by any other scruple. So the more sagacious, taking over power, began to rule the state, while the religious and philosophic gave attention to sacrifices and contemplation, and the plebs took up military training) farming, and manual arts. Fr om thi s it happens that wise men maintain the state with prayers and warnings; the prudent by rule and command; the strong by power and activity. By these three divisions principles, ordinances, and actions-I say, the state is supported. >Priests and wise men give warning; officials issue orders ; agents carry them out . Thu s Anaxagoras influenced Pericles; Plato, DionIsocrates, NicocIes; Plutarch, Trajan; Polybius, Scipio. And constantly, with sensible precepts of wisdom or some religious teaching, the Magi advised the Persians; the Brahmins, the Indians; the seers, the Greeks; and the pontiffs, the Romans. Yet they were incapable of managing affairs, a fact which Plato, although a very wise man, exemplified when he took over the state committed to his care. In the same way Aristotle wrote that Anaxagoras, a very learned man, lacked prudence because he suffered himself to die of hunger and want through neglecting his finances, a thing which happened also to Theodore Gaza in extreme old age. So Philo commended Mos es with high praise, because alone among all mortals he was at the same time a very brave general, a prudent legislator, and a most holy prophet. It remains, then, to apply to the republic of the world the same analysis that has been made about one state, so that when the functions of the various peoples have been meted out wisdom may in a way belong to the southerners, strength to the Scythians, and prudence to the intervening races. This idea may be seen even in the parts of the soul, For the mind itself warns, reason commands, and then the senses, like agents, are employed for carrying out orders, and in the threefold power of the soul -- animal, vital, and natural -- the first, of course, brings motion and sensation from the brain, the second the vital spirit from the heart, the third quickening power from the liver. I think that there is no better way of understanding the inborn nature of each people or of obtaining a truer and more definite opinion about the history of each than if this microcosm be compared with the great man, that is, with the world. Therefore, what Plato did in his Republic we shall do for the republic of the world, but a trifle differently. He wished control to he in the possession of guardians, whom he placed in the mind, like Pallas in the citadel. In this he seemed to wish to restore the reign of Saturn; hence that sentence of his praised by all- yet understood by few-"Either kings should be philosophers , or philosophers should reign." Philosophy, however, the perpetual contemplation of the most beautiful things, as all Academicians would have it, has nothing in common with military or civil affairs. Furthermore, he armed soldiers and stationed them in the heart, because there is placed the seat of anger. Finally he assigned farmers and manual workers to the liver, so that they might supply food and necessaries for the state. Nevertheless, these arrangements could not be carried through without great disturbance, as we shall explain in its place. >Then I disagree with Plato in this respect, in that he placed soldiers in the heart, magistrates in the brain, common people in the liver. I should prefer priests and learned men in the brain, officials in the heart, manual workers and soldiers, who are drawn from the people, in the liver. Nor does the vital power of the heart produce strength, which is proper to blood and liver; rather, it impels to activity. Certainly Machiavelli did not mean that the best soldier should be chosen from Italy, but the best general, because he wins by means of greater sagacity, not by greater strength. "Service of the body is demanded from the soldier," said Ammianus, "of the mind, from the general." Indeed, it is not the function of a general, as Plutarch stated in the life of Pelopidas, to fight hand to hand with the enemy. It is not for a magistrate to work as lictor, but to rule and to control. Moreover, when Plato gave the command to philosophers and wise men, who, we have shown from history, were fitted for contemplation, although incapable of action;" it was consistent to place the soldiers in the heart. They, however, were best selected from the farmers, as Pliny wrote about the old Roman training, or from manual workers, as in our times, because they had become inured to work. As a matter of fact, Aristotle included operators and manual workers among the plebs. We observe that formerly, and even today, the Scythians, or Germans, have always been sought for military service at high salaries. To reiterate, the best soldiers always are chosen from the farmers and plebs, whose abilities are in manual work. If these things should be considered in relation to the celestial bodies, they will be equally consistent with them. >Again, this division of peoples into three groups can be referred to the threefold universe : that is, the intellectual, consisting of the minds; the celestial, the stars; the elemental, where the origin and destruction of things occurs. Here, in turn, belongs a threefold order of souls (except that which is beyond classification, which is contaminated by no worldly stain). The first seems to turn purified intellects of men to God ; the second, to direct states; the last is occupied with matter and form >Other things, indeed, seem very valuable for a knowledge of the nature of the soul and really admirable for shaping the morals of each man, but the things gathered from the reading of historians about the beginnings of cities, their growth, matured form, decline, and fall are so very necessary, not only to individuals but to everyone, that Aristotle thought nothing was more effective in establishing and maintaining societies of men than to be informed in the science of governing a state. Yet, about this matter the opinions of great men are so varied and divergent that it is noteworthy that in so many centuries no one until now has explained what is the best kind of state >Since Plato thought that no science of managing a state is so difficult to understand that no one could grasp it, he advocated this method of formulating laws and establishing the government on a firm foundation; if sage men, having collected all the customs and all the laws of all countries, should compare them , they might compound from them the best kind of state.' Aristotle seems to have followed this plan as far as he could, yet he did not carry it out. Following Aristotle, Polybius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, Dio, and Tacitus (I omit those whose writings have perished) left many excellent and important ideas about the state scattered throughout their books.

>Then we shall explain our opinion about each point and reject the rooted error about the mixed state. We shall speak in its turn about the three types of rule, later about the changes in empires,and finally about the best form of government. What is a citizen? >Aristotle defined a citizen as one who may share in the administration of justice, may hold office, or act in a deliberative capacity." This definition, he confessed, is suited to a popular rule only. But since a definition ought to deal with universals, no one will be a citizen according to the idea of Aristotle, unless born at Athens and in the time of Pericles. The others will be exiles or strangers in their own cities, debarred from honors, judicial matters, and public counsels. What, then, is to be done in the case of Emperor Antonine, who in a proclamation ordered that all free men included within the limits of the Roman monarchy should be Roman citizens? If we are to believe Aristotle, they were aliens because they had been denied popular rights. Since these opinions are absurd and dangerous for governments, then the conclusions which follow from them must seem absurd also. This definition of Aristotle caused Contarini, Sigonius, Garimberto and many others to err. There is no doubt that in many countries it offered an excellent pretext for civil war. But what if this description of a citizen brought forward by Aristotle were not suited even to a popular state? At Athens, where the rule is reputed to have been most democratic of all, a fourth class, the weakest and the poorest, that is, by far the largest p art of the population) according to the law of Solon had been kept away from honors, from the senate, and from the sortition of office, as Plutarch wrote. >The same man defined a magistrate as one who has power, jurisdiction, and the deliberative capacity." From this he intimated that the man who has actually rendered those services, which a citizen is eligible to give, is called a magistrate, whereas a citizen is such only by qualification and capacity. But, not to argue too subtly, who then in the state could be called a magistrate by this system , when so few officials are admitted to the council? Almost everywhere the senate of the nation lacks sovereignty and jurisdiction, and those things which it decrees will not take effect before they are ratified by the people or the optimates or the prince, as we shall make clear later. But why discuss the matter, when Aristotle himself in his last book listed many kinds of magistrates who have neither power nor jurisdiction nor any right of sharing counsel? Indeed, when he called a state the aggregation of magistrates and the citizen body, he clearly made the citizenry earlier in time than the state, so that the citizenry would be a group of men without officials or powers, whereas the government would be the aggregate of citizens and magistrates. But if many come tog ether in one place without laws and controls, if no one protects public interests, which are practically nonexistent, but each one his private affairs, if there are no punishments decreed for the wicked, no rewards for the good, wherein lies the resemblance to a city? Under such conditions this collected multitude ought not to be called a city-state, but anarchy, or by any other name than that of civitas, since men of this kind are without a country, and as Homer said, without law. >Indeed, he never defined the supreme authority, which he himself called the supreme government and the supreme power," in which consists the majesty and the determining condition of the Republic. Unless we are to think that he meant to do this when he specified three functions of government and no more : one taking counsel; another, appointing officials; the last, giving justice. But that power which is called the highest ought to be of such a sort that it is attributed to no magistrate; otherwise, it is not the highest (unless the people, or the prince, divests itself entirely of control). Moreover, the man to whom sovereignty is given, unless it is given temporarily, will no longer be an official, but a prince. As a matter of fact the right of deliberation about the state is conceded even to private citizens, and the administration of justice to the humblest man. These, then, do not pertain to sovereignty So there is no one of these three in which the highest majesty of power can be reflected, except in the creation of magistrates, which belongs to the prince alone or to the people or to the optimates, according to the type of each state. It is much more typical of the supreme power to decree and to annul laws, to make war and peace, to have the final right of appeal and, finally, the power of life [and death] and of rewards. But if we grant that Aristotle did not wish to signify sovereignty, but merely the adrninistration of the state, we must also admit that he never defined sovereignty or the type of rule at all, since the form of government is determined by the location of sovereignty, while the actual governance of the state, which extends far and wide, perhaps will be defined more briefly and concisely in decisions, orders, and execution. There is no fourth thing, and in these three all functions of the state, military and civil offices, and honors are comprised. For instance, the senate decides upon war, the prince proclaims it, the soldiers carry it out. In trials, private justices and arbitrators also make decisions, the officials give orders, the public servants carry them out. These things are often done by one and the same man Then, since magistrates decree and proclaim edicts, those proclamations, which the Latins called "orders" and "commands," cannot indicate the supreme government, much less the decisions or executions in which the administration of justice consists.

>This being the case, let us seek more definite principles, if only we can do this-principles better established than those which have been suggested hitherto. So I hold that the family or fraternity is the true image of the state, and since the family cannot come into existence in the solitude of one man, so the state cannot develop in one family or in one guild . But if more than one should come together under the same roof, and one did not command or the other obey, or one command all (or a few, the separate individuals, or the whole group, the separate individuals), the family or fraternity could not stand together, because it is held together only by domestic rule. On the other hand, if several are held together by private authority or domestic rule of the same person, for example, a man, his wife, children, and serfs, or several colleagues-they make a family or a guild. Only, there should be three persons in a guild, as Neratius would have it in the passage "Neratius" under the title "About the meaning of terms." In a family three persons with the mother should be subjected to the rule of the father of the family, as Ulpian defined it in the passage "Renunciation," under the title "About the meaning of terms," if we combine his words with the discourse of Apuleius. The latter wrote that fifteen persons constitute a populace, that is, five fraternities or three families, for a family includes five persons, a fraternity three. Then three or more families or five or more fraternities form a state, if they are joined together at a given moment by the legitimate power of authority. If, on the other hand, families or colleges are separated from each other and cannot be controlled by any common rule, the group should be called an anarchy, not a state. >It is of no importance whether the families come together in the same place or live in separate homes and area. It is said to be no other than the same family even if the father lives apart from children and serfs, or these in their turn apart from each other by an interval of space, provided that they are joined together by the legitimate and limited rule of the father. I have said "limited," since this fact chiefly distinguishes the family from the state -- that the latter has the final and public authority. The former limited and private rule. So, also, it is still the same government, made up of many families, even if the territories and the settlements are far apart, provided only that they are in the guardianship of the same sovereign power: either one rules all; or all, the individuals; or a few, all. From this it comes about that the state is nothing else than a group of families or fraternities subjected to one and the same rule. >A citizen is one who enjoys the common liberty and the protection of authority. Cicero's definition of the state as a group of men associated for the sake of living well indicates the best objective, indeed, but not the power and the nature of the institution. This definition applies equally well to the assemblies of the Pythagoreans and of men who also come together for the sake of living well, yet they cannot be called states without great confusion of state and association. Furthermore, there are families of villains, no less than of good men, since a villain is no less a man than a good man is. A similar observation must be made about the governments. Who doubts but that every very great empire was established through violence by robbers? The definition of a state offered by us applies to villages, towns, cities, and principalities, however scattered their lands may be, provided that they are controlled by the same authority. The concept is not conditioned by the limited size of the region or by its great expanse, as the elephant is no more an animal than the ant, since each has the power of movement and perception. So Ragusa or Geneva, whose rule is comprised almost within its walls, ought to be called a state no less than the empire of the Tartars, which was bounded by the same limits as the course of the sun. >That Aristotle said is absurd-that too great a group of men, such as Babylon was, is a race, not a state. But there is no empire common to races, nor anyone law; moreover, Babylon was not only controlled by the same authority, officials, and laws but also circumscribed within the same walls. What, then, is a state if not this? The definition of the word which Cicero gave elsewhere seems furthermore rather obscure -- the union of several associations under an approved law for a common advantage.'' If we accept this, then it will not be enough that citizens acknowledge the same authority unless at the same time they are bound by the same laws. But it would be absurd to say that the empire of the Turks, which includes peoples living together under no common system of law, is not a state, since all are kept together by the same officials and authority. It will have to be either a government or an anarchy; it is not the latter, therefore the former. >From this it follows that a state is defined by one and the same rule; a city-state, by government and law, but it is a town when it encompasses its citizens not only by government and laws but also within its very walls. So a town includes villages; a city-state, the countryside, sometimes also cities and walled towns joined only by common law; principalities, or, more suitably, hereditary lands include several city-states; finally the state, like a class, includes all these variations. Thus Caesar said, "The entire Helvetian civitas is divided into four cantons." Cicero reported that the Tusculan municipality was comprised within the Roman civitas. Bartolus differed, since in the passage "the name town" under the title "Concerning the meaning of matters and terms," he limited a city state by its walls. Under the head ing municipal law he called a uniceps a kind of citizen, without advancing any reason or authority. Yet Censorinus, in Appian's "Libyan War," answered the ambassadors of the Carthaginians that he would indeed destroy the town of Carthage, but that he would spare the city-state and the citizens enjoying its laws, as the Romans had promised: the city-state its elf did not consist of walls or land.

>From this it happened that citizens were given different names by the Latins, and urban citizens got better terms than citizens of the colonies, for although they had the same laws, customs, and privileges, yet they did not inhabit the same fields or the town which had the prestige of authority and granted exemptions. But the municipalities themselves were at one time on a lower status than the colonies, on account of the irnportance of race and of Roman blood. As a special grace the legal rights of colonies were given to municipalities up to the time of Tiberius, when they voluntarily repudiated these rights and preferred to use their own laws and customs rather than the Roman, as Gellius reported. So in truth they were citizens of the same state, yet not of the same city; in this sense, then, we ought to interpret the Julian Law, whereby the Romans in the Social War extended citizenship to all allies. Not that they were not citizens before, since they were all controlled by the same governrnent, but that they were denied the seeking of honors. Afterwards this right was extended gradually to all Italians. Then the colonies which Ulpian treated in the chapter on taxation received the rights of the Italians. The remaining population was in part tributary, as Pliny list ed them, although at intervals some concession might be made to some group. >Not only in the Roman Republic, but everywhere else we shall find this difference in citizens. Rome within the same walls there were patricians, knights, and plebs; among the ancient Egyptians, priests, soldiers, and workmen, as Diodorus wrote; among our ancestors, Druids, knights, and farmers; today, clergy, nobles, and plebs; among the Venetians, nobles, citizens, and plebs; formerl y among the Florentines, nobles, people, and plebs, and three classes of the people-the more powerful, the ordinary, and the lowest. Plato also provided for guardians, soldiers, and farmers. Everywhere each group in turn was divided from the other by rights, laws, offices, votes, honors, privileges, status, exemption, or by some other means. Yet all are citizens of the republic, like the members of the same body. Rightly St.Paul said, "Will the foot say, I am not the eye, therefore I am not of the body? >From this it becomes plain that the definition of "citizen" brought forward by Aristotle and approved by Contarini, Sigonius, Garimberto, and Soderinus can in no way stand. But that all ambiguity may be removed, we may ask whether governments federated among themselves can create one and the same state; for example, the city-states of the Swiss and the towns of the Baltic. This often seemed the case to Leander Mutius and to many others, indeed, because the Swiss are allied together in the closest union, have furthermore the same assemblies, a town in Baden and many places common to them all where they send common officials. But to have exchange of goods, sanctity of contract, rights of intermarriage and of mutual entertainment, finally a firm bond of friendship does not create one and the same republic, otherwise the kingdom of the French and that of the Spanish, who have these things in common, would be the same. This is not the case, even if they use the same laws, as once upon a time the Romans and the Greeks did, after the Romans had accepted the laws of the Greeks. Finally, it is not true even if they had so close a union among themselves that they attacked the same enemies and welcomed the same friends, as often happens among princes of the greatest loyalty and sympathetic understanding >Thirteen Swiss city-states, three of the Rhetians, and seventy of the Baltic area sealed a lawful alliance to the effect that they would not injure each other and that in their common peril they would fight their sworn foes with mutual aid. But there is no common authority and no union. The seven Amphictyonic cities used no other type of alliance, nor the three Aetolian, nor the twelve Ionic, which, however, had certain common assemblies that they might defend their possessions and drive off the enemy. Yet each one of these city-states was separated from the others by its sovereign right. Thus the separate city-states of the Helvetians are bound by the decrees of the others only so far as they voluntarily agree, as in private partnerships. On the contrary, in one and the same dominion what pleases the majority binds all. >A different opinion must be given about the forty-seven states of the Latins, twelve of the Achaeans, the same number of the Etruscans, and about the German imperial towns and provinces, which compose a state because they are subordinated to the same empire and the same emperor. Achaeans, Latins, and Etruscans created an executive for each separate year (sometimes, however, they extended the term longer) j the Germans, for life. The two Philips and Antigonus, kings of Macedonia, were once elected leaders by the Achaeans, as Plutarch and Polybius reported. Similarly, Servius Tullius and Tarquin the Proud were created rulers of the Latins, and Coriolanus, of the Etruscans, as Dionysius wrote. The Spanish and the French kings were created German emperors in the same way. But the Suabian association, which was formed for forty years, and the alliance of Baltic towns differ from the Helvetic association only in this respect, that the latter was made for all time, the former for only a stated period, saving, however, the majesty of the German Empire. >Then an alliance of diverse city-states, exchange of goods, common rights, laws, and religions do not make the same state, but union under the same authority does. So the king of Spain has dominion over provinces of considerable extent and separated by wide distances, but the individual provinces contain many city-states, which differ in laws and customs. Each city-state has some villages, cities, walled towns, and camps, which use the same fundamental law; but there is no town which does not have some individual difference (disregarding areas belonging to the community) which is not shared with the others. Yet the laws of the empire are common to all, uniting under the majesty of one and the same prince many peoples who are separated by great differences of language, customs, and religion. The same decision ought to apply to the remaining cases. >Moreover, all kingdoms of all peoples, empires, tyrannies, and states are held together by nothing but the rule of reason and the common law of nations. From this it follows that this world is just like a city-state and that all men are associated, as it were, under the same law. But since this dominion of reason constrains no one, one state cannot actually be forged out of all peoples. So princes, by using either their armies, or treaties, or mutual good will, seek to obtain lawful conduct and adjudication of affairs outside the borders of the kingdom

What is the magistrate? >Having explained the definition of "citizen," let us also define "magistrate," for these are the elements of the city-state. This man, then, Aristotle described as a man of authority, jurisdiction, and deliberative capacity, but in the end he includes all functions of the state under the name "magistrate." By this reasoning almost no one could be a magistrate, since men who share the right of counsel, jurisdiction, and authority are few, It may also seem absurd that all those who hold public offices should come under the appellation of "magistrate," for this would mean that scribes, attendants, adjutants, public servants, even executioners may be called magistrates those who formerly were classed as slaves and might more truly be called "attendants." The word "magistrate," however, signifies authority and power. Thus, a dictator, the greatest magistrate of all, is called "master of the people." This was the subject of a serious controversy between Aeschines and Demosthenes, since Aeschines said that was a master. Dernosthenes denied it, but called this office some public commission or service. Moreover, he defined «magistrate" as a man with authority. But these things are discussed by us more thoroughly in the book De imperio. >Then let a magistrate be a man who has part of the public authority. I add "public" that it may be distinguished from the authority of a father and of a slaveowner. Furthermore, the command of a magistrate is nothing more than an ordinance, whereas in a prince, it is law. But an order is given in vain unless action follows the commands. However, since the smallest part of exercising authority against the unruly is vested in arrest, according to the ruling of Varro and of Ulpian, it follows that he who lacks the right to arrest lacks authority. And so in almost all city-states arrest is permitted to the least important magistrates, even to those who do not have the right of summons, like the tribunes of the plebs, although they abused their power too often and summoned to trial. Among the Venetians, triumvirs and advocate s may arr est and accuse criminals ; they do not have the right of summons. Among us arrest is granted not only to all judges but even to those whom they call commissaries of the fortress," who nevertheless may not serve as judges. Those who have more authority can also summon and impose penalties, in accordance with their power, for the sake of maintaining jurisdiction, which otherwise would be an empty thing. The right to exact fines is granted even to those judges who have the most limited jurisdiction, which we call mercantile. To the others a greater fine is permitted; to some the power of flogging; even the use of torture, to a few; the final limit is reached when the right of the sword is granted. In the last-mentioned jurisconsults place pure (merum ) authority, since nothing greater can be given to a magistrate unless he enters upon sovereignty -- that is, the power of life and death >But the authoritative functions of magistrates range from the power of the sword to the power of arrest, which constitute the upper and lower limits; these often are distinct from jurisdiction. The latter is based on laws, but authority is vested in edicts. So we see that private judges and deputies of magistrates decree and judge; the magistrates themselves command and execute, while only occasionally do they judge. Thus, among us the superior courts decree, the prince himself commands. Since Varro attributed to certain magistrates the right to arrest and to summons, to others the right to summons and to attend, to still others, neither, so it seems that he gave the name "magistrate" also to those who lack power to command, such as aediles and quaestors. I think that this is done because of a common, but incorrect, designation >For who would call a man a magistrate when he lacks an agent and cannot issue a command? He may be endowed with office and honors, indeed, but not with authority as well. Charles Sigonius and Nicolas de Grouchy are mistaken when, following Festus, they think that power is given to such officials, but not authority. Such matters should not be settled by the rules of grammarians, but of jurisconsults, who make power equal to authority and sometimes even greater. The word "power," said Paul the Jurisconsult, signifies authority in a magistrate. But a proconsul is a magistrate who has the widest jurisdiction (for thus Ulpian defined the office), and he alone of all the confidential magistrates, has authority (imperium). It is called power" by jurisconsults, in the title "About jurisdiction," starting at "authority." Thus Emperor Alexander asserts in Lampridius, "I will not suffer traffickers in power." So when a warning was issued in the words of an edict, lest it should be allowed to summon to trial the consul, the praetor, and others who have authority or power, the final words are understood to apply to provincial magistrates. Otherwise, if what they say is true, it would not have been permissible to summon to justice aediles and quaestors, contrary to what Varro wrote and Valerius Maximus proved by examples. For they lacked power and authority, although aediles took a part of the praetorial jurisdiction;" as we learn from the Institutes of Justinian >Aristotle, also, when he defined the magistrate as one who had the tight of pronouncing judgment and of taking counsel, did not ref er to authority, for those who preside over the council of state have the right decree, indeed, but not to command, and private judges and priests can also judge and decree, but they cannot command . They have no right to summon or to arrest, indeed no summoner or attendant. "Priests," said Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, "are judges of religion; the senate, of law ." But the senate cannot execute what it has decreed, as we shall make plain from Dionysius, nor have priests any authority at all or a summoner. But the praetors used to execute their judgment about incest, vestals, and extinct fires, as may be seen in Livy and Valerius. Similarly, our clergy have either summoner nor lictor, but they either ask for summoners and lictors from a magistrate, or the magistrates execute their capital decisions since it is not permitted to us (for thus they say absurdly) to kill anyone." These are the words of the Jews, from whom all authority was taken, and Judea was reduced to the form of a province forty years before the second overthrow of the temple, as the rabbis write. Not that they were prohibited by the law of Moses, as our men falsely think, since it was permitted only to priests and deputies, and to their agnates, to pronounce capital sentence on malefactors, and hold capital trials; so the jurisconsults of the Hebrews report in the books of the Talmud under the title "Sanhedrin," chapter 4, and in the commentary on Jeremiah. The Chaldean interpreter thought it worthy of note. Since the municipal magistrates of the Jews had only ord inary power of chastisement against the slaves, as Ulpian wrote in the passage «in the case of magistrates) "under the title "About jurisdiction," they publicly answered Publius Pontius, governor of Judea, who wished Christ to be punished only lightly by them, that he had admitted a capital crime according to the law of Moses, yet it was not permitted to them to pronounce death fer anyone. From these things it becomes plain that the division of the public functions brought forward by us in chapter iii is no less true than necessary

What is sovereignty? >Let us come to the definition of sovereignty, in which is involved the type of state. >The Italians [call it] signoria; we, sovereignty ; the Latins, summa rerum and summum imperium. When this is understood, many obscure and difficult questions about the state are explained. Nevertheless, it was overlooked by Aristotle and by those who have written about government. I used to think that the summum imperium was defined either as the power of creating magistrates or as the right to give rewards and penalties. But since various penalties and rewards are usually given at the wish and command of the magistrates themselves, it would be necessary that there should be associated with the prince in the sovereignty, which is absurd. Yet it would be more dangerous to grant all power in the state to a magistrate, as Soderini wisely commented in Guicciardini's book; Where the Florentines used to do this, it brought ruin to the state. Likewise among the Assyrians and our own ancestors; in olden times mayors the palace were created by the prince; they controlled all power in the government to a point where they invaded royal authority itself. Therefore the state will not be well constituted in which all authority is attributed to a magistrate. >Then, having compared the arguments of Aristotle, Polybius, Dionysius, and the jurisconsults, and these with the general history of principalities, I see the sovereignty of the state involved in five functions. One and it is the principal one, is creating the most important magistrates and defining the office of each one; the second, proclaiming and nulling laws; the third, declaring war and peace; the fourth, receiving final appeal all from all magistrates; the last, the power of life and death when the law itself leaves no room for extenuation or gra ce. These things are never granted to the magistrates in a well-constituted state, unless because of pressing necessity and out of due order. If a magistrate does make decrees about these things, the sanction should reside with the prince or people, depending upon the type of each state. It is evident that these things are peculiar to the prince in the opinion of the jurisconsults, and indeed many other attributes; for example, the power of laying taxes and tribute and of striking coins. This they say belongs to the prince alone, although these things were often granted to magistrates in former times and are even in these days. They have been discussed more by us, however, in the book De jure imperio in the chapter about the right of majesty. Moreover, when in a democracy or an aristocracy the optimates and the people have power equal to that of the king in a monarchy, the result is that these most important points of authority are accordingly attributed to the people. That they may be understood more clearly, the problem must be explained. It has been discussed at length by the jurisconsults, but not precisely decided: that is, whether the magistrate should have merum imperium) or whether this is suitable for the prince alone. To settle the problem, Emperor Henry VII at Bologna, when he was elected arbiter between Lothair and Azo, promised justice and decreed that merum imperium belongs to the prince alone. From this Lothair was said to be right, but Azo wrong. All others, except Alciati and Du Moulin, have written that they judged the opinion of Azo was the more correct. >So Cato suggested that Caesar ought to be surrendered to the Gauls, because he had declared war upon them without proper authority. When the general is given power of ratifying peace or of declaring war under certain laws or conditions, this commission is extraordinary, and he cannot exceed the delegated power or give it to another, for he does not have it by right of office and authority, but has only the bare statutory process. On the other hand, the dictator had the power of war, peace, life, death, and control of the whole country by right of this office, but still it was only temporary, while he was dictator of the state. He held, not actually an office, but a trusteeship. Even if the magistrate's authority is peculiar to him, nevertheless no one has an office or honors in his own right, but as a trust until the term has elapsed or until he who has given it takes it away. Ulpian meant this when he said, "I have laid down the office which I once took up." This disturbed Alciati. Moreover, when the prince dies, or the man who delegated powers, whatever was entrusted to the magistrate or the private citizen according to his peculiar right or statutory process is recalled if power is still intact, as in a procuratorship, but not so the things appropriate to the office >A more difficult question is whether the senate's decrees need the sanction of the prince or of those who have the highest authority in the state. It is less doubtful about the prince, because he is the head of his senate and his council and so all decrees have the sanction of the prince. They do not have force in any way except that the prince himself orders them, since the senate has no authority, no jurisdiction, unless by the concession of prince or people, who seem to approve the acts of the senate which they do not actually disapprove. But if there is anything more serious and pertaining to sovereignty, it is usual to refer it to the prince. >This, however, Dionysius confirmed, Book II. "For the senate of the Romans," said he, "is not supreme arbiter of those things which it has decreed, but the people." Hence these expressions occur frequently in the pages of Livy-"the senate decreed," "the people ordered." And when he described the power of Scipio Africanus he said, "The ruling city-state of the world lies beneath the shadow of Scipio; his mere nod takes the place of the decrees of the senate, of the orders of the people." "But nothing can be sacrosanct," said Cicero, "unless the plebs or the people order it." So senatus consulta were only annual, contrary to what Connan thought; the source is again Dionysius, Book VII . It was just the same among the Athenians, as Demosthenes wrote in his speech "Against Aristocrates," and decrees did not bind the people or the plebs. The same system applies to the edicts of the magistrates, who had only the adjudication of the lighter fines after the Lex Aterina, whereas the adjudication and penalizing of the heavier fines were made by the judgment of the plebs.

>If this seems absurd, what Polybius affirmed ought also to seem absurd-that the sovereignty of the state was partly in the people, partly in the senate, partly in the consuls. Furthermore, he thought that the form of government seemed to be mixed-aristocracy, monarchy, and democracy. This opinion Dionysius and Cicero adopted; then Machiavelli, Contarini, Thomas More, Garimberto, and Manutius vehemently approved it. We must refute them in debate, because this subject is of great importance for the thorough comprehension of the history of states. When the restoration of liberty to the people was mooted with bitter contention among the Florentines and it did not seem sage, and indeed was dangerous, to spread the secrets of empire among the throng, it was decided that after they had segregated the dregs of the plebs, who could not legally hold office, the laws must be ordained and the magistrates must be elected by the people. Other matters were to be regulated through the senate and the popular magistrates. For thus Guicciardini wrote. >From this, also, it is made plain that the right of sovereignty is chiefly displayed in these specified attributes. Therefore, in every state one ought to investigate who can give authority to magistrates, who can take it away, who can make or repeal laws -- whether one citizen or a small part of the citizens or a greater part. When this has been ascertained, the type of government is easily understood. >Moreover, it is evident that these things have always been so, not only in a monarchy but also in a government of optimates or in a popular state. For the frequent statement that there was no right of appeal from the senate and the praetorian prefect refers only to ordinary law, since it was permitted in extraordinary cases to call upon prince or people, an appeal which Arcadius called "supplication" lodged when the unusual character of the case or the importance of the persons affected required. But not to take endless examples from history, we shall use as examples Athenians, Romans, and Venetians, in order to show that what they taught about the mixed type of the Roman state is false. The type of state of the Romans >Then I think this-that the type of state of the Romans in the age of Polybius, and much more in the time of Dionysius and Cicero, was entirely popular. When they had driven the kings from the city, the first law about the government proposed by Brutus to the people was this, that annual consuls were to be created by the people. This Livy and Dionysius reported. From this it is evident that all consular authority ought to be sought and asked from the people. >I come to the senate, in which they placed a semblance of aristocratic rule, even though it had all right and authority from the people. Indeed, the choice of senators was made at the will or the command of the people. "Our ancestors," said Cicero, "created magistrates each year so that they might offer constant direction to the state. They were chosen for this counsel by the people as a whole, and the approach to this highest rank lay open to the endeavor of all citizens." Afterwards, to lighten its labors, the people by the law Ovinia tribunitia ordered the censors to select from every class each best man according to curia, as we read in Festus. Furthermore, the censors, like other magistrates, were created by the people. The result, then, is that authority of whatever kind was received from the people. Where, then, is the aristocratic rule of the senate! If there is any, it ought to be the same in a kingdom, where the council is established by the prince and has power equal to that of the Roman senate. But to unite this body in an association of power with the prince is not only stupid but even a capital error. The same decision ought to be made about the senate of the Romans, to which these authors attributed a share of the rule with the people. That is, they united masters with servants and agents in exercise of dominion. But we assert that all powers of the senate and the magistrates had their source in the authority and will of the people, which is sufficient proof that the type of state was altogether popular >On the other hand, when a small part of the citizens rule, and what pleases a few citizens is regarded as legal, the power is aristocratic. Unless, indeed we should base everything on a nice precision of words, so that the governments are not aristocratic unless the best men are at the head. By this reasoning, however, not only will no aristocracy be found among the Venetians, the Ragusans, the Genoese, the people of Lucca, and the Germans, where very few have control, but nowhere else will any aristocracy be found to have existed. Corruption will appear to exist in states in which nobles or rich people alone have political power, without any regard for virtue or erudition, while sometimes the best and most sagacious are cast aside on account of poverty or obscurity of birth. This conception leads to an absurdity. Therefore let us use the popular parlance and define the rule of optimates as rule by a few, and define a few as the less er part of the citizens: either two (for more than that number are understood, as jurisconsults report) or three, as when Augustus, Antony, and Lepidus, triumvirs for establishing the state, ruled it arbitrarily. >There have been cases in which the rulers were very few and very sinful, as among the Megarians and the Athenians under the Thirty Tyrants, among the Romans under the decemvirs, among the Perugians under the Oddi, among the Sienese after the patricians had been ejected. Or if the noblest ruled in considerable numbers, as among the Romans the patricians actually held the power before the creation of the tribunes, the popular label was a fiction. It was so among Cnidians, Venetians, Ragusans, men of Lucca, and men of Nuremberg . Or the rulers may be a few rich citizens, as among Rhodians, Thebans, and Genoese, when power had been taken from the people. >If, however, they are to be drawn by election or by lot, it is better that each hundredth man be co-opted according to the geometric ratio, which is best suited to the rule of optimates, since the harmonic ratio is for a kingdom, the arithmetic ratio for the popular state. >I call [a state] a monarchy, when the sovereignty is vested in one man, who commands either lawfully or unlawfully. The latter is called tyrant; the former, king. The aim of the one is honor, of the other, selfish pleasure. What Aristotle said that the king becomes a tyrant when he governs even to a minor degree contrary to the wishes of the people -- is not true, for by this system there would be no kings. Moses himself, a most just and wise leader, would be judged the greatest tyrant of all, because he ordered and forbade almost all things contrary to the will of the people. Anyway, it is popular power, not royal, when the state is governed by the king according to the will of the people, since in this case the government depends upon the people. Therefore, when Aristotle upheld this definition, he was forced to confess that there never were any king

>>5172 >rule of optimates Incredibly un-based.

The Herodotus Debate Between Otanes (Democracy), Megabyzus (Oligarchy), & Darius (Monarchy) As told by the Father of /his/tory, Herodotus Among the oldest sources of Monarchist politics there is, next to Homer's monarchist maxim: Let there be One Lord, One King Jean Bodin revives the spirit of Herodotus in our political discourse in maintaining 3 forms of State only, denying a mixed State, but only a govt to be mixed. Others imitated Herodotus such as Josephus, Cassius Dio, & Philostratus, to follow the discourse between one, few, many. Otanes (Democracy) Otanes was for giving the government to the whole body of the Persian people. "I hold," he said, "that we must make an end of monarchy; there is no pleasure or advantage in it. You have seen to what lengths went the insolence of Cambyses, and you have borne your share of the insolence of the Magian. What right order is there to be found in monarchy, when the ruler can do what he will, nor be held to account for it? Give this power to the best man on earth, and his wonted mind must leave him. The advantage which he holds breeds insolence, and nature makes all men jealous. This double cause is the root of all evil in him; he will do many wicked deeds, some from the insolence which is born of satiety, some from jealousy. For whereas an absolute ruler, as having all that heart can desire, should rightly be jealous of no man, yet it is contrariwise with him in his dealing with his countrymen; he is jealous of the safety of the good, and glad of the safety of the evil; and no man is so ready to believe calumny. Nor is any so hard to please; accord him but just honour, and he is displeased that you make him not your first care; make him such, and he damns for a flatterer. But I have yet worse to say of him than that; he turns the laws of the land upside down, he rapes women, he puts high and low to death. But the virtue of a multitude's rule lies first in its excellent name, which signifies equality before the law; and secondly, in that its acts are not the acts of the monarch. All offices are assigned by lot, and the holders are accountable for what they do therein; and the general assembly arbitrates on all counsels. Therefore I declare my opinion, that we make an end of monarchy and increase the power of the multitude, seeing that all good lies in the many." Megabyzus (Oligarchy) Megabyzus' counsel was to make a ruling oligarchy. "I agree," said he, "to all that Otanes says against the rule of one; but when he bids you give the power to the multitude, his judgment falls short of the best. Nothing is more foolish and violent than a useless mob; to save ourselves from the insolence of a despot by changing it for the insolence of the unbridled commonalty — that were unbearable indeed. Whatever the despot does, he does with knowledge; but the people have not even that; how can they have knowledge, who have neither learnt nor for themselves seen what is best, but ever rush headlong and drive blindly onward, like a river in spate? Let those stand for democracy who wish ill to Persia; but let us choose a company of the best men and invest these with the power. For we ourselves shall be of that company; and where we have the best men, there 'tis like that we shall the best counsels. Darius (Monarchy) Darius was the third to declare his opinion. "Methinks," said he, "Megabyzus speaks rightly concerning democracy, but not so concerning oligarchy. For the choice lying between these three, and each of them, democracy, oligarchy and monarchy being supposed to be the best of its kind, I hold that monarchy is by far the most excellent. Nothing can be found better than the rule of the one best man; his judgment being like to himself, he will govern the multitude with perfect wisdom, and best conceal plans made for the defeat of enemies. But in an oligarchy, the desire of many to do the state good service sometimes engenders bitter enmity among them; for each one wishing to be chief of all and to make his counsels prevail, violent enmity is the outcome, enmity brings faction and faction bloodshed; and the end of bloodshed is monarchy; whereby it is shown that this fashion of government is the best. Again, the rule of the commonalty must of necessity engender evil-mindedness; and when evil-mindedness in public matters is engendered, bad men are not divided by enmity but united by close friendship; for they that would do evil to the commonwealth conspire together to do it. This continues till someone rises to champion the people's cause and makes an end of such evil-doing. He therefore becomes the people's idol, and being their idol is made their monarch; so his case also proves that monarchy is the best government. But (to conclude the whole matter in one word) tell me, whence and by whose gift came our freedom — from the commonalty or an oligarchy or a single ruler? I hold therefore, that as the rule of one man gave us freedom, so that rule we should preserve; and, moreover, that we should not repeal the good laws of our fathers; that were ill done."

Homer's Monarchist Maxim How can all Achaeans be masters here in Troy? Too many kings can ruin an army-mob rule! '''Let there be One commander, One master only Endowed by the son of crooked-minded Cronus With kingly scepter and royal rights of custom: Whatever One man needs to lead his people well. Caligula Chancing to overhear some kings [PLURAL], who had come to Rome to pay respects to him, disputing at dinner about the nobility of their descent, he cried: Let there be One lord, One king! What Caligula says here is often the same attitude I have. I will not settle for many kings, no matter they be an aristocracy of kings; the very best kings, assembled as a few men oligarchically; I demand above all else one king. This is a very monarchist opinion, by its most sincere definition. Only made controversial because of the wind of Tocquevillism, that makes people make all kinds of pretenses of a nobility and few men against the pre-eminent state of Monarchy and resist with everything they can muster and reason from the voice of Megabyzus himself, revived today to draw us away from Darius.

<But since many men of this age, serious and learned men, prefer the rule of optimates, and some even a democracy, we must speak briefly about the best type of government, after we have repudiated their opinion. We have already refuted the opinion of Polybius and those who came from his school, with arguments, as we think, demanding assent <If, then, Plato were to change the nature of things and set up several lords in the same family, several heads for the same body, several pilots on a ship, and finally several leaders among bees, flocks, herds (if only the farmers will permit); if at length he would join several gods into an association for ruling, then I would agree with him that the rule of the optimates is better than a kingdom. But if the entire nature of things protests, reason dissents, lasting experience objects, I do not see why we ought to follow Plato or anyone else and violate nature. What Homer has said, "No good thing is a number of masters; let one man be master, one man be king," Euripides repeated, "Power belongs to one man in the homes and in the cities. <It is not only most salutary, as Tacitus wrote, but also necessary in the administration of great affairs that power should rest entirely with one man. Three tribunes with consular power, indeed, were a warning, as Livy reported, of the ineffectiveness of the rule of several men in time of war. L. Paulus and Terentius Varro had a similar experience against Hannibal; the Christian princes, against the king of the Turks; the leaders of the Greeks, against Philip; not so long ago, the princes of the Germans opposed to Charles V learned at great cost that nothing can be properly directed by many people. So the Greeks and the Romans, when a serious war or civil rebellion disturbed the state, had recourse to the rule of a dictator or an archon or a harmost as to a sacred refuge, just as Florentines, Genoese, and Venetians in crises of the state often granted to one general the highest power over war and peace. >It goes back four hundred years earlier to Herodotus. He said that many thought that the mixed was the best type, but for his part he thought there were only three types, and all the others were imperfect forms >Let us therefore conclude, never any Commonwealth to have been made of an Oligarchy and popular estate; and so much less of the three states of Commonweals, and that there are not indeed but three estates of Commonweales, as Herodotus first most truly said amongst the Greeks, whom Tacitus amongst the Latins imitating, saith, The people, the nobility, or one alone, do rule all nations and cities. >Wherefore such states as wherein the rights of sovereignty are divided, are not rightly to be called Commonweales, but rather the corruption of Commonweales, as Herodotus hath most briefly, but most truly written.

Of course each man was ruler of his family and had the right of life and death not only over the slaves but also over his wives and children, as Caesar himself testified. Justinian, in addition to many others, erred in alleging, in the chapter on a father's power, that no people had so much power over their sons as the Romans had, for it is evident from Aristotle and the Mosaic Law that the custom is also common to the Persians and the Hebrews. The ancients understood that such was the love of the parents toward their sons that even if they wished very much to abuse their power, they could not. Moreover, nothing was a more potent cause of virtue and reverence in children toward their parents than this patriarchal power. Therefore, when they say that they are masters of the laws and of all things, they resemble those kings whom Aristotle calls lords, who, like fathers of families, protect the state as if it were their own property. It is not contrary to nature or to the law of nations that the prince should be master of all things and of laws in the state, only he must duly defend the empire with his arms and his child with his blood, since the father of a family by the law of nations is owner not only of the goods won by him but also of those won by his servants, as well as of his servants Even more base is the fact that Jason when interpreting in the presence of King Louis XII a chapter of law well explained by Azo, affirmed recklessly that all things are the property of the prince. This interpretation violates not only the customs and laws of this kingdom but also all the edicts and advices of all the emperors and jurisconsults. All civil actions would be impossible if no one were owner of anything. "To the Icings," said Seneca, "power over all things belongs; to individual citizens, property." And a little later he added, "While under the best king the king holds all within his authority, at the same time the individual men hold possessions as private property." All things in the state belong to Caesar by right of authority, but property is acquired by inheritance >All which power to commaund ouer others, is either publick or priuat: The power publick, is either free from law, as is theirs which hold the chiefest place of soueraigntie; or els restrained by law, as is the power of the Ma∣gistrats, who although they commaund ouer priuat men, are yet themselues subiect vnto the commaunds and laws of others their superiours. The power priuat, consi∣steth either in the heads of families, or in corporations, or colledges, where all by a ge∣nerall consent, or the greater part, commaundeth ouer the rest. But the domesticall [ I] * power is of foure sorts: viz. The power of the Husband ouer his Wife, the power of the Father ouer his children, the power of the Lord ouer his slaues, and the power of the head of a Familie ouer his mercenarie seruants. And for as much as the right and lawfull gouernment of euerie Commonweale, Corporation, Colledge, Societie, and Familie dependeth of the due knowledge of commaunding and obeying; let vs now speake of euery part of commaunding in such order as is by vs before set downe. For naturall libertie is such, as for a man next vnto God not to be subiect to any man liuing, neither to suffer the commaund of any other than of himselfe; that is to say, of Reason, which is alwaies conformable vnto the will of God. This naturall commaundement* of Reason ouer our affections and desires, is the first, the greatest and most antient that [ K] is: for before that one can well commaund ouer others, hee must first learne to com∣maund himselfe, giuing vnto Reason the soueraigntie of commaund; and vnto his af∣fections obedience: so shall it come to passe that euerie one shall haue that which of right vnto him belongeth, which is the first and fairest iustice that is; and that where of the common Hebrew prouerb grew, That euery mans charitie should first begin of himselfe: which is no other thing than to keepe our affections obedient vnto Reason. >For that commaund which he had before giuen the Husband and his Wife, is two wayes to be vnderstood; first literally for the power the Husband hath ouer his Wife, and then morally for the commaund the soule hath ouer the bodie, and reason ouer affection. For that reasonable part of vnderstanding, is in man as the Husband; and Affection, as the Woman: For before God had created Eua, it was said of A∣dam, Male and female created he them *. Wherefore the woman in holy writ is of∣tentimes taken for affection: but neuer more than with Salomon, who so liued as a man vnto women most kind >But what if by consent of the man and of the woman, contract of marriage be made by words of the present time, be∣fore they know one another; for that, the law calleth just marriage: I am for all that of opinion the power of an Husband not to be yet gotten by such a contract, except the Wife haue followed her Husband: for as much as by the decrees of the Diuines and Canonists (whose authoritie is in this matter the greatest) as often as question is made of the right of mariages, scarce any regard is had of such mariages betwixt man and wife, except it be of fact consumat, by the mutuall couiunction of their bodies; which by the consent of many nations is expresly receiued, as often as question is made of enioying of such commodities as are to be gained by marriage. But after that lawful coniunction* of man and wife (which we haue spoken of) the Wife is in the power of her Husband >The reason whereof is, for that a Familie should haue but one head, one maister, and one Lord: whereas otherwise if it should haue many heads, their commaunds would be contrarie, one forbidding what another commandeth, to the continuall disturbance of the whole familie. Husband & Wife: >the law of nature, which willeth, That euery man shuld be maister of his owne house, (as saith Homer) to the end that he may be a law vnto his familie... the law of God, which commaundeth the Wife to forsake father and mother to follow her Husband; and also giueth power vnto the Husband to confirme or breake the vowes of his Wife. Wherefore that law of the Romans is* worthily abrogated, and especially with vs: for that the custome generally exempteth the married woman out of the power of her father; as was likewise in the Lacedemo∣nian Commonweale, as Plutarch writeth, where the married woman saith thus; When I was a daughter I did the commaund of my father, but since that I am marri∣ed, it is my Husband to whome I owe mine obeysance: for otherwise the wife might tread vnder foot the commaundement of her Husband, and acquit her selfe when shee saw good vnder the guard of her father. Now the interpretors of this Roman law haue vsed many cautions to auoid the absurdities and inconueniences following, if the [ G] wife should not be subiect to her husband, vntill she were set at libertie by her father. Yet in that point the lawes of all people agree with the lawes of God and nature, That* the wife ought to be obedient vnto her husband, and not to refuse his commaunds not repugnant vnto honestie.

The Father >The right gouernment of the Father and the children, consisteth in the good vse of the power which God (himselfe▪ the Father of na∣ture) hath giuen to the Father ouer his owne children: or the law ouer them whom any man adopteth for children vnto himselfe: and in the obedience, loue, and reuerence of the children towards their Fathers. This word Power, is common vnto all such as haue power to commaund ouer others; either publickly or priuatly. So the Prince (saith Seneca) hath power ouer his subiects, the Magistrat ouer priuat men▪ the Father ouer his chil∣dren, the Maister ouer his schollers, the Captaine ouer his souldiers, and the Lord ouer [ K] * his slaues. But of all these the right and power to commaund, is not by nature giuen to any beside the Father, who is the true Image of the great and Almightie God the Father of all things, as saith Proclus the Academick. Plato also hauing first in certaine chapters set downe lawes concerning the honour of God▪ saith them to bee as a Pre∣face to the reuerence which the child oweth vnto the Father, vnto whome next vnto God he is beholden for his life, and for whatsoeuer thing els he hath in this world. And as the Father is by nature bound to nourish his children according to his abilitie▪ and to instruct them in all ciuilitie and vertue: so the children also when they are once grown >Neither any curse greater in holy writ, than against him who wickedly laughed at the naked priuities of his Father. Neither is it maruell if wee in holy Scripture read** of the contentions and strife of the sonnes among themselues, for the getting and foregaining their Fathers blessing; as they which feared more their curse than death: As young Torquatus who cast off by his Father, slew himselfe for sorrow. And that is it why Plato saith, that aboue all things we must haue care of the cursings and blessings that the Fathers giue vnto their children: for that there is no prayer that God doth more readily heare, than that of the Father towards his children. If children then bee so straitly bound to obey and reuerence their parents? what punishment then deserue they that are vnto them disobedient, irreuerent, or iniurious? what punishment can be [ C] great enough for him which shall presume to lay violent hand vpon his Father or Mo∣ther? for against him that shal murder either of them, there was neuer yet Iudge or law maker that could deuise torment sufficient for a fact so execrable: although that by the law Pompeia, a punishment be appointed rather new and strange, than fit for such a crime. And albeit that we haue seene one in our memorie (who had caused his Fa∣ther to be slaine) torne with hot yron tongs, afterwards broken vpon the wheele, and so at last (being yet aliue) burnt: yet was there no man which did not more abhorre the wickednesse of his villanie, than the horror of his punishment, and which said not that he had deserued more than he had yet suffered. Also the wise Solon; when hee had made lawes for the Athenians, being asked why he had appointed no punishment a∣gainst [ D] him which had killed his Father; answered, That he thought there was no man so wicked as to commit so horrible a fact: which was grauely answered: for the wise law maker should neuer make mention of an offence which is not at all, or but very lit∣tle knowne, for feare he should not seeme so much to forbid the fact, as to put the wicked in remembrance thereof.

This thread is drawing close to an end. I will share some screencaps and my infographs. Starting with these from Jean Bodin.

These are from Methodus from Jean Bodin. It is commonly said that Bodin was less of an absolutist in his early works. Though Methodus delves into Sovereignty and even has important insights to find later for Six Books. Like the difference between the magistrate and sovereign is very important. For why giving so much authority to the magistrate is wrong, but to the sovereign rightfully belongs the authority. Important distinctions are made in Methodus to understand why, so I recommend that book along with the Six Books. I think Methodus also debunks a lot of misconceptions: the reason why I say when historians talk about the "Age of Absolutism" and I talk about the politics of Jean Bodin and even other authors w/ an absolutist politics, it's two different things. Yes, I think the politics of absolute monarchy has been given a bad rap and even purposefully misconstrued, misrepresented, deeply misunderstood by so many people. The reason why I make infographs is to put the information from these authors themselves and from a contemporary person who upholds the politics of absolute monarchy. In light of the bell curve meme, I also mean someone worth their salt. & there aren't many people worth their salt in this regard. that goes for "Neoabsolutists" too; I don't consider them absolutists worth their salt personally for political reasons (like their view of HLvM as opposed to an individual, indivisible Sovereignty guiding the State; I also see HLvM as a tocquevillism narrative, that is, again, the complaint of Megabyzus) but also because they are heavily reliant on Jouvenel & Hoppe & dubious NRx blogs and autism (again, under "the wind of Tocquevillism" like I said). I doubt they even read Bodin like yours truly. I strongly believe in reading your sources from the people "from the camp" & making Jouvenel their chief intellectual is, in /pol/ terms, equivalent to getting all your information from Elie Wiesel or Noam Chomsky regarding the Third Reich and Hitler and Fascism or learning Marxism from Rothbard or Friedrich Hayek or entrusting /leftypol/ to tell you everything about right libertarianism politics. Or, in terms of religion, asking contemporary Jews or Muslims or Varg to give you the story of Jesus Christ Obviously, you want to first listen to the devotees themselves before their critics, my point being, however valid they deem Jouvenel to be

It is a sorry state for the very, very small percentage of us. While the Constitutionalists dominate r/monarchism, the discords, and traditionalist circles, those generically called absolutists (though not really worth their salt, but i.e., those advocate the pre-eminence of a Monarchy) are swept away with all the voices, whether it be from the constitutionalist, right libertarian anarchist, or vile traditionalist circles. Not only suppressed by partisans of Otanes, but also a lot more covertly by partisans of Megabyzus. The latter works like tides hitting a sand castle on a beach. Eroding w/ little reference to a monarchist framework at all. This reason I distance myself from traditionalists as a means of self-preservation. Not only because they vehemently scold my politics like Frankenstein's monster. And while I try my best to reach out to those who strive for monarchical pre-eminence, many people smack my hand away or get tangled up in whatever NRx / Neoabsolutist vine and get hit by the tides.

A pirate who better deserved to be called a King than many of them w/ regal scepters & diadems <Not for that it is impossible to make a good Prince of a robber, or a good King of a rouer: yea, such a pirat there hath beene, who hath better deserued to be called a King, than many of them which haue carried the regall scepters and diadems, who haue no true or probable excuse of the robberies and cruelties which they cause their subiects to endure. As Demetrius the pirat by way of reproach said to Alexander the great,* That he had learned of his father no other occupation than piracie, neither from him receiued any other inheritance than two small frigots▪ whereas he which blamed him of piracie, roamed about neuerthelesse, and with two great armies robbed the world without controlment, albeit that he had left him by his father the great and flourishing kingdome of Macedon. Confusion of laws divine, natural, & human >And countrarywise, when as they shall limit and restrain the sovereign power of a Monarch, to subject him to the general estates, or to the council, the sovereignty has no firm foundation, but they frame a popular confusion, or a miserable Anarchy, which is the plague of all States; the which must be duly considered, not giving credit too their goodly discourses, which persuade subjects, that it is necessary to subject Monarchs, and to prescribe their prince a law; for that it is not only the ruin of the Monarch, but also of the subjects. It is yet more strange, that many hold an opinion that the prince is subject to his laws, that is to say, subject to his will, whereon the civil laws (which he has made) depend; a thing impossible by nature. <And under this color and ill digested opinion, they make a mixture and confusion of civil laws with the lawes of nature, and of both jointly with the laws of God: so as they suppose, when the prince forbids to kill, to steal, or to commit adultery, that it is the prince's law. That a pure absolute Monarchy is the surest State <It shall suffice that we have made apparent demonstration, that a pure absolute Monarchy is the surest Commonweal, and without comparison the best of all. >Wherein many are abused, which maintain that an Optimacy is the best kind of government: for that many commanders have more judgement, wisdom, and council than one alone; but there is a great difference betwixt council and commandment: The advice and counsel of many grave and wise men may be better than of one, as they say commonly that many men see more than one alone: but to resolve, to determine, and to command, one will always perform it better than many: and then he which has advisedly digested all their opinions, will soon resolve without contention, the which many cannot easily perform: <Besides ambition is so natural among commanders that are equal in power, as some will rather see the ruin of the Commonweal, than acknowledge any one to be wiser than themselves: Others know what is good, but shame keeps them from changing of their opinions, fearing to lose the least point of their reputations: So as it is necessary to have a sovereign prince, which may have power to resolve and determine of the opinions of his council. >There are a thousand such like examples, which do show us the necessity to have one head or commander, not only in war (where there is greatest danger) but also to obey one sovereign prince in a Commonwealth: for even as an army is ill led, and most commonly defeated that has many Generals; even so is a Commonwealth that has many lords, either by division, or a diversity of opinions, or by the diminution of power given to many, or by the difficulty there is to agree and resolve upon any thing, or for that the subjects know not whom to obey, or by the discovery of matters which should be kept secret, or through altogether. And therefore whereas we said before, that in a well ordered State, the sovereign power must remain in one only, without communicating any part thereof... (for in that case it should be a Popular State and no Monarchy).

a true king can cumshoot 50 miles no man that cannot cumshoot deserves the title of king

>Finding by experience that an absolute power united in one person, is more eminent and of greater effect, and that the same power imparted to two, three, or many lords, or to a whole communality, declines and loses his force, like unto a bundle of sticks unbound and divided into many parts <And therefore Tacitus says, that for the execution of great exploits the power of commanding must be restrained to one alone: the which is confirmed by Titus Livius, who said, that three Tribunes created with Consularie power, gave a sufficient testimony that the force of command imparted to many, is fruitless Many heads hideous >If then a Commonwealth be but one body, how is it possible it should have many heads, but that it must prove a monster, as the emperor Tiberius said unto the Senate, else it were no body, but a hideous monster with many heads. But some one will say that new princes make new laws, new institutions, new ordinances: we will confess that it happens in some, who to show their power make laws sometimes without any reason, but this is more frequent and usual without comparison in Popular and Aristocratical estates: For new magistrates so often created, and which play the petty kings in their Commonwealths, would be loth the year should pass away without giving some cause to speak of them, either for good, or evil, for proof whereof we find more laws published at Rome and at Athens, then throughout the world. <For always through jealousy one undid what another had made: and all, as they said, was to make themselves famous, and to rob the honor of their companions Sovereignty of Aristocracy & the Rich >A just proportionate number betwixt one & a thousand: increasing or diminishing the number according to the multitude of the subjects; wherein they shall hold that commendable and desired mediocrity betwixt a Monarchy and a Democracy. There is yet another argument of no less efficacy, to prove that an Aristocratical estate is the best, which is, That the power of sovereign command, by natural reason, is to be given to the most worthy: and dignity cannot consist but in virtue, in nobility, or in riches, or in all three together. If then we desire to choose one of the three, or to join them all together, the estate shall be always Aristocratical: for the noble, rich, wise, and valiant men, make always the least part of the citizens, in what place soever; by natural reason then that government must be Aristocratical, when as the least part of the citizens command the State, or whereunto the best and most virtuous men are admitted. <A man may also say, that the sovereignty should be given only to the most rich, as to them that have most interest in the preservation of the whole State. Without a doubt the most rich have the greatest interest, and bear a greater charge than the poor, who having little to lose, abandon the Commonwealth at need. And therefore Q. Flaminius did wisely commit the government of the cities of Thessalie, to the most rich, as to them that had most interest in the preservation of the State. >Moreover it seems that necessity does guide us to an Aristocratical estate: for although that in a Popular estate, and in a Monarchy, the monarch or the people in show have the sovereignty, yet in effect they are forced to commit the government to the Senate, or privy council , who consult, and many times determine of greatest affairs: so as it is always an Optimacy. And if the Monarch, or People, be so ill advised as to govern otherwise than by a wise council, there can nothing be expected but an inevitable ruin of the State... To conclude, that an Aristocracy is the most commendable State. <And yet I say, that all together are not sufficient to prove it: as for that commendable mediocrity which we seek, it is not real, dividing things in the middest, but consists in reason: as liberality a mean betwixt two vicious extremes, yet does it approach nearer unto prodigality than unto covetousness. The mean which they seek betwixt one and all in general, is real; neither can it ever be alike, for that there are some cities which have not a thousand citizens, and others that have above three hundred thousand: so as Aristocratical estate shall be always mutable and variable, for the uncertainty of the number: and it will often fall out, that a great Aristocratical estate shall have more commanders, than a Popular state in a small city shall have citizens: as if there be four hundred thousand citizens, to observe a true Geometrical proportion, there must be four thousand governours or commanders: so as by a necessary consequence, the inconveniences which are incident to a Popular estate, will also fall out in an Aristocracy, by reason of the multitude of lords: for the more governors there be, the more factions will grow; their consultations will be more hard to determine, and are sooner discovered. And therefore those Aristocratical estates are more durable and assured, that have fewest lords: as the Lacedemonians, who had but thirty governors, and the Pharsalians twenty; they did long maintain their estates, whereas others decayed soon. It is not then the middle betwixt one and all, which makes that commendable mean, seeing that there be as many kinds of vicious Commonweals, as of commendable and virtuous. Moreover it seems (a brief bit from another passage) >Yet those who have come from his school approve more highly the rule of the optimates, which lies halfway between a democracy and a monarchy. They err, however, in this respect, that they seem to place virtue in the average thing or number, not in the mean proportional. Indeed, if this is true no prince will ever be good, nor will any oligarchy be quarrelsome, because between one and many they place the mean of a few, like the mean of virtue. Yet if there is any excellence in numbers, I suppose that unity is most to be praised of all, as Plato himself most divinely wrote, in the book about entity and unity.

This talks about the origin of the term Majesty. That was introduced w/ Charles V & later Henry VIII. Jean Bodin talks about Majesty as Sovereignty.

>>5253 2/10; she looks like a ditz tbqh.

>>5251 Let's continue with Majesty From Jean Bodin. Majesty >As for the title of Majesty itself, it sufficiently appears, that it only belongs to him that is a soverign prince: so that for him that hath no sovereignty to usurp the same, were a very absurd thing: but to arrogate unto himself the addition of most excellent and sacred majesty, is much more absurd the one being a point of lightnes, and the other of impiety: for what more can we give unto the most mighty and immortal God, if we take from him that which is proper unto himself? And albeit that in ancient time neither emperors nor kings used these so great addition or titles: yet the German princes nevertheless have oft times given the title of Sacred Majesty unto the kings of France; aswell as unto their emperor. As I remember my self to have seen the letters of the princes of the empire, written unto the king, for the deliverance of countie Mansfeld, then prisoner in France: wherein there was sixe times V. S. M. that is to say, Vestra, Sacra, Majestas, or Your Sacred Majesty an addition proper unto God, apart from all worldly princes. As for other princes which are not soueraignes some use the addition of His Highnesse, as the dukes of Loraine, Sauoy, Mantua, Ferrara, and Florence: some of Excellency, as the princes of the confines; or else of Serenitie, as the duke of Venice. <"Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness." >For so here it behoueth first to define what majesty or Sovereignty is, which neither lawyer nor political philosopher hath yet defined: although it be the principal and most necessary point for the understanding of the nature of a Commonweal. And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power: it rest to be declared, what is to be understood by the name of a most high and perpetual power. <We have said that this power ought to be perpetual, for that it may bee, that that absolute power over the subject may be given to one or many, for a short or certain time, which expired, they are no more than subjects themselves: so that whilest they are in their puissant authority, they cannot call themselves Sovereign princes, seeing that they are but men put in trust, and keepers of this sovereign power, until it shall please the people or the prince that gave it them to recall it >Who always remained ceased thereof. <For as they which lend or pawn unto another man their goods, remain still the lords and owners thereof: so it is also with them, who give unto others power and authority to judge and command, be it for a certain time limited, or so great and long time as shall please them; they themselves nevertheless continuing still ceased of the power and jurisdiction, which the other exercise but by way of loan or borrowing. >And that is it for which the law saith, That the governor of a country, or lieutenant of a prince, his time once expired, give up his power, as but one put in trust, and therein defended by the power of another. And in that respect there is no difference betwixt the great officer and the lesser: <For otherwise if the high and absolute power granted by a prince to his lieutenant, should of right be called Sovereignty, he might use the same against his prince, to whom nothing was left but the bare name of a prince, standing but for a cipher: so should the subject command his Sovereign, the servant his master, than which nothing could be more absurd: considering that in all power granted unto magistrates, or private men, the person of the prince is always to be excepted; who never gives so much power unto another, but that he always keeps more unto himself; neither is ever to be thought so deprived of his sovereign power, but that he may take unto himself the examination and deciding of such things as he hath committed unto his magistrates or officers, whether it be by the way of prevention, concurrence, or evocation: from whom he may also take the power given them by virtue of their commission or institution, or suffer them to hold it so long as shall please him. >These grounds thus laid, as the foundations of Sovereignty, wee conclude, that neither the Roman Dictator, nor the Harmoste of Lacedemonia, nor the Esmynaet of Salonick, nor he whom they cal the Archus of Malta, nor the antient Baily of Florence, (when it was gouerned by a popular state) neither the Regents or Viceroyes of kingdoms, nor any other officers or magistrats whatsoeuer, vnto whom the highest, but yet not the perpetual power, is by the princes or peoples grant commit∣ted, can be accounted to have the same in Sovereignty. <And albeit that the antient Dictators had all power given them in best sort that might be (which the ancient Latins called Optima Lege) so that from them it was not lawful to appeal and upon whose creation all offices were suspended; until such time as that the Tribunes were ordained as keepers of the peoples liberty, who continued in their charge notwithstanding the creation of the Dictator, who had free power to oppose themselves against him; so that if appeal were made from the Dictator, the Tribunes might assemble the people, appointing the parties to bring forth the causes of their appeal, & the Dictator to stay his judgement; as when Papirius Cursor the Dictator, condemned Fabius Max the first, to death; and Fabius Max the second had in like manner condemned M•…nutius, both Colonels of the horsemen, for that they had fought with the enemy contrary to the command of the Dictator; they were yet both by appeale and judgement of the people acquitted. For so saith Livy, Then the father of Fabius said, I call upon the Tribunes, and appeal unto the people, which can do more than thy Dictatorship whereunto king Tullus Hostilius gave place. Whereby it appears that the Dictator was neither sovereign prince, nor magistrat, as many have supposed; neither had any thing more than a simple commission for the making of war, the repressing of sedition, the reforming of the state on instituting of new officers. >So that Sovereignty is not limited either in power, charge, or time certain. And namely the ten commissioners established for the reforming of custom and laws; albeit than they had absolute power, from which there was no appeal to be made, and that all offices were suspended, during the time of their commission; yet had they not for all that any Sovereignty; for their commission being fulfilled, their power also expired; as did that of the Dictators.

<"Majesty or Sovereignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth: Which the Latins call Majestatem, the Italians Segnoria, that is to say, The greatest power to command. For Majesty (as Festus saith) is so called of mightiness." >And forasmuch as wee have before defined a Commonweal to be the right government of many families, and of things common amongst them, with a most high & perpetual power

>I know not also how it came into Plato his mind, that having made a division of his citizens into Keepers, Soldiers, and Husbandmen, he separates the Soldiers (under whose bucklers and defense the citizens ought to rest) I know not how, from keepers. But in brief, he would have the keepers of his Commonwealth to excel all others in wisdom and experience: and so to rule over them, without any respect to bee had either to the honor of their dissent, or to the greatness of their wealth or substance. Truly it was wisely so set down by that most wise man: who although he were himself descended of the most ancient stock of the Senators, and derived his pedigree by the mothers side even from Solon himself, the Athenian law-giver, yet thought the true glory of nobility and sovereignty to consist in virtue only:. Wherefore let us measure true nobility by virtue, for that therein not only Philosophers and Divines, but also Poets, Historiographers, and almost all lawyers, do with one consent in mine opinion agree, denying any place to bee left for nobility without honesty. And two things propounded, to wit, Noble descent, & Virtue, they have decreed, That the more higher & more honorable place is to bee given unto virtue, whether question be of bearing of rule, or of honor, or concerning the gravity and weight of their testimonies and witness. The next cause of nobility unto virtue, many have appointed to be the knowledge of hidden and most excellent things, whom they which have attained thereunto, the law itself expressly calls most noble whom (saith the law) Knowledge makes most noble: or else as Cassiodorus says, ex obscuro nobilem efficit doctrina, Learning makes of an obscure man a gentleman. But then how much more noble is he than both of them, whom moral virtue concurring with the virtues of the mind and knowledge, hath together nobled? But yet if integrity be divided from such knowledge of most secret and most excellent things, the priority in this case is of right to be given unto integrity and virtue: except in such vocations and callings, as wherein such excellent knowledge is of necessity required: For why, it is better and more agreeing with reason, to have a General skillful in martial affairs, although he be otherwise a naughty man to govern an army, than a good man which is no soldier at all: but of these things more shall in due place be said. <Seeing that there is nothing in this world which comes to passe by chance or fortune, as all divines and the wiser sort of the Philosophers have with one common consent resolved: We will here in the first place set down this maxim for a ground or foundation, That the changes and ruins of Commonweal, are humane, or natural, or divine; that is to say, That they come to passe either by the only councel and judgement of God, without any other meine causes: or by ordinary and natural means of causes and effects, by almighty God bound in such fit order and consequence, as that those things which are first have coherence with the last; and those which are in the middest with them both: and all with all combined and bound together with an indissoluble knot and tying: which Plato according to the opinion of Homer hath called the Golden Chain..., or by the will of man, which the divines confess to be free, at the least concerning civil actions: howbeit that indeed it is no will at all, which in any sort whatsoever is enforced and bound. >And therefore Plato divided the citizens into three orders, Keepers, Men at arms, and Laborers: imitating the Egyptians, who made three several kinds of estates. By little and little the Athenians made a distinction of Arms, Policy, and Justice; and so did the Romans. And truly in this short course of our life, there are few that doe excel in politike arts, but in both not any. It seems that Augustus did first take from Senators, Proconsuls, and Governors of Provinces, the power to wear arms: so as in succession of time they called offices without arms dignities; <For as much as by the goodness of the end we measure the worth and excellency, as well of Cities and Commonweals, as of all other things: so that by how much the end of every City or Commonweal is better or more heaven-like, so much is it to be deemed worthily to excel the rest. Yet is it not our intent or purpose to figure out the only imaginary form and Idea of a Commonweal, without effect, or substance, as have Plato, and Sir Thomas More Chancellor of England, vainly imagined: but so near as we possibly can precisely to follow the best laws and rules of the most flourishing cities and Commonweals. In which doing, a man is not bee justly blamed, although he fully attain not unto the end he aims at, no more than the good Pilot, by force of tempest driven out of his course; or the skillful Physician overcome with the force of the malady, are the less esteemed: provided, that the one hath yet in the cure well governed his sick patient; and the other in his course, his ship. >Now if the greatest felicity and happiness of one citizen, and of a whole City, be all one and the self same, and the chief good of both consists in those virtues which are proper unto the mind, and are only conversant in contemplation (as they which in wisdom are said to have far excelled the rest, have with great agreement affirmed) it must needs follow also, those citizens and people to enjoy true felicity, which exercising themselves in the sweet knowledge of things natural, humane, and divine, refer all the fruits of their contemplation unto the almighty God, and great Prince of nature. If we then confess this to be the principal end of the most blessed and happy life of every one in particular, we conclude, that this is the felicity and end also of a Commonweal. But for as much as men of affairs, and Princes, are not in this point agreed, every man measuring his good by the foot of his pleasures and contentments; and that those which have had the same opinion of the chief felicity of a man in particular, have not always agreed, That a good man and a good citizen are not all one; neither that the felicity of one man, and of a whole Commonweal are both alike: this has made that we have always had variety of laws, customs, and decrees, according to the diverse humors and passions of Princes and governors. Most men thinking the life of man to be but base, if his endeavours should bee only directed unto necessity, and not also unto pleasure, and ornament: they would (I say) account it a miserable thing to dwell in poor cottages covered with turf, or in strait cabins and lodges to shroud themselves from the injury of the weather. But for as much as the wise man is in a sort the measure of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood; or as it were an inflexible rule: and they which are thought to excel all others in justice and wisdom, with one consent affirm the chief good of every one in particular, and of all in common, to be but one, and the same; we also putting no difference betwixt a good man, and a good citizen, measure the chief felicity and happiness of every particular man, and of all men in general, by that most beautiful and and sweet contemplation of high matters, which we before spoke of. Albeit that Aristotle sometimes following the vulgar opinion, seems doubtful in setting down the chief good thing, and not well to agree in opinion with himself; as thinking it necessarie unto virtuous actions to join also wealth and power: yet when he reasons more subtly thereof, placing the chief good and felicity of man, in Contemplation. Which seems to have given occasion unto Marcus Varro to say, That the felicity of man consists in a mixture of action and contemplation together

<Whereof this may seem to have been the reason, For that as of one simple thing, the felicity is simple; so of things double or compound, the felicity is also double and compound. For the goodness of the body consists in the health, strength, agility, comliness, and beauty thereof: but the goodness of the mind, that is to say, of that faculty or power which is the true bond of the body and understanding together, consists in the due obedience of our desires unto reason, that is to say, in the action of moral virtues: whereas the chief goodness and felicity of the understanding and mind it self, consists in the intellectual virtues, that is to say, Wisdom, Knowledge, and true Religion: Wisdom, concerning worldly affairs; Knowledge, concerning the searching out of the secrets of nature; and Religion, the knowledge of things divine. Of which three virtues, the first sees the difference betwixt good and evil, the second betwixt truth and falsehood, and the third betwixt true holiness and impiety: and so altogether contain what is to be desired, or to be fled from. >But as in this fabrick of the world (which we may call the true image of a perfect and most absolute commonweale) the Moon, as the soul of the world, coming nearer unto the Sun, seems to forsake this perspirall and elementary region; and yet afterwards by the conjunction of the Sun, filled with a divine virtue, wonderfully imparts the same unto these inferiour bodies: so also the soul of this little world, by the force of contemplation ravished out of the body, and in some sort as it were united unto the great Sun of understating, the life of the whole world, wonderfully lightened with divine virtue, with that celestial force marvelously strengthens the body, with all the natural powers thereof. Yet if the same, become too careful of the body, or too much drowned in the sensual pleasures thereof, shall forsake this divine Sun; it shall befall it even as it doth unto the Moon, which shunning the sight of the Sun, and masked with the the shadow of the earth, looseth her brightness and light, by which defect many foul monsters are engendered, and the whole course of nature troubled: and yet if the Moon should never be separated from the conjunction of the Sun, it is most certain that the whole frame of this elementary world should in right short time be dissolved and perish. <The same judgement we are to have of a well ordered commonweal; the chief end and felicity whereof consists in the contemplatiue virtues: albeit that public and political actions of less worth, be first and the fore-runners of the same, as the provision of things necessary for the maintenance and preservation of the state and people; all which for all that we account far inferiour unto the moral virtues, as are also they unto the virtues intellectual; the end of which, is the divine contemplation of the fairest and most excellent object that can possibly be thought of or imagined. And therefore we see that Almighty God who with great wisdom disposed all things, but that especially, for that he appointed only six days for vs to travel and to do our business in, but the seventh day he consecrated unto contemplation and most holy rest, which only day of all others he blessed as the holy day of repose and rest, to the intent we should employ the same in contemplation of his works, in meditation of his law, and giving of him praises. And thus much concerning the principal end and chief good of every man in particular, as also of all men in general, and of every well ordered commonweale: the nearer unto which end they approach, by so much they are the more happy. For as we see in particular men, many degrees of worldly calamity or bliss, according to the diverse ends of good or bad that they have unto themselves propounded; so have also common∣weals in a sort their degrees of felicity and misery, some more, some less, according to the diverse ends they have in their government aimed at.

>For we often∣times see great quarrels and controuersies to arise as well betwixt princes, as citisens of the same towne or citie amongst themselues. For not vnderstanding the difference of these words, yea they from whome wee ought to expect the true resolutions of these things, are themselues oftentimes farre wide, mistaking a citie for a towne, a Common∣weale for a citie, and straungers for citisens. But they which write of a Commonweale without knowledge of the law, and of the common right, are like vnto them which go about to build faire high houses, without any foundations at all. Aristotle hath defined* vnto vs; A citie to be a multitude of citisens, hauing all things needfull for them to liue well and happily withall: making no difference betweene a Commonweale and a ci∣tie: saying also, That it is not a citie if all the citisens dwell not in one and the selfe same place: which is absurditie in matter of a Commonweale; as Iulius Caesar in his Com∣mentaries well declareth, saying, That euerie citie of the Heluetians had foure villages, or cantons. Where it appeareth that the word Citie, is a word of right or iurisdiction, which signifieth not one place or region, as the word Towne, or Citie; which the La∣tines call Vrbem of Vrbo, that is to say of aratio, or plowing: for that as Varro saith, the compasse and circuit of cities was marked out with the plough. It is also certaine in question of right, That he which hath caried out of the citie, that which was by the law forbidden to be carried out, and hath carried the same into another citie or towne of the same prouince; is neither to be said to haue caried the thing out of the citie, neither to haue offended against the law. Yea the doctors go farther, saying, That hee hath not done contrarie vnto the law, that hath transported the thing forbidden into any other citie or towne subiect vnto the same prince. <And albeit that writers oftentimes confound both, taking sometimes the one for the other, as the greeks oftentimes vse the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Latines the word Ciuitas for a towne, a citie, or the right of citisens, for that the generall which is the citie, comprehendeth in it the particular, which is the town: yet so it is, that they abused not the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as we see that Cicero hath well kept the proprietie both of the one and of the other: for the word*〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth properly a towne, wherof came the word astuti, which with the Greeks signifieth as much as doth with the Latines Urbani, for that the inhabitants of townes are commonly in their behauiour more ciuill and gratious, than are the pesants or rude countrey men: for the word Ciuilis, which we call ciuill, was not of the ancient La∣tines receiued for Urbanas, that is to say courteous, or after the manner of the citie. And least any man should thinke them to be rashly confounded, and to be but a question of words, and not of matter: >it may be that a towne may be well built and walled, and that more is well stored also with people, and furnished with plentie of all things nece∣cessarie to liue withal, & yet for all that be no citie, if it haue not laws and magistrats for to establish therin a right gouernment (as we haue said in the first chapter) but is more truely to be called an Anarchie than a citie. And so contrariwise it may be, that a towne may be in all points accomplished and haue the right of a citie, and of an vniuersitie, [ B] and well ruled also with lawes and magistrats; and yet neuerthelesse shall it not bee a Commonwealth: as we see the townes and cities subiect vnto the seignorie of Ve∣nice, which are no Commonweals no more than the townes in the prouinces subiect and tributarie vnto the citie of Rome were of auntient time no Commonweals, nei∣ther enioyed the right or priuiledge of Commonweals; but the citie of Rome it selfe onely, which had great priueledges and prerogatiues against them all in generall, and against euery one of them in particuler: albeit that the lawes speaking, of the other townes, doe oftentimes vse this word (Citie) but that also vnproperly, for Traian the emperour writing to Plinie the yonger, Proconsul of Asia, denieth the citie of the Bi∣thynians to haue the right of a Commonweale, in being preferred before other priuat [ C] creditos in the right of a pledge, and that truely. <For why? that was proper vnto the citie of Rome, and to them to whome they had especially giuen this prerogatiue, as was onely the citie of Antioch in all the Roman Empire. So wee see that a towne* may be without a citie, and a citie without a towne, and neither the one nor the other of necessitie a Commonweale: and that more is, one and the same citie may still bee kept in the whole and entire state of a citie, the wals thereof being laid flat with the ground, or it quite abandoned by the citisens; as did the Athenians at the comming of the Persian king, vnto whome they left their towne, putting all themselues vpon the sea, after they had put their wiues and children in safetie amongst the Trezenians; fol∣lowing therein the counsell of the Oracle, which had aunswered them, That their citie could not be saued but by woodden wals: which Themistocles interpreted, That the citie (which consisteth in the lawfull bodie of citisens) could not be saued but by ships. In like manner it happened also vnto the inhabitants of Megalopolis, who vnderstan∣ding of the comming of Cleomenes king of Lacedemonia, all voyded their towne, which for all that was no lesse a towne than before; yet was it then neither citie nor Commonweale: in sort that a man might say, That the citie was gone out of the towne. So spake Pompey the Great, after he had drawne out of Rome two hundred Senators, and the better part of the citisens, and so leauing the towne vnto Caesar, said thus, Non est in parietibus respublica, The Commonweale is not in the wals. But for∣asmuch as it had in it two sorts of partakers, and that the citisens diuided into two parts had put themselues vnder the protection of two diuers heads, they now seeme of one Commonweale to haue made two. Wherfore by these words Citie, Towne, Com∣monweale, Colledge, Court, Parish, Familie, are signified the right of these things. And as oftentimes it hath bene iudged that the church being without the wals of the citie, and the parishioners within the citie, that they should enjoy the right of citisens, as if the parish were within the compasse of the wals: so also is it to bee judged of a citie.

>Neither let it seeme vnto any man straunge, that I stand something the longer vppon this matter; if he but remember what importance the lacke of knowledge of these things was long ago vnto the Carthaginensians. For at such time as question was made in the Senat of Rome, for the rasing of Carthage: the report thereof being brui∣ted abroad, the Carthaginensians sent their ambassadors to Rome, to yeeld themselues vnto the mercie of the Romans, and to request the Senat not vnworthily to rase that their citie one of the fairest of the world, famous for the noble acts therof, an ornament of Rome it selfe, and a monument of their most glorious victories. Neuerthelesse the matter being long and throughly debated in the Senat, it was at last resolued vpon, That for the safetie of the Roman empire Carthage should bee destroied, as well for the oportunitie of the place, as for the naturall persidiousnesse of the Carthaginensians themselues, who had now alreadie made warre vpon the allies of the Romans, rigged vp a number of ships contrarie to the agreement of peace, and secretly stirred vp their neighbour people vnto rebellion. The matter thus resolued vpon, the Carthaginensi∣an ambassadors were sent for into the Senat, vnto whome aunswere was giuen by the Consull, That they should continue in their faith and fidelitie vnto the Senat and the people of Rome, and in pawne thereof to deliuer vnto the people of Rome three hundred hostages and their ships: in which doing they should haue their citie safe, with all their rights, priueledges and liberties, that euer before they had enioyed. With this answere the ambassadors returned merily home. But by and by after commission* was giuen vnto Scipio Africanus the yonger, To go in all hast with a fleet to Car∣thage, and with fire and sword to destroy the towne, sauing the citisens and all other things else that they could carrie out of the towne. Scipio ariuing in Africke with his armie, sent Censorinus his lieutenant to Carthage, who after he had receiued the promi∣sed hostages together with the Carthaginensian ships, commaunded all the people of Carthage to depart out of the towne, yet with free leaue to carrie out with them what they would, and to build them a citie further off from the sea, or elswhere to their best liking. With this strait commaund of the lieutenant the Carthaginensians astonished, appealed vnto the faith of the Senat, & of the people of Rome, saying, That they had promised them that their citie should not be rased: to whome it was aunswered, That the faith giuen vnto them by the Senat should in all points be kept; but yet that the ci∣tie was not tied vnto the place, neither vnto the wals of Carthage. So the poore inha∣bitants were constrained to depart and abandon the towne vnto the fire, which was [ I] set vpon it by the Romans, who had not had it so good cheape, had the ambassadors before vnderstood the difference betweene a towne and a citie. <As oftentimes it chanceth that many embassadors ignorant of the law of armes, and of that which right is, do euen in matters of state commit many grosse faults. Although that Modestinus writeth, That Carthage was no more a citie after it was rased, and that the vse and pro∣fit left vnto the citie, was in this case extinct aboue an hundred yeares before: but hee was in the same errour wherein the ambassadours of the Carthaginensians were, vnto whome all their rights, prerogatiues, and priueledges were reserued. The like errour was committed in the agreement made betwixt the Cantons of Berne and Friburg, in the yeare 1505, wherein it was agreed, That the amitie and alliance betwixt those two Commonweals should be for euer, and so long to endure as the walls of both the cities should stand. >Neither are we to stay upon the abuse which is ordinarily committed, or upon the acts of greatest importance of them, which call one and the same thing a towne, a citie, and an university: as some say of Paris, and certaine other places, calling that the citie which is contained in the Isle, and the vniuersitie the place wherein the colledges stand, and all the rest the towne, when as the towne it selfe is contained with∣in the compasse of the wals and suburbs: <Howbeit that wee herein follow not the propriety of the law, calling it the towne and suburbs, for the diverse privileges granted unto them by diuers kings; and the vniuersitie the bodie of all the burgesses of Paris together: but the citie the conjunction or joining together of the town it self and the liberties, as also of the men using the same lawes and customes, that is to say the coniunction of the prouostship and of the countie of Paris together: which abuse is growne, for that of auntient time all the towne was not but the isle environed with walls, and the river about the walls, so as we read in the Epistle of Iulian, governor of the West empire, who made his ordinarie residence in Paris; the rest of the citie that now is being then in gardens and arable land. >But the fault is much more, to say, That he is not a citizen, which is not partaker of the offices of gouernment, of giuing of voices in the consultations of the people, whether it be in matters of judgement, or affaires of the state. This is the definition of a citizen, which Aristotle hath left vnto vs by writing, which he afterward correcting him∣self, sayeth it not to have place put in the popular state only. Now he in another place himselfe confesseth that definition not to be good which is not generall. Small apparance also is there in that he saith in another place, The noble to be more a citizen than the base, and the inhabitant of the towne rather than the plaine country peasant; and that as for the yong citisens, they as yet but grow as nouices, whilest the elder citisens decay; and that they of the middle age are the entire citisens, and the other but in part. Now the nature of a definition never receiueth division; neither containeth in it any thing more or lesse than is in the thing defined. <And yet neuerthelesse that description of a citizen that Aristotle hath given unto vs, is defective and lame, not being aptly to be applied even vnto the popular estate, seeing that in the Athenian estate it selfe which had no peere for the libertie and authority of the people, the fourth ranke or degree of citisens being more than three times as great as all the rest of the people, had no part in the offices of government, or in judgements. So that if we will receiue the definition of Aristotle, we must needs confesse, that the greater part of the natural burgesses of Athens, were in their owne Commonweales strangers, until the time of Pericles. >And as for that which he saith, The noble to be always more citizens than the base and unnoble, is untrue, not only in the popular estate of the Athenians, but also in the popular Commonweals of the Swissers, and namely in Strasbourg, where the nobles (in the quality of nobles) have no part in the offices of state and government.

<Wherefore it is better and more truly said of Plutarch, That they are to bee called citizens that enjoy the rights and privileges of a city. Which is to be understood according to the condition and quality of every one; the nobles as nobles, the commoners as commoners; the women and children in like case, according unto the age, sex, condition, and deserts of every one of them. For should the members of mans body complain of their estate? Should the foot say to the eye, Why am not I set aloft in the highest place of the body? or is the foot therefore not to be accounted amongst the members of the body? >Now if Aristotle's definition of a citizen should take place, how many seditions, how many civil wars, what slaughters of citizens would arise even in the middest of cities? Truly the people of Rome, for no other cause departed from the Senators, than for that they enioyed not the same authoritie and privileges that the nobilitie did; neither could it otherwise be appeased than by the mean of the fable of the members of mans body, whereby the graue and wise Senator Agrippae reconciled the people unto the Senators. For Romulus the founder of the city of Rome, excluded the people from the great offices of command, from the offices of priesthood, and from the augureships; commanding the same to be bestowed upon such only as were descended from them whom he himself had chosen into the Senate, or else from them whom he had afterwards joined unto them. <And this new people having vanquished their neighbors, enforced many of them to abandon their own country and customs, to become inhabitants and citizens of Rome, as they did the Sabines. Afterwards having vanquished the Tusculans, the Volscians, and Herniques, they agreed together that the vanquished should haue part in their offices, and voices also in the assemblies of their estates, without any other chaunge either in their law or customes; who for that cause were not called citisens, but municipes (as who should say, Men made partakers of their immunities) yet indeed lesse esteemed and honoured than the Romans themselues, albeit that their estate were vnited vnto that of the Romans. As we see that Cateline descended of the auntient familie of the Sergians in Rome, and so a naturall Roman, by way of disgrace obiected to M. [ G] Tullius Cicero, That he was but a new vpstart of Arpinas. And that was the cause that many municipiall townes chose rather to vse the Roman lawes than their owne, to become true citisens of Rome, vntil the time of Tiberius the emperor, who vtterly took away the verie shadow of the popular libertie which Augustus the emperour had yet left; hauing remoued the popular assemblies from the people vnto the Senat: at which time the municipiall townes of Italie refused the priueledges of the citie of Rome, whereat the emperour Adrian maruelled (as saith Aul. Gellius) but without cause, for that they seeing the popular honours and offices to be all in one mans bestowing, they thought it now better to vse their owne lawes than others. >Thus we see two sorts of citizens differing in privileges, that is to wit, the Roman citisen, and the municipal or country citizen. Now the third sort were the Latins, who had at the beginning threescore towns, but were afterward augmented with twelve Latin Colonies, who after long wars made peace with the Romans upon condition, That they should live after their own manners and customs, and yet should be made citizens of Rome, whosoever of them should remove his dwelling into the city, having yet left behind him some lawfull issue at home in the country. <Yet when many of them fraudulently abused this agreement, & gaue their children vnto the citi∣sens of Rome in adoption, or vnder the colour of seruitude, to the intent that by them forthwith againe set at libertie, they might in a moment enioy the liberties and priue∣leges of the citie; order was taken by the law Claudia, confirmed by a decree of the Senat, and edict of the Consuls, That all the Latines which had so by craft obtained the freedome of the citie, should be constrained againe to returne into the Latine cities: which thing was done at the request of the Latine cities themselues >And so is that to be understood that Boetius writeth, The Romans sent into the Latin Colonies, to have lost the liberties of the city: as also that which Titus Liuius saith, The Roman Colo∣nies sent to Puteoli and Salerne by the decree of the Senate, to have been no more citizens: which is not further to be understood or extended, but to their right for giving of voices, by that means now taken from them. <So were they of Reims, of Langres, of Saintonges, of Bourges, of Meaux, and of Autun, free people of Fraunce, allies of the Romans, and citisens also, but without voice (as saith Tacitus) before that it was permitted unto them to haue states and honourable offices in Rome. And those of Au∣tun were the first that had the priueledge to bee Senators of Rome, and therefore called themselves Brethren vnto the Romans: howbeit that the Auuergnats tooke vnto them the same privilege & title, as descended from the Trojans (as saith Lucan.) >Now it is not to be doubted, but that that the Roman Colonies were true and natural citizens of Rome, drawn out of the Roman blood, using the same laws, magistrates, and customs; the true marks of a true citizen. But the further that these Colonies were distant from the citie of Rome, the lesse they felt of the glory and brightness of the sunne, and of the honours and offices which were diuided among the citisens and inhabitants of Rome: insomuch that the inhabitants of the Roman Colonies at Lyon, Vienne, and Narbone, thought themselues verie happie to haue gained but the priueledges of the Italians, who were of auntient time the allies and confederats of the Romans, enioying the honourable freedome of citisens, and yet without chaunging either of their owne lawes or customes, or loosing any point of their liberties. <And forasmuch as the Romans, holpen by the strength & power of their friends and allies, had subdued diuers other nations, and yet suffered not those their friends and compa∣nions* to be admitted to sue for the honours and honourable offices in the citie; there∣of rise the confederats warre in all Italie against the Romans, which neuer tooke end vntill that after much harme on both sides both done and receiued, the libertie of the [ B] citie of Rome was by the law Iulia graunted vnto * all Italians, some few onely excep∣ted. For the cities of Italie were called some Colonies, some Allies, some of them of the Latines, and some of the Italian iurisdiction, and all of them different. And that is it for which Titus Liuius saith, I am inde morem Romanis Colendi socios, ex quibus alios in*ciuitatem, at que aequum ius accepissent: alios in ea fortuna haberent, vt socij esse quam ci∣ues mallent. >Now since that time the manner of the Romans was to honour their fellows, of whome some they tooke into the citie, and into like freedome with themselves: othersome they had in that estate, as that they had rather to haue them their fellowes, than citisens with them. And hereof proceeded that speech of Tiberi∣us the emperour, in the Oration which he had in the Senat, which is yet seen engraven in brasse in Lyon. Quidergo? Num Italicus Senator prouinciali potior est? What then? Is an Italian Senator better than the prouinciall Senator? As if he would haue said them both to have been Senators alike. And yet the same emperour excluded the Frenchmen which had obtained the freedome of the citie of Rome, from suing for the honours or offices thereof. Whereby is better to be vnderstood that which Pli∣nie writeth, Spaine to haue in it 470 townes; that is to wit, 12 Colonies: 3 of citisens of Rome, 47 of them which had the freedome of the Latines: 4 of Allies, 6 of them that were enfranchised, and 260 tributaries.

<And albeit that the Latines were so straightly allied unto the Romans, as that they seemed to be verie citisens; yet neuerthelesse that they were not so, it is to be well gathered by that saying of Cicero: Nihil acerbius Lati∣nos [ D] ferre solitos esse, quam id, quod perrarò accidit, a Consulibus iuberi ex vrbe exire. viz. The Latines vsed to take nothing more heauily, than that which but verie seldome times happened, To be commaunded by the Consuls to void the citie: for as for other straungers we read, them to haue oftentimes bene driuen out of the citie. >In brief, such was the variety of privileges and prerogatives amongst them which were con∣tained within the Roman empire, besides their confederat and free people, as that al∣most no one thing was so proper vnto the Roman citisens in general, as that the ma∣gistrats and gouernours might not proceed in judgement against them in matters concerning* their life and libertie, without the peoples leaue. Which prerogatiue was by the tribunitiall law Iunia granted to all the citisens of Rome, after that the people had expulsed their kings, and was called, The holy Law, being oftentimes after reuiued and confirmed by the Valerian Consull laws, at diuers times made by the Consuls Publius, Marcus, and Lucius, of the honourable familie of the Valerians: and last of all by the Tribunitiall law Sempronia, and Portia, where to meet with the proceedings of the magistrats and gouernours, who encroached vpon the iurisdiction of the people, and proceeded oftentimes against the people, without yeelding thereunto, there was the penaltie of treason annexed vnto the law; for that those lawes were oftentimes bro∣ken by the magistrats. And at such time as Cicero was about to have commanded the Roman citisens priuie to the conspiracie of Cateline to be strangled in prison: Cae∣sar [ F] desiring to dissuade the matter in the Senat, said, Our auncestors imitating the ma∣ner of the Grecians, did punish and correct their citisens with stripes; and of men con∣demned tooke the extreamest punishment: but after that the Commonwealth was growne strong, the law Portia and other lawes were prouided, whereby for men con∣demned banishment was appointed. Which law Cicero hauing transgressed, was therefore not onely driuen into exile, but also proscribed, his goods confiscated, his house (esteemed to be worth fiftie thousand crownes) burnt, and a temple built in the plot thereof, which the people at the motion of Clodius their Tribune, commaunded to be consecrated to Libertie: wherewith the magistrats terrified, durst not but from that time forward with lesse seueritie proceed against the Roman citisens, yea euen after that the popular state was chaunged. And that is it for which Plinie the younger, Proconsull of Asia, writing to Traian the emperour, concerning the assemblies made by the Christians in the night, to the disquiet of his iurisdiction: I haue (saith he) many in prison, amongst whome there are certaine citisens of Rome, whom I haue put apart for to send them vnto Rome. <And S. Paul at such time as he was drawne into question, as a seditious person, and a troubler of the common quiet; so soone as he perceiued that Felix the gouernor would proceed to the triall of his cause, he required to bee sent vnto the emperour; saying, That he was a citisen of Rome, for that his father being of the tribe of Beniamin, and borne at Tharsis in Caramania, had obtained the right of a Roman citisen: Which so soone as the gouernour vnderstood, hee surceased to proceed any further in the matter; and sent him to Rome, saying, This man might have been set at liberty, if he had not appealed unto Caesar. Whereas otherwise if he had not been a citizen of Rome, the gouernour would haue proceeded in the matter, seeing the country of Palestine was before brought into the forme of a prouince. >As in like case Pontius Pilat, gouernour of the same countrey, was constrained to condemne Christ Jesus as a tributarie subiect of his prouince, whome for all that hee seemed to haue bene willing to haue deliuered out of the hands of his enemies, and from all punishment, if he could well in so doing haue auoided high treason, which the people threatned him with: Which the gouernour fearing, least he should seeme to haue any thing therein offended, sent the whole processe of the matter vnto Tiberius the emperour (as saith Tertullian.) For if the municipiall magistrats of the Jewes had had soue∣raigne power and iurisdiction, they would not haue sent him back againe vnto the gouernour, crying That he had deserved the death, but that they had not the power to proceed thereunto against him. For the municipiall magistrats of prouinces had not any iurisdiction, more than to commit the offendors into safe keeping, for feare of the present daunger, and to receiue cautions, or to give possession, and sometimes to appoint tutors vnto poore orphans: but in criminall causes, had no power or authori∣tie, neither over the citisen of Rome, neither ouer the straunger or provincial subiect, or ouer others that were enfranchised; but only ouer their flaues, whome they might at the vttermost but with stripes correct. <For as for the iurisdiction giuen to them that had the defence of townes, they were established by Valentinian three hundred and fif∣tie yeares after. Whereby it is to be gathered, all power and authoritie for the execu∣tion of iustice to haue bene giuen to the Roman gouernours, and their lieutenants in their prouinces, and taken from the rest. For they but deceiue vs, which thinke the Jewes priests, for the qualitie of their priesthood to haue made conscience to con∣demne to death our Sauiour Christ Iesus, as if by their religion they had bene hindred so to do; and hereupon haue concluded, That churchmen ought not to giue iudge∣ment that carried with it the execution of blood: which proceeded of the ignorance of fantiquitie: For it is euident that before the land of Palestine was brought into the forme of a prouince, it had but the Senat of the Iewes, consisting of 71 persons, composed in part of priests and Leuites, who had the power of condemning offendors to death, as the Chaldean interpretor plainly sheweth, and the Hebrew Pandects more plainely than he.

>Wherefore this was the greatest and chiefest priueledge proper to the citisens of* Rome, That they could not by the magistrats be punished either with death or exile, but that they might still from them appeale; which libertie all the citisens of Rome enioyed. The other Roman subiects which had not this priueledge, were not called citisens: yet thereof it followeth not, that to speake properly they were not indeed citi∣sens, and according to the true signification of a citisen: <for they must needes be citi∣sens, [ B] or straungers, allies, or enemies, seeing that they were not slaues; for so much as they were contained within the bounds of the Roman empire. But we cannot say that they were allies, for that onely free people which defended the maiestie of their estate, were called the fellowes or allies of the Romans: neither could it bee said that they were enemies or straungers, seeing that they were obedient subiects, and that more is, paid tribute vnto the Roman empire: wee must then conclude that they were citisens; for it were a verie absurd thing to say, That the naturall subiect in his owne countrey, and vnder the obeysance of his soueraigne prince, were a straunger. And that is it for which we haue said, That the citisen is a franke subiect, holding of the soueraigntie of another man. But the prerogatiues and priueledges that some haue more than others, maketh vs to call some of them citisens, and others tributaries. >And albeit that the citie, or rather the grant of the immuni∣ties of the citie seemed so to be communicated vnto all, yet were the priueledges of ci∣tisens diuers, some alwaies enioying more than others; as is to bee seene not onely in the Commentaries and answeres of the great lawyers, which flourished after Antoni∣nus*Pius, but also in the edicts of other princes. For Seuerus more than fiftie yeres af∣ter Antoninus was the first that gaue the priueledge to them of Alexandria, that they [ E] might be made Senators of Rome: but the other Aegyptians could not be made citi∣sens of Rome, except they had before obtained the freedome of the citie of Alexan∣dria. Which well sheweth, that the greatnesse of the priueledges make not the subiect therefore the more or lesse a citisen. <For there is no Commonwealth where the citi∣sen hath so great freedome, but that he is also subiect vnto some charge: as also the no∣bilitie, although with vs exempted from taxes and tallages, are yet bound to take vp armes for the defence of the Commonweale and others: and that vpon paine of their goods, their blood, and life. For otherwise if the largenesse of prerogatiues and priuileges should make a citisen, then verely straungers and allies were to bee called citisens, seeing that oftentimes greater and larger priueledges are giuen vnto strangers or allies, than to citisens themselues: >For why? the freedome of the citie is oftentimes for an honour giuen vnto straungers, who yet for all that are bound vnto no commaund or necessarie duties. As the Swissars gaue the freedome of their citie first to Lewes the ele∣uenth,* and so afterwards vnto the rest of the French kings. So Artaxerxes king of Persia, gaue the freedome of the citie vnto Pelopidas (and all his posteritie) entreating of alliance with him. So the Athenians made free of their citie Euagor as king of Cyprus, Dionysius the tyrant of Sicilie, and Antigonus and Demetrius kings of Asia. Yea that more is, the Athenians gaue vnto all them of the Rhodes the freedome of their citie: and the Rhodians with like courtesie vpon the agreement of the league, made all the [ G] Athenians citisens of their citie, as we read in Liuie: which league was called, The treatise of Comburgeosie. What manner of league that was made betwixt the Valesi∣ans, and the fiue little Cantons in the yeare 1528; and betwixt the Cantons of Berne and them of Friburg, in the yeare 1505; and againe betwixt them of Geneua & them of Berne in the yeare 1558: the force of which leagues was such, as that there should be a mutuall communication betwixt them both of their citie and amitie: and in case that any of the confederats forsaking his owne citie, had rather to goe vnto the citie of his fellowes and confederats, he should presently become a citisen and subiect of the other citie, without any new choyce or speciall letters of his naturalisation or enfran∣chising. <But the freedome of any citie giuen for honour sake vnto any, bindeth no [ H] man vnto the commaund thereof; but him which forsaketh the dwelling place of his natiuitie or citie, that so he may come into the power of another prince: For neither were those kings whom we haue spoken of; neither Hercules, or Alexander the Great, when they were made honourable citisens of the Corinthians, subiect or bound vnto their commaunds; in such sort as that the right of a free citisen was vnto them but as a title of honour. >Wherefore seeing it impossible for one and the same person to bee a citisen, a stranger, and an allie; it may well be said that the priueleges make not a citi∣sen, but the mutuall obligation of the soueraigne to the subiect, to whome for the faith and obeisance he receiueth, he oweth iustice, counsell, aid, and protection, which is not due vnto strangers. <But some may say, How can it then bee, that the allies of the Romans, and other people gouerning their estate, were citisens of Rome (as those of Marseilles and of Austun?) Or what is that which M. Tullius crieth out: O the notable lawes, and of our auncestors by diuine inspiration made and set downe, euen from the beginning of the Roman name, That none of vs can be the citisen of more than one citie: (for dissi∣militude of cities must also needs haue diuersities of lawes) nor that any citisen can against his will be thrust out, or against his will be detained in the citie. For these are the surest foundations of our libertie, Euery man to bee master both of keeping and of leauing of his right and libertie in the citie. And yet he the same man, before had said it to be a thing granted vnto all other people, that euerie man might be a citisen of many [ K] cities: with which errour (saith he) I my selfe haue seene many of our citisens, igno∣rant men, led; to haue at Athens bene in the number of the judges, and of the Areopa∣gi, in certaine tribe, and certaine number, when as they were yet ignorant whether they had obtained the libertie of that citie; and to haue lost this, except they had by the law made for the recouerie of things lost, againe recouered the same. Thus much hee. >But first to that which he writeth concerning the Athenians; that law of Solons was long before abolished, which admitted not a straunger to the freedome of a citisen of Athens, except he were banished out of his owne countrey: at which law Plutarch wondreth aboue measure; not foreseeing that to haue bene done of Solon, to the end (as it is like) That no man should enioy the immunitie and priueleges of a citisen of Athens, and that popular prerogatiue which the people had, except he were bound vn∣to the commaund and lawes of the Athenians. But he which is against his will detai∣ned vnder the commaund of a straunge citie, hath without doubt lost the right of his owne citie: which can in no wise be applied vnto those kings whome wee haue before spoken of, or yet to the Rhodians which had ordained the freedome of the Atheni∣ans.

<Wherefore this is it, as I suppose, that M. Tullius meant (for why, hee well agreeth not with himselfe) That he which was indeed a true citisen of Rome, that is to say, which was bound vnto the Senat and the lawes of the people of Rome, could not [ B] be bound vnto the commaund of another citie. As Pomponius Atticus borne in the citie of Rome, being a Roman citisen, and of the honourable order of the knights, who for his loue towards the Athenians, was thereof called Atticus (and vnto whome three of the Roman emperours referred the beginning of their discent) refused the freedome of the citie of Athens offered him by the Athenians; least (as saith Cornelius Nepos) he should haue lost the freedome of the citie of Rome: which is true in regard of the true subiects and citisens; but not in the citisens of honour, which are not indeed subiects: neither in respect of them which are citisens of diuers cities, vnder the power of one and the same prince, a thing lawfull vnto all euen by the Roman law. >For although one may be the slaue or vassall of many maisters or lords, yet can no man be the subiect of [ C] diuers soueraigne princes, but by the mutuall consent of the princes; because that these are vnder no mans commaund, as are they vnto whome seruice is by turne done by slaues, who may by the magistrats be enforced to sell their slaue, except the seruile la∣bours, which cannot at once be done to them all, be by turnes done by the slaue. And this is the point for which we oftentimes see warres betwixt neighbour princes, for the subiects of their frontiers, who not well knowing whome to obey, submit themselues sometimes to the one and sometimes to the other: and oftentimes exempting them∣selues from the obeisance of both two, are ordinarily inuaded and preyed vpon by both the one and the other. As the countrey of Walachie hauing exempted it self from the obeisance of the Polonians, hath become subiect vnto the Turks; and afterwards submitting it selfe vnto the kings of Polonia, paied tribute neuerthelesse vnto the Turke, as I haue learned by the letters of Stanislaus Rasdrazetoski sent to the c•…nstable of France, bearing date the 17 of August 1553. <Neuerthelesse there are many people vpon the frontiers, which haue set themselues at libertie, during the quarrels of princes, as it is come to passe in the low countrey of Leige, of Lorraine, & of Burgundie: where there are more than twelue subiects of the French king, or of the empire, or of Spaine, who haue taken vpon them the soueraigntie. Amongst whome Charles the fist reckoned the duke of Bouillon, whome he called his vassall: and for that he was his prisoner in the yeare 1556, at the treatie made for the deliuerance of prisoners, hee demaunded an hundred thousand pound for ransome; for that he called himselfe a soueraigne prince. [ E] But there are well also others beside the duke of Bouillon: & to go no further than the marchesse of Burgundie (which is called, The forbidden countrey) six princes haue so∣ueraigne power ouer their subiects, which the mutual wars betwixt the French and the Burgundians haue by long prescription of time brought forth. And in the borders of Lorraine, the counties of Lume & of Aspremont haue taken vpon them the right and authoritie of soueraigntie. >Which hath also happened vpon the borders of England and Scotland, where some particular men haue made themselues great commaunders within this twenty or thirty yeres, against the antient agreements. For, for to meet with such enterprises, the English and the Scots had of auntient time agreed, That the [ F] Batable ground, (that is to say a certaine part of the countrey so called, vpon the fron∣tiers of both realmes, being fiue miles long, and two miles broad) should neither be til∣led, built, or dwelt vpon; howbeit that it was lawfull for both people there to feed their cattell: with charge that if after the sunne setting, or before the sunne rising, any of their beasts were there found, they should be his that so found them: which was one of the articles agreed vpon by the states of Scotland, in the yere 1550, and sent to Hen∣rie the second the French king, as was by him prouided. <But where the soueraigne lords are good friends, as the Swissers of the countrey of Lugan, and the other territo∣ries which belong in common to all the lords of the league, whither they send their of∣ficers euerie Canton by turne: there the subiects are not reputed to bee the subiects of [ G] diuers soueraignes, but of one onely, which commaundeth in his order; in such sort as that one of them seeke not to encroach vpon the others. Whereof rise a sedition betweene the seuen Cantons Catholick, and the foure Protestants, in the yeare 1554, the Catholicks desiting to chastice the inhabitants of Lugan and Louerts, who had se∣perated them from the church Catholike: and the Protestants hindring them so to do, and were now vpon the point to haue taken vp armes the one against the other, if the Cantons of Glaris, and Appenzell, who allow of both religions, had not together with the ambassadour of the French king, interposed themselues, and so pacified the matter. >Now therefore the full and entire citisen or subiect of a soueraigne prince, can bee no more but a citisen of honour of another seignorie. For so when as we read that king [ H] Edward the first gaue the freedome of citisens vnto all the inhabitants of base Britaine; that is to be vnderstood for them to enioy the liberties, exemptions and freedoms, that they of the countrey enioyed. So say we also of the Bernois, and the inhabitants of Geneua, who call themselues by their treaties of alliance, Equall, and by their letters Combourgeses. For as for that which Cicero saith, That the citisens of Rome might* at their pleasure leaue their freedome of citisens, to become citisens of another citie: nothing was vnto them therein more lawfull, than that was in like case vnto all other people lawfull also: and that especiallie in a popular estate, where euerie citisen is in a manner partaker of the maiestie of the state, and doe not easily admit strangers vnto the freedome of citisens. As in Athens, where to make a straunger free of their citie, [ I] there must of necessitie 6000 citisens, by their voices in secret giuen consent therunto. But in such places and countries as wherein tyrants rule, or which for the barrennesse* of the soile, or intemperature of the ayre are forsaken by the inhabitants; not onely the citisens, but euen the strangers also are oftentimes by the princes of such places prohi∣bited to depart, as in Moscouia, Tartaria, and Aethiopia; and that so much the more, if they perceiue the stranger to be ingenious and of a good spirit, whome they detaine by good deserts, or els by force, if he would depart: in stead whereof hee must buy it deare, or right well deserue of the Commonweale, that shall get his freedome of a citi∣sen amongst the Venetians or Ragusians, or such other free states. <And although that by the Roman law euerie man might giue vp his freedome; and that in Spaine it is [ K] free for euery man to remoue elswhere, and to be enrolled into another citie, so that it be done by protestation to the prince: yet hath it and shall bee alwayes lawfull to all princes and cities, by the right of their maiestie and power to keepe their citisens at home. And therefore princes in making of their leagues, protest that they will not re∣ceiue any the subiects or vassals of their confederats into their protection, freedome, or priueleges, without their expresse consent.

>Which is conformable vnto the auntient clause of the Gaditane confederation reported by *Cicero: Ne quis faederatorum a po∣pulo Romano ciuis reciperetur, nisi is populus fundus factus esset; id est auctor. viz. That none of the confederats▪ should of the people of Rome be receiued for a citisen, except [ A] that people so confederat had bene the ground, (that is to say, the author thereof.) For therein lieth the state of that cause: for that Cornelius Balbus was a citisen of a confede∣rat citie, & therfore could not contrarie to the league, by Pompeius be made a citisen of Rome without the consent of the confederats. The same Cicero writeth also in the leagues of the French with the Romans to haue bene excepted, That none of them should of the Romans be receiued for a citisen. The same laws we yet at this present vse. For althogh that the Swissers are with vs ioined in a most strait bond of amity & frend∣ship: yet neuerthelesse is the same clause conceiued in that league, which was with them made in the yeare 1520. And againe at such time as the fiue lesser Cantons of the Swissers made a league of alliance and amitie amongst themselues, it was excepted [ B] that no citisens of the confederats should be receiued; or if they should desire the free∣dome of another citie, they should not otherwise obtaine it, except they would dwell* in the countrey, their land and goods remaining as before. And besides these leagues, there is no prince which hath not taken the like order. <So that oftentimes the subiect dare not so much as to depart out of the countrey without leaue, as in England, Scot∣land, Denmarke, and Sweden, the noble men dare not to goe out of their countrey without leaue of the prince, except they would therefore loose their goods: which is also obserued in the realme of Naples, by the custome of the countrey. As also it was forbidden by the emperour Augustus to all Senators to goe out of Italie without his leaue, which was alwaies right straitly looked vnto. And by the ordinances of Spaine [ C] it is forbidden the Spaniards to passe ouer into the West Indies, without the leaue of the king of Spaine: which was also of auntient time forbidden in Carthage, when Han∣no their great captaine had first discouered the islands of the Hesperides. And by the* decrees of Milan, it is not lawfull for any subiect to receiue the freedome of any other citie; or to enter into alliance or league with any other princes or Commonweales, without the expresse leaue of the Senat of Milan. And that more is, we see oftentimes that it is not permitted vnto the subiect, so much as to change his dwelling place, albeit that he depart not out of the seignorie and obeysance of his soueraigne prince: as in the dutchie of Milan, the subiect comming to dwell in the citie of Milan, or within a certaine circuit of Milan, must first haue leaue so to doe; and also pay vnto his prince [ D] three duckets. We also find that it was in auntient time forbidden the Bithynians (subiects vnto the Romans) to receiue any other subiects into their towne, or to giue vnto them the freedome of a citisen, as they oft times did, to decline the iurisdiction of others, or to ease them of paying of customes and tributes due: in which case the law commaundeth, That he which hath so chaunged his dwelling should beare the charges of both places; which was also decreed by the kings, Philip the faire, Iohn, Charles the fift, and Charles the seuenth. >And albeit that it be lawfull for euerie subiect to chaunge the place of his dwelling, yet is it lawfull for no man to forsake his natiue countrie; and much lesse for them [ F] * which are enrolled and tied to the soyle, whome we call Mort-maines, who of aunti∣ent time might not chaunge their dwelling place without speciall leaue. And so gene∣rally a man may say in tearmes of right, That the freedome of a citisen is not lost, nei∣ther the power of a prince ouer his subiect, for chaunging of the place or countrey; no more than the vassall can exempt himselfe from the faith and obedience hee oweth vnto his lord; or the lord without iust cause refuse to protect and defend his vassall, without the consent of one to the other, the bond betwixt them being mutuall & reci∣procall. But if the one or the other haue giuen their expresse or secret consent; or that the subiect forsaking his prince, hath yeelded himselfe vnto the protection of another prince, by the sufferance of the first, without contradiction, he is no more bound vnto the obeisance that he oweth him: neither can otherwise than as a stranger afterwards returne into the former citie. For princes oftentimes by large gifts or priueleges draw* into their countries ingenious straungers; whether it be so to weaken their neighbour princes, or for the better instruction of their owne people, or so to encrease their wealth and power, or els for their immortall fame and glorie which they hope to get in ma∣king the towns and cities by them built, more renowned with the multitude of citisens and plentie of all things. <These reasons show not onely the difference that is betwixt a citisen and him that is none, but also of citisens amongst themselues; and that if we follow the varietie of priueleges to iudge of the definition of a citisen, there shall bee fiue hundred thou∣sand of definitions of citisens, for the infinit diuersitie of the prerogatiues that citisens [ G] haue one against another, and also ouer straungers: seeing that it is oft times better in* the same citie to be a straunger, then a citisen, especially in such cities as are oppressed with the crueltie and insolencie of Tyrants. As in Florence many citisens requested Cosmus the new duke to be reputed and esteemed as straungers, by reason of the liber∣tie of straungers, and thraldome of the citisens, which they obtained not: and yet hee allured fiftie straungers to sue for the freedome of the citie, putting them in hope of the great offices and commaunds: whereby it was brought to passe, that from those fiftie citisens so made, he extorted fiftie thousand crownes, confirmed the authoritie of the new citisens gotten by deceit, and thereby brake the power of the conspirators against him. So in auntient time the Venetians empouerished and brought low by [ H] the warres against the Genowayes, and fearing the rebellion of many subiects, with a few of the great states, sold the right and priueledge of a gentleman of Venice vnto three hundred citisens, so to strengthen themselues with their goods, their force, and counsell, against the power of the people.

... >Now to make the matter short, it may be that of right among citisens, some be ex∣empted from all charges, taxes, and imposts, whereunto others are subiect: whereof wee haue infinit examples in our lawes. As also the societie is good and auailable,* where some of the associats haue part in the profit, and yet beare no part of the losse. And that is it for which we see the diuision of citisens or subiects into three estates, that is to say▪ the Spiritualtie, the Nobilitie, and Commonaltie, which is obserued al∣most in all Europe. And beside this so generall a diuision, there bee other more spe∣ciall [ A] in many Commonweales, as in Venice the gentlemen, the citisens, and the com∣mon people: in Florence before it was brought vnder one prince, they had the great ones, the common people, and the reseall menie. And our auntient Gauls had their Druides, their Chiual•…ie▪ and the vulgar people. In Aegypt the priests, the souldiers, and the a•…ans; as we read in Diodorus. Also the aun•…ent law giuer Hippodamus, diui∣ded the citisens into souldiors, handie crafts men, and labourers; & hath without cause bene blamed by Aristotle; as we read in the Fragments of his ordinances. And albe▪* it that Plato enforced himselfe to make all the citisens of his Commonwealth equall in all rights and prerogariues; yet so it is, that he diuided them into three states; that is to wit, into Gouernours, Souldiors, and Laborers: which is to show that there was neuer [ B] Commonweale, were it true, or but imaginarie, or the most popular that a man could thinke of; where the the citisens were equall in all rights and prerogatiues; but that al∣waies some of them haue had more or lesse than others.

>183 posts >still going

Another AI generated Grace

>>5294 >>5296 >flat design There's a reason you don't see flat design commiecats, and that is because commiecat is clearly superior to Grace.

Charles II w/ Cavalier K. Charles Spaniels Elizabeth II w/ Corgis Charles III w/ Jack Russell Terrier.

>>5297 The Alunya ones were also flat.

>>5300 Jumping Jehosophat. Whatd you get a child to draw those? Bloody hell mate.

>>5301 Those are AI generated. Like these.

>>5302 Oh I gotcha. I mostly make pics of David Koresh with that. Have you tried specifying a real artist? Tends ti improve results.

>>5302 This looks like it was drawn by a 10 year old or just a Trannitter artist.

>>5303 Someone else has been using the AI lately.

>>5305 Always fun to make art I suppose.

>>5300 Jesus Christ it's shit.

Rivers from their channels turned Other plains and meadows bless, And those tow'rs from whence they cease Ruined lie and unadorned; 'tis the prince's presence graces And his absence that defaces, Seats of monarchs naked look By the monarch once forsook, For majesty moves like the season's bright king, Appears and withdraws, restores and gives life Both to places and men. … If then we've found the want of his rays, Thank wicked contrivance And ambition as vain That sought t'have shortened our sovereign's days. But kings, like the sun, sometimes have their clouds To make them shine more bright, Their greatness exhales the vapour that shrouds And seeks to eclipse their light. But heaven has now dispelled those fears And here once again our monarch appears, The delight of our eyes To try if his subjects at length will grow wise. … Come then, change your notes, disloyal crowd, You that already have been too loud With importunate follies and clamours; tis no business of yours To dispute the high powers, As if you were the government framers; But with heart and with voice Join all to rejoice With welcomes redoubled to see him appear, Who brings mercy and peace And all things to please A people that knew not how happy they are.

Great Caesar's reign with conquest did begin, and with triumphant SHOUTS (3x) was ushered in.

Is Graceposter on the spectrum?

>>5320 You know the Qween said the corgis should not outlive her. They must be sent to the Fauci fly face eating chamber. >>5322 I should have known.